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 Abstract	
 
The stochastic discount factor model provides a general framework for pricing assets. A 
suitably specified discount factor encompasses most of the theories currently in use, 
including the CAPM, consumption CAPM, higher-moment CAPM and their conditional 
versions. In this thesis, we focus on the empirical admissibility of alternative SDFs 
under restrictions that ensure that investors’ risk-preferences are well behaved. More 
innovatively, we explore whether the SDF implied by the 3 and 4-moment CAPM is 
plausible under restrictions that are weaker than those considered by Dittmar (2002) yet 
sufficient to rule out implausible curvature of the representative investor’s utility 
functions. We find that, even under these weaker restrictions, the 3 and 4-moment 
CAPM cannot solve well known puzzles which plague the empirical performance of 
extant rational asset pricing models, even though the higher order terms do generate 
considerable additional explanatory power. Faced with this difficulty, we then explore 
whether the failure to fully account for cross-sectional differences in average returns can 
be explained by the presence of either transaction costs or a behavioural component of 
the SDF, reflecting investors’ systematic mistakes in processing information. We find 
evidence of both problems, though our analysis is not conclusive in this respect. Finally, 
in a more applied exercise, we apply the SDF-framework to test whether Chinese fund 
managers generate superior investment performance, and find that Chinese fund 
managers have not achieved better performance than the individual investors under 
either the unconditional or the conditional measure.  
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1. Introduction	and	Overview	
1.1. Introduction	
Starting with the establishment of portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), financial 
researchers have devoted considerable efforts to the investigation of the trade-off 
between return and risk for traded assets. A legitimate pricing model is equivalent to a 
pricing function that projects uncertain future payoffs into present prices that are 
conditionally determined in the observable information set. Cochrane (2001) partitions 
asset pricing into two folds: absolute asset pricing and relative asset pricing. Absolute 
pricing involves pricing each asset with respect to its exposure to fundamental sources 
of macroeconomic risk. For example, the fundamental sources can be GDP, oil price, 
industry production, and consumption. Relative asset pricing is less ambitious. It aims 
to price an asset with reference to the prices of other assets. The CAPM (i.e. the “beta” 
model) and the Black-Scholes option pricing theory, respectively, are two classical 
examples. No matter which approaches we want to use, however, a generalized 
framework, namely the pricing model representation based on the stochastic discount 
factor (henceforth SDF) or pricing kernel, can be applied. 
 
For example, consider the paradigm proposed by Arrow-Debreu for the study of 
equilibrium in financial markets. In this setup, as a fundamental mechanism to study 
investor's wealth allocation between consumption and investment across time and states 
of nature, asset pricing models focus on the relation between future payoffs and current 
prices. In a complete market, for each state of nature at each time date, there exists a 
state price. And for each traded asset, the sum of all its possible future payoffs weighted 
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by the relevant state prices equals the current price of this asset. This approach can be 
renormalized in the framework of the SDF pricing model. As pointed out by, among 
others, Cochrane (2001) and Smith and Wickens (2002), most asset pricing models can 
be treated as particular versions of the SDF model. These models include the original 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) introduced by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Black (1972), the European option pricing model developed by Black and Scholes 
(1973), and the general equilibrium consumption-based inter-temporal capital asset 
pricing model of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) and Lucas (1978). Precisely, if the 
SDF is linearly related to the market portfolio, then stock returns can be described by 
the static single-factor CAPM; If one constructs a SDF which prices an asset 
continuously, then it also can be applied to price the related option (Cochrane, 2001); If 
the economy has a representative agent with a well-defined utility function, then the 
SDF is related to the growth of marginal utility of aggregate consumption and stock 
returns can be explained under the consumption-based CAPM. Furthermore, most 
models proposed by the recently emerged behavioural asset pricing literature, notably 
the behavioural asset pricing theorem (Shefrin, 2010), also can be formalized in terms 
of this framework. 
 
As pointed by Campbell (2000), the challenge for researchers is to understand the 
economic forces that determine the SDF, or the reward for investors’ bearing particular 
risks. Although we have made progress in this field in the past 30 years, our 
understanding is still far from perfect. A number of anomalies persist in asset pricing 
(Lewellen & Nagel, 2006). For example we do not yet fully understand why, for many 
years, small stocks have outperformed large stocks (the “size effect”, see, (Fama & 
French, 1992)), why firms with high book-to-market (B/M) ratios outperform those with 
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low B/M ratios (the “value premium”, see, (Fama & French, 1992), and (Loughran & 
Ritter, 1997)), why stocks with high returns in the previous years outperform those with 
low prior returns (‘‘momentum phenomenon’’, see, (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), and 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1999)), why the link between consumption growth and the equity 
premium or interest rates is so weak (“equity premium puzzle”, see, (Mehra & Prescott, 
1985), and (Campbell & Cochrane, 2000); and “risk-free rate puzzle”, see, (Weil, 
1989)).  
 
Any measurable random variable can be described by its moments. For example, the 
mean of a random variable is its first moment, variance is its second moment centred 
around the mean, skewness is a centred third moment and kurtosis is a centred fourth 
moment. In this thesis, I make large use of the notion of moments in discussing and 
characterizing the multivariate distribution of equity returns. I study mainly first, second, 
third and fourth moments. I pay special attention to their interaction, as emphasized by 
modern asset pricing theory, and I discuss the portfolio, investment and risk 
management implications of alternative models equilibrium first moment, i.e. 
equilibrium mean returns.  
 
In the next section, I define and contrast unconditional and conditional moments from 
the viewpoint of the task represented by the modelling of the multivariate and 
multi-period distribution of asset returns. In 1.3, I outline the old and new paradigms of 
asset returns. In Section 1.4, I specify the main research questions. In Section 1.5, I 
explain the motivations of this study. In Section 1.6, I outline the structure of this thesis. 
In Section 1.7, I provide an overview of the main theoretical results and empirical 
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findings of this thesis and I highlight their contribution to the extant financial and 
econometric literature. Section 1.8 concludes. 
 
1.2. Conditional	vs.	Unconditional	Moments	
Time series of asset returns can be seen as realizations y1, y2, ..... yt of a multivariate 
random variable y drawn from a joint probability distribution p(y1, y2, ..... yt). Similarly, 
for practical modelling purposes, future returns can be seen as realizations yt+1 of a 
random variable drawn from the conditional probability distribution p(yt+1|y1, y2, ..... yt). 
Loosely speaking, stationary series have time invariant moments. Strictly stationary 
series are realizations of random variables drawn from a time invariant probability 
distribution and, therefore, all their moments are time invariant. Covariance stationary, 
also known as wide sense or weakly stationary, series have finite and time invariant 
first, second and cross-second moments (e.g., respectively, the mean, variance and 
autocovariances/autocorrelations). Thus, strictly stationary series with finite first and 
second moments are also covariance stationary but not vice versa. Since independence 
of two random variables refers to the possibility of writing their joint density function as 
the product of their marginal densities, serial independence requires that all the 
cross-moments between any polynomial of current and past realizations be zero. It 
therefore requires independence between all the moments. Formally, for any random 
process, and hence also for any return yt, serial independence (i.e. independence 
between yt and yt-i) means that E[g(yt)h(yt-i)] = E[g(yt)]E[h(yt-i)] for any integer i, 
implying that   0)(),(  itt yhygCov  for any measurable function g and h and, 
therefore, for any cross-moment of yt and yt-i. Autocorrelation is one possible source of 
serial dependence in returns. It implies linear dependence of the mean of the process on 
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past realizations, and it therefore corresponds to dependence in the first moment. More 
general forms of serial dependence introduce linear relations between different 
moments. These might appear as non-linearities in the dependence in first moments. 
 
One way to summarize serial dependence and co-dependence between moments is to let 
the corresponding polynomials of returns g(yt) be determined by data generating 
processes similar to those commonly used for returns, e.g. auto-regressive moving 
averages (ARMA). Serial dependence between moments can then be modelled as 
dependence between polynomials of current returns and past return realizations. For 
example, with tt yyg )( , the expectation of yt conditional on its past history 
)(1 ttyt yE  , i.e. the first conditional centred moment of yt, can be defined as a 
function of yt-i (i > 0). Using a simple autoregressive specification, we might let 
ttt ybgayg   )()( 1  or ttt ybgay   )( 1 , where a and b are constants and 
ttt y    is a conditionally zero-mean return innovation. In this specification, the 
first moment is a function of the past realization of the process, i.e. 
11 )(   tttyt byayE . Similarly, with 2)( ttyg  , the conditional expectation 
2
1
22
1
2 )()()(   ttttttyt byayyE   is the conditional variance of the return 
process and it depends upon the past history of the latter.  
 
Specifications like these introduce the distinction between conditional and 
unconditional moments and allow the former to be time-varying. In Finance, this 
distinction is important unless we assume that assets are held for a long period of time. 
In this case the relevant conditioning information set is far in the past and its influence 
on conditional expectations is negligible, e.g. for (stationary) series for which E[g(yt)] 
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exists, limk→+∞  Et-k[g(yt)] = E[g(yt)]. The distinction between conditional and 
unconditional variance was emphasized by Engle (1982). 
 
If a process is covariance stationary, its unconditional moments exist and they are the 
mean of the conditional moments over all the possible realizations of the process itself, 
i.e.  
 
 
       
  
1 ( ) 1 1, 2, ... ( ) ,
( ) 1, 2, ...
t t t k t
t k t
E E g y t E E g y k
E E g y k
 

      
  
.	 (1‐1)	
 
Thus, if a process is co-variance stationary, its unconditional variance exists and is the 
expectation of the time-t conditional variance conditional upon all the possible 
realizations, i.e. letting 2)( ttyg  , the unconditional variance of ty  is  
 
  2 2 1, 2, ....y t k tE E k    . 	 (1‐2)	
 
As pointed out by Loretan and Phillips (1994), the existence of unconditional moments 
critically depends on the shape of the density in the tails, i.e. if the density function does 
not decline rapidly enough as we move away from the centre of the distribution some of 
the moments might not exist. For example, returns with finite conditional variance 
might display infinite unconditional variance. The density in the tails of a distribution, 
i.e. its “thickness” and the related height of the peak towards the central part of the 
distribution (leptokurtosis), is captured by the fourth moment, the kurtosis.  
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1.3. Old	and	New	Paradigm	
The last few decades have witnessed a radical transformation in the way financial 
theory and financial econometrics researchers model asset returns. In the old paradigm, 
returns were thought to be independently drawn from an underlying joint distribution 
with time-invariant moments and all the moments were supposed to exist. In other 
words, returns were assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
(henceforth, i.i.d.). This view was particularly common in the fifties and sixties and it is 
summarized by the random walk representation (see Malkiel (1999) for a discussion) of 
the asset price process with constant drift and white noise error1. In the random walk 
model of asset prices, returns have finite moments of any order and conditional and 
unconditional moments are the same. Normality of the error term, moreover, implies 
that the entire multivariate distribution of asset returns can be described by its first and 
second moments. This, in turn, implies that rational investors should only be concerned 
about the mean and variance of their portfolios, leaving no room for any role of higher 
moments in the portfolio optimization problem, as in Markowitz (1952) 
mean-variance-portfolio theory. In such a setting, broadly corresponding to the static 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), only the 
first two moments of the multivariate return distribution have asset pricing implications.  
 
This paradigm came under intense scrutiny, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Four 
main issues about the distribution of asset returns drew the attention of the empirical 
                                                 
 
1 Formally: 
P
dP
 = μdt + εσ dt  with μ = 


P
dPE , σ2 =
2


  
P
dPE , P is the price, ε i.i.d and E(ε) =0. 
Here E() represents both the unconditional and conditional expectation operator. 
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financial literature, namely whether financial series are independently distributed, 
whether they are identically distributed over time, whether all the moments of the asset 
returns distribution exist and whether returns are normally distributed. A large body of 
evidence, as summarized in Pagan (1996), has since then made clear that, while high 
frequency returns are virtually serially uncorrelated and lower frequency returns are 
generally little auto-correlated, there is considerable serial dependence in higher 
moments. For example, there is overwhelming evidence of conditional 
heteroskedasticity and time variation in second moments. Furthermore, evidence on 
return predictability suggests that first moments are time-varying. For example, while 
monthly returns are generally found to be largely unpredictable2, there is evidence that 
annual returns are somewhat predictable and returns at five-year horizons are very 
predictable (Fama and French (1989) and Cochrane (1999b)) using forecasting variables 
such as the dividend yield, the price earning ratio and other functions of stock prices 
normalized by an appropriate divisor to make them stationary. This suggests that the 
mean of the return process is time varying and driven by a slow moving state variable.  
 
Subsequent studies in the empirical finance literature have reported evidence of two 
types of asymmetries in the distribution of stock returns. The first is skewness, i.e. 
)( 3 1, titE  , or asymmetry in the distribution of individual stock returns, which has been 
reported and studied by numerous authors over the last three decades. See, among 
others, Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) and Singleton and Wingender (1986). The 
second type of asymmetry is in the joint distribution of stock returns. One possible 
                                                 
 
2 Monthly and higher frequency stock returns typically have slight, statistically significant predictability with 
coefficient of determination R2 of about 1 percent. 
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source of such an asymmetry is coskewness, i.e. )( 2 1,1,  tititE  , where 1, ti  and 1, tj   
are two zero-mean return innovations. Evidence that stock returns exhibit some form of 
asymmetric co-dependence has been reported by several authors in recent years, see for 
example Erb et al. (1994), Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Bekaert (1999, 2002), 
Ang and Chen (2002), Campbell et al. (2002) , and Bae et al. (2003). The presence of 
either of these asymmetries violates the assumption of normally distributed portfolio 
returns, which underlies traditional mean-variance analysis (see Ingersoll (1987)).  
 
Pagan (1996), Campbell et al. (1997) and Cochrane (1999b), among many others, 
provide a summary of the main stylized empirical features of the multivariate 
distribution of asset returns, such as serial dependence, time variation in first, second 
and higher moments and non-normality. As these features have become common 
characteristics of models of asset returns, the old paradigm has been gradually 
abandoned in favour of a richer one. In this new paradigm, the multivariate distribution 
of asset returns cannot be described simply by its first and second moments and 
conditional and unconditional moments are not in general the same.  
 
1.4. The	Fundamental	Research	Questions	
The research questions that I address in this thesis are both theoretical and empirical in 
nature. They all concern the asset pricing problem, i.e. the description and explanation 
of observed mean returns, including the fundamental questions concerning the 
relationship between the representative investor’s risk preference and the distribution of 
asset returns. The key question, however, is whether investors are rewarded not only for 
holding portfolios that perform poorly when aggregate returns are low, as in Sharpe 
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(1964) and Lintner (1965) CAPM, but also for holding portfolios that perform poorly 
when volatility is high or even for holding portfolios that perform poorly when 
skewness is low. One way of reformulating this question is to ask whether asset 
coskewness and cokurtosis, in addition to the covariance with the market portfolio, 
explains the cross-section of average asset returns. In the empirical investigation of this 
issue, I focus on the explanatory power of coskewness and cokurtosis for the 
cross-section of average returns on a particular set of benchmark assets, i.e. the 
portfolios formed sorting by industry the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks included 
in the database of the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) of the University 
of Chicago. A further research question related to the asset pricing problem is whether 
investors’ sentiment and market frictions play important roles.  
 
1.5. Motivations	
The investigation of the asset pricing problem is motivated by its profound implications 
for capital budgeting, portfolio selection and portfolio management. There is ongoing 
debate on the ability of the CAPM to explain the cross-section of average asset returns. 
In particular, there is puzzling evidence on the limited ability of theoretically motivated 
risk factors to drive out the explanatory power of firm characteristics such as size and 
book-to-market ratio, see Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995), momentum, see 
Jagadeesh and Titman (1993), coskewness (i.e. systematic skewness), see Harvey and 
Siddique (2000), cokurtosis, see Dittmar (2002), and industry, see Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) and Dittmar (2002). The evidence on the asymmetry of the multivariate 
distribution of asset returns suggests that, if investors’ preferences are not restricted to 
be defined only over the first two moments, expected returns might depend on higher 
 15
order odd moments. This possibility motivates the study of the explanatory power of 
asset coskewness and cokurtosis in the cross-section of excess returns, as in Harvey and 
Siddique (2000), Dittmar (2002), Post et al. (2008) and Potì and Wang (2010). I focus 
on the cross-section of portfolios3 formed sorting stocks according to the industry in 
which the issuing firm operates because this characteristic has been used less frequently 
in the extant empirical literature as a sorting criterion and it is known, see Dittmar 
(2002), for producing a very dispersed (and therefore challenging) cross-section of 
average returns.  
 
As stressed by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), empirical studies in finance must rely on 
non-experimental data. As a consequence, there is a concern that established statistical 
and econometric methods may suffer from biases. Since empirical research is often 
motivated by the successes or failures of past investigations, there is a danger of 
data-snooping, e.g. Ferson and Harvey (1999). Following a similar line of argument, 
Lewellen et al. (2010) suggest that asset pricing models should not be judged by their 
success in explaining average returns on portfolios for which a few popular factors are 
known to explain most of the time-series and cross-sectional variation. For example, 
nearly 92 percent time variation of portfolio constructed on the basis of size and 
Book-to-Market ratio can be explained by the three-factor model that includes market 
return, SMB and HML as factors (Fama & French, 1992). Then tests of whether pricing 
models capture cross-sectional variation of asset returns on the size-B/M portfolios is 
more or less equivalent to searching for factors which are highly correlated with the 
SMB and HML factors. This critique is similar in spirit to the point made by Farnsworth 
                                                 
 
3 I thank K. French for making this data publicly available for download. 
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et al. (2002b), and was also raised in the seminal paper by Roll (1977). Since the strong 
factor structure involved in size-B/M portfolios is less of a theory than an empirical 
observation, one way of making pricing model tests more convincing is to expand the 
set of test portfolios beyond the size-B/M sorting (Ferson & Siegel, 2009). Hence, in 
order to minimize data snooping bias, I use portfolios of CRSP stocks sorted by 
industry, alongside portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market, and experiment with a 
dataset of Chinese mutual funds.  
 
1.6. Structure	of	the	Thesis	
The first part of this thesis is devoted to the discussion of the extant literature on asset 
pricing. The second part presents original, largely empirical results on asset pricing and 
on fund evaluation. In particular, my novel contributions appear in Chapters 3 to 6 and 
in Chapter 7 I discuss their implications for asset pricing.  
 
I first discuss, in Chapter 2, the modern view of the multivariate distribution of asset 
returns within the conceptual framework of modern asset pricing theory. Chapter 3 
focuses on the cross-sectional dimension of the asset pricing problem and, in particular, 
on whether coskewness helps explain the cross-section of average returns and raised the 
so called ‘coskewness puzzle’. This Chapter is based on an article, i.e. Potì and Wang 
(2010), recently published in the Journal of Banking and Finance. In chapter 4, we show 
that augmenting the (C)CAPM with sentiment, and thus allowing for systematic 
investor error in forming beliefs about the distribution of returns, permits to largely 
reconcile investors’ optimizing behaviour with the cross-section of average returns. In 
Chapter 5, we comparas e several competing pricing kernels using a modified version of 
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Hansen-Jagannathan distance (Hansen & Jagannathan, 1997), which not only accounts 
for the conditional information but also recognizes the existence of transaction costs. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the study of the open-end fund performance in the Chinese 
market. Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings, provides a discussion of their 
implications, outlines directions for future research and draws together the conclusions.  
 
1.7. Main	Findings	and	Contributions	
My thesis contributes to depict a representation of the multivariate distribution of stock 
returns where the relations between moments and their conditional dynamics are 
important in explaining their cross-sectional differences. More innovatively, we explore 
whether the SDF implied by the 3 and 4-moment CAPM is plausible under restrictions 
that are weaker than those considered by Dittmar (2002) yet sufficient to rule out 
implausible curvature of the representative investor’s utility functions. We find that, 
even under these weaker restrictions, the 3 and 4-moment CAPM cannot solve well 
known puzzles which plague the empirical performance of extant rational asset pricing 
models, even though the higher order terms do generate considerable additional 
explanatory power. In chapter 3, our findings confirm that the quadratic and cubic 
market factors help explain observed stock returns. They play an important role in the 
pricing of certain payoffs, including strategies characterized by relatively high SRs, 
such as those spanned by a fine industry-level diversification, most notably until the late 
90s, or by dynamic portfolios managed on the basis of available conditioning 
information, as well as momentum portfolios. They do so, however, by generating high 
levels of SDF volatility. To rationalize this evidence within a higher moment CAPM 
framework, we would need to postulate implausibly high levels of investors’ risk 
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aversion. We conclude, therefore, that the 3M and 4M-CAPM provide at best a partial 
explanation of the differences in average returns on stocks and stock strategies. This 
gives rise to a coskewness (and cokurtosis) puzzle. The solution of the latter requires an 
explanation, different from the 3M and 4M-CAPM, for why the quadratic and cubic 
market factors are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. 
 
Faced with this difficulty, we then explore whether the failure to fully account for 
cross-sectional differences in average returns can be explained by the presence of either 
transaction costs or a behavioural component of the SDF, reflecting investors’ 
systematic mistakes in processing information. In chapter 4, we show that augmenting 
the (C)CAPM with sentiment, and thus allowing for systematic investor error in 
forming beliefs about the distribution of returns, permits to largely reconcile investors’ 
optimizing behaviour with the cross-section of average returns. In fact, The 
Sentiment-(C)CAPM and Sentiment-3M(C)CAPM are empirically more successful, and 
most of the increase in the explanatory power is due to the inclusion of sentiment. This 
implies that investors must either commit systematic errors, at least ex-post, in assessing 
the joint distribution of stock returns and aggregate consumption or they must behave in 
a way that, at the aggregate level, is inconsistent with expected utility maximization and 
with standard risk aversion assumptions. 
 
In chapter 5, we compare several competing pricing kernels using a modified version of 
Hansen-Jagannathan distance (Hansen & Jagannathan, 1997), which not only accounts 
for the conditional information but also recognizes the existence of transaction costs. 
We follow the approach done by He and Modest (1995) and Luttmer (1996), shows how 
the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds can be derived for economies with the kinked 
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budget constraints that arise from proportional transaction costs. Since these bounds do 
not depend on a particular model for the stochastic discount factor, but only on the form 
of the budget constraint, this analysis provides a robust way to quantify the extent to 
which market frictions affect inferences about important features of asset pricing 
models. In fact, we find that, if the market is frictionless (i.e. if we assume no 
transaction costs), the volatility of the admissible nonparametric pricing kernels is so 
high that even the models with nonlinearity terms cannot match it whereas a number of 
the estimated pricing kernels can do so when transaction costs are assumed to be 0.8 
percent per each one-way trade. 
 
In the final part, we follow apply the SDF approach, as in Chen and Knez (1996), to 
analyse the open-end fund performance in the Chinese market. In a similar spirit as 
Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999), we test whether Chinese open-end fund managers 
process information more professionally than individual investors do, so as to generate 
significant abnormal returns, and also try to observe whether their performance can be 
replicated by employing mechanic and easily replicable strategies that make use of 
publicly available information. The results of our analysis show the performance of 
such fund managers in an unfavourable light. The fund managers of the selected 
open-end funds in fact generate no superior performance. Even the naive buy-and-hold 
trading strategy is able to replicate their performance easily. Then the question that 
really needs to be answered, but that we leave for future research, is how the 
phenomenon of the poor fund performance can coexist with the rapid expansion of the 
open-fund industry in the Chinese market. 
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1.8. Conclusions	
In this Chapter, I first introduced some preliminary material on the distinction between 
conditional and unconditional moments and how it arises in the transition from the old 
to the new paradigm of asset returns. I then specified the fundamental research 
questions of this thesis and discussed the motivations that drive their investigation. In 
particular, I discussed the connection between the research questions and unresolved 
issues in asset pricing and second moment modelling. Finally, I outlined the structure of 
the thesis and I summarized the main findings and their contribution to the extant 
literature.   
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2. Literature	Review:	Asset	Pricing	
2.1. Introduction	
In this chapter, I review the literature on the distribution of asset returns and on the 
closely related topic of asset pricing. Rather than attempting to list all the countless 
contributions, my aim is to show how the discovery of moment dynamics and their role 
in asset pricing unfolded over the transition from the old view of asset returns, based on 
the random walk model and on the identity between conditional and unconditional 
moments, to the new paradigm that allows for time-varying conditional moments and 
returns predictability. I first show, however, how all asset pricing models can be derived 
as specializations of a common analytical framework, the general SDF model with 
possibly time-varying risk premia and returns predictability. I then discuss at more 
length select specifications. In particular, I focus on specifications that allow for 
systematic skewness and kurtosis to play a role in asset pricing.  
 
The Chapter is organized in eight main sections. The next two sections introduce the 
SDF approach to asset pricing and the risk-neutral density. In Section 2.4, I provide a 
brief account of no-arbitrage moment restrictions on the SDF. In Section 2.5, I discuss 
the relationship between the SDF and popular linear pricing models. Section 2.6-2.8 
review the developments in the theory of efficient markets and rational asset pricing, 
and the literature focusing on coskewness and higher-moments as priced risk exposures. 
Section 2.9 discusses the alternative behavioural approach to asset pricing and Section 
2.10 illustrates the dichotomy between absolute and relative pricing. Section 2.11 
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discusses the importance of transaction costs. The last section summarizes the chapter 
and draws together the conclusions. 
 
2.2. Pricing	the	Contingent	Claims	through	SDF	
Under the assumption of no-arbitrage (henceforth NA), an asset with payoffs that 
always dominate the payoffs of another asset in every state of world must have a greater 
price. The absence of arbitrage opportunities implies the Law of One Price (here forth 
LOP), i.e. two assets that have exactly identical payoffs across every state of nature 
must be priced identically at every point in time. This assumption is more restrictive 
compared with the LOP. The violation of this relation creates a riskless opportunity for 
making unlimited profit.  
 
Pliska (1997) provides a systematic analysis of NA in a one-period complete market 
setting. The initial state of the system is at time t, and the terminal time is 1t  . 
Trading and consumption can be done only at these times. 1 2{ , , ..., }d     denotes 
the possible states of the world4. A probability measure is defined on   with 
( ) 0 P   for all   . Since P  is a probability measure then we have 
( ) 1P   . This complete probability space can be denoted as ( , , )tF P , where 
tF  is the sigma-filtration, with 1 2t tF F  when 1 2t t . Therefore, the filtration tF  
represents the information available up to and including time t. The risk-less asset is 
modelled as a bank account process, denoted by 1{ , },t tB B B  where 1,tB  and 
                                                 
 
4 Here, d  could be infinite in a Hillbert Space. 
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1 1(1 )t t tB B r    for every state of the world   at time t , earning the risk-free 
interest rate 1tr  . In the market there are N  risky securities, 1 2, , ..., NS S S . For each 
security, the price in a particular state of world   at time 1t   will be denoted 
1( )
i
tS  . An investor’s portfolio will be made of the bond tB  and several risky 
securities itS . A linear pricing measure is a non-negative vector 
1 2( ( ), ( ), ..., ( ))d       5  such that for every trading strategy 
1 2( , ,..., )Nt t t tH H H H=  , where the elements of tH  denote the value initially invested 
in each particular asset, generates a value process 01 1 1
1
( ) ( )
N
i i
t t t t t
i
V H B H S   

  with 
the current value 1 1( ) ( )t t tV V B

   

  . If we let *1 1 1( ) ( )t t tV V B    , then we 
have, 
 * 11
1
( )( ) ( ) ( ) tt t
t
VV V
B 
     
  
   .  (2-1) 
 
Notice that, if in Equation (2-1) we consider the strategy that invests only in the bank 
account and nothing in the risky assets, we get 
 
 
0
* 01
1
1
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t tt t t
t
H BV V H
B  
      
  
     ,  (2-2) 
 
                                                 
 
5 This is an implication of Riesz’s Representation Therom. Denote by H  a Hilbert space, and let *H be its dual 
space, then for any linear function *: ,H Hj j " Î , we have ( ) ,x y xj =< > , where ,x y HÎ  
and ,< > denotes the inner product on the linear space H . The assumption of the existence of the linear function 
: Hj   in fact requires the holding of the law of one price, i.e. 1 2 1 2( ) ( ),   x x if x xj j= = . But 
1 2 1 2( ) 0x x x xj - =  =  is not necessary. 
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but 0 ,t tV H which implies ( ) 1

 

 , and therefore   can be treated as a 
probability measure. Moreover, if in (2-1) we consider the strategy that invests in just 
one particular asset nS (thus 0 for all jH j n  ), then  
 
 ,1 1
1
( )( ) ( ) ( ),  for all 1,...,n n nt t t
t
S S S n N
B 
     
  
    .  (2-3) 
 
Equation (2-3) says that the initial price of the asset equals the expected value of its 
discounted future price, under the linear pricing measure  . It can be proved that, if 
the no-arbitrage opportunity condition holds, the linear pricing measure   for each 
state of world is positive. Moreover, the linear pricing measure   is unique if the 
market is complete, i.e. if any contingent claim is attainable. Equation (2-3) can be 
rewritten as follows, 
 
 
,
1 1
1 1
1 |
1 |
( ) ( )( ) [ ( ) | ],  
( )*
( ) ( ) ( )   for all 1,..., .
( ) t
t
n n n
t t t t
t t
n
t F
t F
S S E S F
B P B
S f d n N
B f
 


    
    

 
   


 
 


 
  (2-4) 
 
where | ( )tFf    is the conditional probability density function, under the information 
set tF , for each state of world  . In fact, both 1
1
( )[ ( ) | ]
( )*
n
t t
t
E S F
P B
      and 
1 |
1 |
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) t
t
n
t F
t F
S f d
B f 
       make the same statement, the former in discrete time 
and the latter under the continuous time measure. If, following Cochrane (2001), we 
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scale the contingent claims prices by the inverse probability of each state, the resulting 
expression provides the SDF specification so widely used in finance. That is, 
1
( )
( | )*t tP F B
 
   or, equivalently, 1 |
( )
( )
tt F
B f
 
  can be seen as the value taken by the 
SDF or pricing kernel, 1tm  , in state of the world   and equation (2-4) is simply 
written as 
 
 1 1[ ( ) | ],   for all 1,..., .
n n
t t t tS E m S F n N    	 (2‐5)	
 
Equivalently but more conveniently,  
 
 1 1[ | ] 1,t t tE m R F    	 (2‐6)	
 
where 1tR   is the gross return for any asset 
nS  in market at time 1t  , and tF  
denotes the information set available to investors at t. Of course, condition (2-6) also 
can be represented using vector notation,  
 
 11 1[ | ] .
N
t t tE m R F        	 (2‐7)	
 
Here, 1tR   is the vector of asset returns, and 
1N   is the 1N   vector of units. Asset 
prices then equal the expectation of the product between the SDF and the payoffs. As 
explained by Campbell (2000), linear factor pricing models are associated with SDF 
specifications linear in a set of linear factors. For example, the well-known classical 
consumption-based pricing model is associated with a SDF structure specified as the 
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inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative-agent investor, which 
is linear in the consumption growth of such agent. 
 
2.3. Risk‐neutral	pricing	density	
1 1( )t i tB   is the state-contingent price ( )t ip  , which represent the current price of a 
security that secures one dollar once a certain state ( i ) occurs at a future date 1t  , and 
nothing otherwise. As discussed in section 2.2 of this chapter, the relation among 
state-price contingent prices ( )t ip  , the risk-neutral pricing density ( )i  , and the 
pricing kernel 1 ( )t im   is, 
 
 1 1
1
( )( ) ( ) ( )it i t i t i
t
p m f
B
    

  ,  	 (2‐8)	
	
here, 1 ( )t if   is the physical probability density at time 1t  . If the non-constant 
information set tF  at time t is available, then 1 ( )t if   is the conditional density, 
otherwise the unconditional density is used instead in empirical test. The sum of such 
state-contingent prices across all states at 1t   has to equal the current price of a 
risk-free bond that pays off one unit at maturity 1t   for sure, i.e.  
 
 1 1
1
( )( ) [ 1] [ | ] 1
i i
i
t i i i t t t
tw w
p d d E m F B
B
     
 
     .  	 (2‐9)	
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Since 1tB   is observable at t  and can be replaced by risk-free rate ,f t
re , the 
availability of either ( )t ip   or 1tm   permits the estimation of the other. Breeden and 
Litzenberger (1978) provide an explicit formula for the estimation of ( )t ip  :  
 
 ,
1
2
( )2( ) ( ) |
f t
t i
r t
t i i S K
Cp e
K 
       ,  	 (2‐10)	
	
i.e. the second derivative of a European call price tC  taken with respect to its strike 
price K  is the state-contingent price ( )t ip   of the future asset price ending up at 
exactly the strike price of the option. The measure ( )   satisfies the probability 
axioms, since it is positive and ( ) 1

 

 , and therefore can be referred to as the 
risk-neutral pricing density,  
 
 ,
1
2
( )2( ) |
f t
t i
r t
i S K
Ce
K 
     ,  	 (2‐11)	
	
It satisfies, under no-arbitrage, the following pricing condition, 
 
 , ,1 1( ) [ ]f t f t
r r
t i t i tS e S d e E S


    

  .  	 (2‐12)	
	
Here, [ ]E    is the expectation operator under the risk-neutral probability ( )  . 
According to equation (2-12), in a world in which investors are risk-neutral, all risky 
assets - including options - must yield an expected return equal to the risk-free rate of 
interest. Estimating the risk-neutral pricing density from option prices is equivalent to 
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estimating the SDFs using the prices and payoffs of assets priced by each SDF. 
Generally, the approaches for estimating the risk-neutral pricing density can be 
categorized into two different classes: parametric estimation and non-parametric 
estimation (see Cont (1997), and Jackwerth (1999)).  
 
Concerning parametric estimation, expansion methods, generalized distribution methods 
and mixture methods are the three main subgroups. More specifically, starting with a 
simple distributional assumption, expansion methods typically add correction terms into 
the normal or lognormal density, then estimate a flexible-shape version of the 
risk-neutral distribution in order to fit the observed option prices. Fore example, Abadir 
and Rockinger (1997) use confluent hypergeometric functions as a basis for the 
risk-neutral density and derive the option price function across strike prices. Abken et 
al. (1996a, 1996b) use instead four-parameter Hermite polynomials. Potters et al. 
(1998) use cumulant expansions to add a single correction term to a normal distribution, 
which adjusts for the kurtosis of the risk-neutral distribution. However, this approach 
may generate negative values for the risk-neutral density, which violate the positivity 
constraint. Without adding correction terms, generalized distribution methods 
concentrate more on inherent flexibility, abandoning familiar two-parameter normal and 
lognormal distributions by adding one or two additional parameters beyond mean and 
variance (see, Aparicio and Hodges (1998), Posner and Milevsky (1998)). The mixture 
methods can even achieve greater flexibility than the previous two. For example, Melick 
and Thomas (1997) apply the mixture methods, which combine three lognormal 
distributions, to evaluate American options on crude oil futures. Ritchey (1990) 
modifies log returns by a mixture of normal distributions to generate option prices. 
Although the number of parameters expands quickly under mixture methods, this 
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approach is more capable of generating a wider variety of shapes for the probability 
distributions than generalized distributions. 
 
Non-parametric estimation tries to achieve greater flexibility in fitting the risk-neutral 
distribution to option prices. Rather than requiring a parametric form of the distribution, 
it allows the use of more general functions. The most commonly used non-parametric 
method is kernel regression, which is conceptually related to regressions in that they 
both try to fit a function to observed data. The main difference is that kernel regression 
does not specify the parametric form of the function. As a data-intensive method, kernel 
regression assumes each data point is the center of the region where the true underlying 
functions lie. The further away a point in the support of the density is from the observed 
data point, the less likely it is that the true function goes through that distant point. Take 
the observe implied volatilities ( )iK  across strike prices iK  as an example, the 
kernel regression in one dimension is  
 
 1
1
( ) ( )
( )
( )
n
i
i
i n
i
i
K Kk K
hK
K Kk
h

 


 


  	 (2‐13)	
	
where h  is the bandwidth, which governs the smoothness of the kernel regression, and 
the kernel 
21
21( )
2
x
k x e
 , which as often the case takes the the form of a normal 
distribution probability density function with zero mean and unit standard deviation, 
measures the corresponding drop in likelihood when we move away from the data point. 
Aït‐Sahalia and Lo (1998) use kernel regression to estimate the risk-neutral density or 
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state-price density (SPD) based on five-dimensional data points consisting of stock 
price, strike price, time to expiration, interest rate and dividend yield. They also 
experiment with a lower-dimension problem, in which, for simplicity, the three 
dimensions are forward price, strike price, and time to expiration. Pritsker (1998) 
employs their methodology in order to investigate the risk-neutral distribution of 
interest rates.. 
 
2.4. Moment	Restrictions	on	SDF	
According to Equation (2-6), the expected return on the asset i is given by 
 
 1 , 1, 1
1 1
( ,  )1( )
( ) ( )
t t i t
t i t
t t t t
cov m R
E R
E m E m
 

 
  .  	 (2‐14)	
	
where ( )tcov    denotes the conditional covariance operator. The first moment of the 
SDF is determined by the risk-free rate. The above relation holds also when 1tR   is the 
risk-free return , 1f tR  , which equals ,f t
re  in continuous time. Since the conditional 
covariance between SDF and risk-free rate is, by definition, zero, we have that 
 
 1
, 1
1( )t t
f t
E m
R 
 .  	 (2‐15)	
	
In other words, the expected SDF is the price of a short-term risk-free zero-coupon bond 
with a unit payoff at time 1t  . This characterizes the SDF as a random variable, i.e. 
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, 1
1
1 1f tt tR
m 
   , where the conditional mean of the error term is zero, i.e. 1( ) 0t tE    . 
The restriction in (2-14) also applies to excess returns, i.e.  
 
 
1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1
1
, 1 1 , 1 , 1
( ,  )
( )
( )
( ,  )
t t i t f t
t i t f t
t t
f t t t i t f t
cov m R R
E R R
E m
R cov m R R
  
 

   
  
  
.  	 (2‐16)	
	
or, equivalently, 1 1 , 1[ ( )] 0t t t f tE m R R    . The conditional volatility of the SDF is 
related to the 2   metric distance between the risk-neutral and the objective probability 
measures (Bakshi et al., 2005). In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, Bakshi et al. 
(2005) prove that the one-to-one correspondence is 
 
 
1
1 2 1
2
1 1
( ) [ ]
( ( ) ( )) ( )
t
t t t
t t
f
m f
f f d

   
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
 
 

  
 
.  	 (2‐17)	
	
As just seen, the fact that 1tm   prices excess returns gives that 1 , 1 , 1[ ( )]t t i t f tE m R R    
equals zero. Also the absolute value of correlation between SDF 1tm   and 
, 1 , 1( )i t f tR R   is bounded from above by 1, and this implies that, under no-arbitrage 
and for a given level of correlation between the SDF and asset returns, spreads in 
expected excess returns across assets are proportional to SDF volatility, 
 
 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1( ) ( ) ( )t i t f t f t t i t f t t tE R R R R R m         .  	 (2‐18)	
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Noting that (2-18) must hold for any SDF that prices the assets, including the minimum 
variance SDF 1tm

 , which is the projection of 1tm   on the payoff set, we can rearrange 
(2-18) to obtain the well-known Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) lower bound on SDF 
volatility 
 
 
, 1 , 1*
1 1
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 
 
  
 
, 	 (2‐19)	
	
where, * 1 1( ) inf{ ( )}t tm m    indictates the miminum variance of 1tm   over the 
support of admissible kernels (not a singleton, in incomplete markets). Obviously, if the 
payoff space contains N  securities, condition (2-19) satisfies 
 
 2 11 1 1 1 1( ) [ ( ) ( )] ' [ ( ) ( )]t t t t t t t t t tm E m E R E m E R          ,  	 (2‐20)	
	
where 1( )t tcov R    denotes the covariance matrix of asset returns and   is the 
1N   unit vector. 
 
Moreover, Ross (2005) points out that risk-averse investors prefer volatile SDFs. 
Specifically, he shows that, in a complete market and given a family of SDFs with the 
same mean but different volatility, the expected utility of a risk-averse investor is 
uniformly larger if the payoffs are priced by a more volatile SDF. This implies that, if a 
risk-free asset with a given return identifies the SDF mean, the expectation of a concave 
utility function increases in the volatility of the unique SDF (i.e. the state-price density) 
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that prices the investment opportunity set. In incomplete markets, more than one SDF 
price the marketed payoffs and thus expected utility increases in the volatility of the 
projection of all admissible pricing kernels on the payoff space, i.e. it increases in the 
volatility of the minimum-variance SDF. Similar arguments can be traced to Bakshi et 
al. (2005) and Chabi-Yo et al. (2008). More precisely, Bakshi et al. (2005) show that 
1( )t tm   is related to both the level of risk aversion,  , and the variance of the 
consumption-growth 1( )t tc   
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t t
t t
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 

.  	 (2‐21)	
	
where 1 1( )t t tc log C C  , represents the growth of consumption. The argument of 
Chabi-Yo, et al., (2008) is more general than Bakshi, et al., (2004) without assuming a 
specific utility function, and they show that the growth of the SDF is proportional to the 
Arrow-Pratt index of absolute-risk aversion (ARA), 
 
 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
( )
t t
t t
log m U C ARA
C U C
 
 
    .  	 (2‐22)	
	
Of course, a higher volatility of the SDF requires a higher ARA. In other words, if the 
ARA is restricted within a reasonable range, 1sup{ ( )}t tm   is bounded. 
 
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (1996) and Cochrane (2001) introduced the term ‘good 
deals’ to denote desirable investment opportunities, i.e. arbitrage opportunities and 
investment opportunities that offer a large reward for risk. Similarly, Cerný and Hodges 
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(2000) define good deals as desirable investment opportunities that have zero or 
negative cost. They also formalize the conditions under which good deals can be ruled 
out in complete and incomplete markets, given the absence of good deals in the space of 
payoffs spanned by a subset of the traded assets. Again, the absence of good deals is 
connected to the volatility restriction of the SDF. Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (1996) 
suggest that, 
 
 * 1
, 1
( )t t
f t
hm
R
 

 .  	 (2‐23)	
	
where h  is the pre-specified volatility bound. The results in Ross (2005) shows that 
good deals offer expected utility improving opportunities to the risk-averse investors 
who prefer a high SDF volatility. Potì (2007) and Potì and Wang (2010), in order to 
restrict the volatility of the minimum-variance SDF, extend this argument by restricting, 
by means of an upper bound, the volatility of the representative investor’s 
inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) between present and future 
consumption, which is specified as in the typical three-moment CAPM, i.e. it coincides 
with the representative investor’s IMRS and is a linear function of the market return and 
its square. 
 
2.5. The	SDF	Approach	and	Linear	Pricing	Models	
The classical linear Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been established in the 
work of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Black (1972), Merton (1973) and Breeden 
(1979). The main prediction of the model is that the expected return on a financial asset 
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is a function of its covariance with some systematic risk factors or, equivalently, 
linearly related to the coefficients, known as betas, of the regression of the excess-return 
on the factors. Cochrane (1996) subsequently formalizes the relation between the SDF 
approach and linear beta-pricing models and reformulates the CAPM in a SDF setting. 
Generally, inference in the SDF approach requires the specification of fewer 
assumptions about the distribution of asset returns than when estimating linear pricing 
models.  
 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) assume that all investors are single-period 
mean-variance optimizers to show that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient 
and the expected return of each asset is linearly related with the market portfolio 
through the asset risk exposure beta. Ross (1976) points out that this conclusion can also 
be reached using an asymptotic no-arbitrage argument and the assumption that the 
market portfolio is the only source of common, undiversifiable risk. In other words, if 
there are several common factors that generate undiversifiable risk, then a multifactor 
model holds. Within the SDF framework, these same conclusions can be reached 
directly from the assumption that the SDF is a linear combination of K  common 
factors , 1,   1...k tf k K  . For expositional simplicity the factors are assumed to have 
conditional mean zero and are orthogonal to one another. If 
 
 1 , , 1
1
K
t t k t k t
k
m a b f 

  .  	 (2‐24)	
	
then the negative of the covariance of any excess return with the SDF can be written as 
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        
             . 	 (2‐25)	
	
Here ,ik t  is the conditional covariance of asset return i with the thk  factor, 2,k t  is 
the conditional variance of the thk  factor, 2, , ,k t k t k tb    is the price of risk with the 
respect to the thk  factor, and 2, , ,ik t ik t k t    is the regression coefficient of asset 
return i on that factor, or the formerly mentioned beta . Then equation (2-25) together 
with the equation (2-16) implies that the risk premium on any asset can be rewritten as a 
sum of the asset’s betas with common factors times the risk prices of those factors. 
More particularly, if we set the asset i  as the market portfolio, i.e. , 1 , 1i t m tR R  , 
, 1 , 1 , 1( )k t m t t m tf R E R     and 1 , 1 , 1[ ( )]t t m t t m tm b R E R    , then , 1ik t   and  
 
 , , 1 , 1 , 1( )k t t m t f t f tE R R R     .  	 (2‐26)	
	
In other words, if 
,
2
, 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( )m tkt t m t f t f t Rb E R R R      , then 1tm   will exactly generate 
the CAPM. Here, it is noticed that 1tm   is negatively correlated with , 1m tR  . 
 
2.6. Conditional	Liner	Models	
The unconditional or static asset pricing model was derived by considering the rational 
behaviour of investors living for only one period. In extending this model to a 
multiperiod setting, one of the commonly made assumptions is that asset betas remain 
constant over time. According to Jagannathan and Wang (1996), this is not a 
particularly reasonable assumption since the relative risk of a firm’s cash flow is likely 
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to vary over the business cycle. During a recession, for example, financial leverage of 
firms in relatively poor shape may increase sharply relative to other firms, causing their 
stock betas to rise. Also, to the extent that the business cycle is induced by technology 
or taste shocks, the relative share of different sectors in the economy fluctuates, 
inducing fluctuations in the betas of firms in these sectors. Hence, betas and expected 
returns will in general depend on the nature of the information available at any given 
point in time and vary over time. Therefore, they specify a relation between conditional 
expected return and conditional betas, i.e.  
 
 1 , 1 , ,
1
( )
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t t f t k t k t
k
E R R   
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  .  	 (2‐27)	
	
We can take the unconditional expectation of both sides of equation (2‐27) to get 
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(2‐28)	
	
where, ,( )k k tE   and ,( )k k tE  . k  is the regression coefficient of ,k t  on ,k t , 
i.e., 
 
 , , ,( , ) ( )k k t k t k tcov var    .  	 (2‐29)	
	
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) defined two types of unconditional betas: 
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 1 , 1 , 1( , ) ( )k t k t k tcov R var     .  	 (2‐30)	
	
 1 , 1 , 1[ , ( )] [ ( )]
z
k t t k t t k tcov R E var E     .  	 (2‐31)	
	
where k  and zk  are all constant. Moreover they proved that, 
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k k
z
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 
           
,  	 (2‐32)	
	
Here, 0  and 1  are constant coefficient vectors. Then, the unconditional expectation 
of the conditional expected return is 
 
 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 1
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t f t k t k t k t k
k k
E R R E      
 
    .  	 (2‐33)	
	
The betas in equation (2-33) are not time-varying as the ones in equation (2-27), yet 
they follow from the same asset pricing model. In fact, equation (2-33) is the 
unconditional implication of equation (2-27). 
 
According to Cochrane (2001), letting tz  represent a vector of variables that 
summarize the relevant conditioning information, we can reformulate conditional linear 
models according to a SDF representation by writing the parameters in (2-24) as 
functions of the conditioning variables, i.e. we can write ( )t t ta a z  and ( )t t tb b z  in 
(2-24). The simplest way to model conditional time-variation in these parameters is to 
specify them as a linear function of the set of conditioning variable:  
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0 1
0 1
t t
t t
a a a z
b b b z
 
 
.   (2-34) 
 
Here, ta  is a scalar, tb , 
0b  are 1N   vectors, tz  is a 1k   vector of conditioning 
variables, 1a  is a 1k   vector and 1b  is an k N  matrix. Using, (2-34) we can 
rewrite (2-24) as follows: 
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.   (2-35) 
 
Here, 2b  is a ]1)[(  Nk  vector obtained stacking the N  columns of 1b , i.e  
 
 2 1( )b vec b .   (2-36) 
 
The specification in (2-35) and (2-36) can be seen as an unconditional model, i.e. a 
model with time-invariant parameters, in the new set of factors 
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For convenience, we can also rewrite (2-35) folding the unconditional mean of these 
factors in the constant and write the SDF as a linear function of a new set of 
unconditionally de-meaned factors:  
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Here, 
 0 1 0 21 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t ta a a E z b E f b E f z 
       .   (2-39) 
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      
.   (2-41) 
 
Since the parameters of the factors in (2-38) are by definition constant over time, the 
conditional and unconditional implications of the model are the same. In particular, we 
can derive the unconditional implications without worrying about co-variation between 
the parameters of the SDF and the factors. To this end, we may take the unconditional 
expectation of (2-6) with the SDF specified as in (2-38). The covariance and 
beta-pricing representations of the implication of this unconditional expectation are the 
following: 
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where, 
        1 11 1 , 1 1 1 , 1, ,i t t i t t t i tvar F cov F R var F cov F R          .  	 (2‐43)	
    3 3, 1 1 1f t t tR var F b var F b       .  	 (2‐44)	
 
2.7. Asset	Pricing	Paradigms	and	EMH	
The efficient market hypothesis (henceforth, EMH), as formulated by Fama (1970, 
1976), requires that conditional expectations of future cash-flows and conditional 
moments of the multivariate return distribution be formed using all the available 
relevant information6 and, ultimately, that returns in excess of the rate of return on 
riskless assets do not deviate in any systematic (i.e. exploitable) way from their 
conditional expectation7 . This implies that returns deviations from their possibly 
time-varying equilibrium conditional expectations follow a fair game process (see, for a 
simple taxonomy, Copeland et al. (2004)) with zero conditional and unconditional mean 
but with possibly time-varying higher order moments. On average, then, returns equal 
conditional expected returns or, equivalently, expected returns conditional on the 
available information set are unbiased estimates8 of actual future returns. The key 
                                                 
 
6 This is a definition of market efficiency implied by Fama (1970) discussion and reported in Fama (1976). 
7 Recall that, if the distribution of the relevant conditioning variables is known, unconditional moments can be 
derived from the conditional ones. Therefore, if either asset cash-flows conditional expectations or conditional return 
moments are not formed using all the available relevant information, superior forecasts of asset prices could be 
formed by using conditioning variables that convey the relevant information neglected by market prices. These 
forecasts would be exploitable to earn above-average risk-adjusted returns. Clearly, this does not need to apply to 
conditional asset cash-flows expectations and return moments formed using subsets of the available information set, 
such as the data available to the econometrician. 
8 This condition can be formulated as follows: E(ri,t) = E[ri,t  - E(ri,t |Ω)], where Ω denotes the conditioning 
information set. 
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difference between rational asset pricing under the old and new paradigm9 is that 
conditional expected returns and higher order moments of the returns deviations from 
their conditional means are fixed in the former and possibly time-varying in the latter.  
 
The old paradigm implies the EMH, but the reverse is not true. In particular, within the 
new paradigm of asset returns, it is possible to recognize explanations for asset pricing 
phenomena based either on asset pricing models with investors that process information 
and decide upon it rationally, and thus consistently with the EMH, or on models that 
allow for some degree of investors’ irrationality. I refer to the former as rational asset 
pricing models and to the as latter behavioural asset pricing models.  
 
2.8. Rational	Asset	Pricing	Models	
Rational asset pricing models can be interpreted as specifications of a unified theoretical 
framework, the neoclassical rational economic model (Constantinides, 2002), that views 
expected excess returns as the reward demanded by risk averse, expected utility 
optimizing investors for bearing non diversifiable risk. These investors have 
unambiguously defined preferences over consumption. If we add the assumptions that 
investors’ expectations are rational and investors’ beliefs consistent, in the sense 
implied by Sargent (1996) discussion of the rational expectation equilibrium, this 
framework implies the EMH. Versions of this theory allow for market incompleteness, 
market imperfections, informational asymmetries, and learning. The theory also allows 
                                                 
 
9 The key difference is therefore that the former relies on a random walk whereas the latter in based on a fair game 
view of conditionally unexpected returns. Also recall that conditional and unconditional moments are the same only 
in the random walk case. 
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for differences among assets for liquidity, transaction costs, tax status, and other 
institutional factors. 
 
2.8.1 Consumption Asset Pricing 
For inter-temporal utility maximizing investors, the SDF depends on their impatience 
and on the marginal utility of whatever they must give up in order to acquire additional 
units of the payoff 1tx  . To see this, suppose that investors extract utility from 
consumption, and that they have the following 2-period utility function: 
 
 1 1( , ) ( ) ( )
j j j j
t t t tU C C U C E U C      .  	 (2‐45)	
	
Here, jtC  denotes investor j’s consumption and   is the subjective discount factor 
that represents the investors’ impatience 10 , that is by how much, under any 
circumstance, any payoff is worth less if it is paid at a later date. Subjective discount 
factors should be always less than unity for impatient investors. Desirable properties of 
investors’ utility function, as argued by Arrow (1971), are positive and decreasing 
marginal utility of wealth and non-increasing absolute risk aversion. Positive marginal 
utility of wealth, or 0U   , implies investors’ non satiation (NS), whereas decreasing 
marginal utility, 0U   , implies risk aversion (RA). Non increasing absolute risk 
aversion (NIARA), ( / ) 0j
d U U
dC
   , implies that risky assets are not inferior goods 
and, as shown in Arditti (1967), it is a sufficient condition for 0U   . Hence 0U    
implies NIARA and aversion to negative skewness. NIARA, for a utility maximizing, 
                                                 
 
10 It has nothing to do with the CAPM asset beta but I keep this notation because it is almost standard in the 
literature.  
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risk-averse individual, and hence with positive marginal utility and RA, is also related 
to prudence as defined by Kimball (1990). Included in the set of utility functions that 
display these desirable attributes are the logarithmic, power and negative exponential 
utility function. It should be noted that the popular quadratic utility function does not 
satisfy NIARA.  
 
The investor in t must decide how much to consume and how much to invest in the 
asset that offers the payoff 1tx  . Subject to his inter-temporal budget constraint, the 
more of the asset he purchases, the less his consumption today but the more he will be 
able to consume in the future. The problem of a rational investor, therefore, is to find 
the level of investment that maximizes his expected utility. Assuming that the utility 
function is concave, denoting by ( )jtU C  the marginal utility of consumption and  
setting 11
( )
( )
j
j t
t j
t
U Cm
U C
    , (2-7) can be seen as the first order condition for the 
maximization of the investor j’s expected utility, i.e. the expectation of (2-45), given the 
price 
tp  of the pay-off 1tx  . In this setup, 1
j
tm   is known as the investor’s 
inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution and acts as the SDF that prices the assets 
faced by such investor. Treating the subjective discount factor as an inter-temporal 
constant, we thus have that the SDF 1
j
tm   is proportional to the investor’s marginal 
utility growth and (2-16) implies that the investor is willing to pay more for assets that 
are expected to pay off handsomely when her marginal utility of consumption is high.   
 
The economy SDF, i.e. the process 1tm   that prices all pay-offs (that is, the payoffs 
faced by all investors), depends in general on the circumstances (factors) that determine 
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the extent to which investors’ aggregate marginal utility in 1t   is high relative to the 
previous period. The shape of investors’ utility functions and the extent to which they 
can freely form portfolios has also implications for the shape of the SDF that prices the 
assets. For example, NS imply no-arbitrage and therefore a positive SDF. Furthermore, 
if the utility function is concave, marginal utility is high when resources to purchase 
additional units of consumption are scarce and therefore consumption is low. A payoff 
that made additional resources available when these were needed the most would be 
particularly welcome and the investors would value it more ( 1tm   would be high). This 
implies a SDF decreasing in wealth. At a more technical level, the shape of investors’ 
utility also has implications for how closely the SDF that prices all assets resembles the 
shape of individual investors’ marginal utility growth. In other words, whether 
aggregation of individual investors’ marginal utility growth results in a SDF defined 
over aggregate wealth with the same shape as the individual investors’ SDF depends, in 
general, on the shape of the utility function. In empirical applications, the assumption 
that prices are set by a representative investor allows to bypass this issue (essentially, 
leaving it in the background for asset pricing theorists). 
 
2.8.2 Representative Investor 
Under the representative investor assumption, { ,    , 1}ji iC C i t t    and the SDF 1tm   
can be expressed in terms of aggregate consumption as the growth of such investor’s 
marginal utility: 
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    .  	 (2‐46)	
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For example, in LeRoy (1973), Lucas (1978) or Breeden (1979), whose specifications 
represent instances of the consumption-based CAPM (henceforth C-CAPM), one can 
identify the stochastic discount factor with the IMRS of a representative agent. The 
asset pricing implications of the representative investor assumption and of the 
assumption that capital markets are complete are the same. This is because, in complete 
capital markets, as in Lucas (1978), investors can exchange contingent claims on any 
future state of the world. Full risk-sharing and diversification are therefore optimal for 
all investors, who then hold portfolios with risky assets in identical proportions. In these 
circumstances, pricing assets with respect to individual investors’ consumption or with 
respect to aggregate consumption is equivalent because marginal utility growth is the 
same for all investors.  
 
In a 2-period setting, investors must consume at the end of the second period all their 
wealth. Thus, in the SDF in (2-46), we can substitute out the representative investor’s 
consumption with wealth. In a multi-period setting, consumption and wealth are 
equivalent only if either returns are unpredictable, as in the old paradigm, or 
predictability has no effect on inter-temporal optimal consumption-investment and 
portfolio choices. Strictly, the latter condition requires the assumption of logarithmic11 
utility. The empirical literature, e.g. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001b), however, often assume that the SDF pricing equation holds 
conditionally period by period even under other types of utility functions. This 
corresponds to the assumption that predictability is at most a second order effect relative 
                                                 
 
11 As explained in Cochrane (2005), for this type of utility function substitution effects (higher expected returns 
imply an higher opportunity cost of current consumption and therefore tend to decrease it) and income effects (higher 
expected returns imply higher next period wealth and therefore tends to increase consumption) exactly offset each 
other. 
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to the variability in consumption and wealth. Under these conditions, the inter-temporal 
marginal rate of substitution in (2-46) can be expressed as a function of aggregate 
wealth: 
 
 11
( )
( )
t
t
t
U Wm
U W
    .   (2-47) 
 
The SDF of a representative investor with preferences defined over wealth that display 
NS, RA and NIARA is positive, decreasing and concave in wealth.  
 
2.8.3 CAPM 
The CAPM is a special single factor model. In its original version, it is a static 
equilibrium model. Under investors’ NS, it can be derived either by assuming a 
representative investor with quadratic utility, thus excluding preference for moments of 
the multivariate distribution of asset returns higher than the second, or allowing for 
preference for higher moments (as under a power utility function) but assuming that 
returns are multivariate normal, and that investors, rational and risk averse, can freely 
diversify and have access to the same information. The latter assumption, even when a 
subset of investors is imperfectly rational, can be replaced by the assumption that the 
most informed marginal investor is rational and can borrow and lend without limits at 
the risk-free rate (this, essentially, requires a frictionless capital market). Quadratic 
utility assures that the U   and U   term in (A-3) in Appendix A is zero. Under a 
multivariate normal distribution, the covariance with the squared rate of return on 
investor’s wealth is zero (because of the symmetry of the normal distribution). In either 
 48
case, the SDF depends linearly only on the return on the mean-variance efficient 
portfolio of risky assets, i.e. (2-24) becomes: 
 
 1 , 1t m tm a bR   .   (2-48) 
 
From (2-42), then, the expected excess return on any asset is proportional to the 
coefficient of the regression of the asset excess returns on the portfolio excess return 
(that captures the asset systematic risk exposure). The proportionality coefficient, i.e. 
the risk-premium, is the market expected excess return. This is because, by 
construction, the regression coefficient ,m m  of the market excess return on itself 
equals 1 and therefore, from (2-42), , 1( )m m tE R  .  
 
2.8.4 Conditional CAPM 
We might extend the CAPM to an inter-temporal setting, where returns are not i.i.d. and 
moments are allowed to be time-varying, by letting the CAPM hold conditionally, 
period by period. This is clearly an approximation, as a rational mean-variance investor 
would anticipate the possibility of variation in the first moment of the return distribution 
and thus would seek to hedge against adverse (negative) changes in expected returns, 
i.e. a demand for hedging against reinvestment risk would arise and a corresponding 
risk premium would enter the equilibrium expected return determination equation. For 
the general derivation, please see Section 2.6.  Since in the one-period CAPM 
expected returns are proportional to expected market variance, the latter would show up 
in the multi-period CAPM as an additional risk factor with a positive risk price in the 
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SDF of the representative investor, as in Merton (1973) Inter-temporal CAPM 
(henceforth, ICAPM), i.e.  
 
 , 1 1, , 1 , 1 2, 1 , 1( ) ( , ) ( , )t i t t t m t i t t t t i tE R b cov R R b cov z R       .   (2-49) 
 
Here 1tz  is a state variable that describes the state of the investment opportunity set, 
i.e. it captures reinvestment risk. Merton (1980), however, points out that the hedging 
motive is likely not very important. Following Merton (1980) advice, Jagannathan and 
Wang (1996) set the price of reinvestment risk to zero and approximate the SDF as a 
linear function of the return on the market portfolio with time-varying parameters, i.e. 
1 , 1t t t m tm a b R   . Such a SDF summarizes the asset pricing implication of the 
conditional CAPM, henceforth (C)CAPM. Alternatively, we could just treat this 
specification of the SDF as a reduced form representation of the true inter-temporal 
SDF. In any case, letting the SDF parameters depend linearly on the conditioning 
variable tz , as in (2-34), and setting 1 , 1t m tf R   in (2-24), we have: 
 
 1 0 1 0 1 , 1
0 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1
( )t t t m t
t m t m t
m a a z b b z R
a a z b R b z R
 
 
   
    .   (2-50) 
 
Using (2-50) in (2-42), the beta-pricing representation of the conditional excess return 
pricing implications of the (C)CAPM is the following: 
 
 , 1 , , ,( )t i t m i t m tE R    .   (2-51) 
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Here, , ,m i t  is a time-varying coefficient of the regression of , 1i tR   on , 1m tR   and 
,m t  is the conditional market risk premium, given by (2-44): 
 
 , , 1( )m t t m t tvar R b   .   (2-52) 
 
Also, since by definition , , 1m m t  , we have from (2-51) that , , 1( )m t t m tE R  . Hence, 
the conditional market risk premium is equal to the conditional market expected excess 
return. Since, as shown in Appendix A, 1,t tb RRA  , the market risk premium in (2-52) 
can be rewritten as follows: 
 
 , , 1 , 1( ) ( )m t t m t t t m tE R RRA var R    .   (2-53) 
 
RRAt can be interpreted as the representative investor’s relative risk aversion parameter 
for reasons that become clear by examining the derivation of the stylized risk-return 
relation reported in Appendix (B-12) and (B-16). 
 
To derive the unconditional implications of the conditional SDF model in (2-50), I 
apply (2-51) and take unconditional expectations of both sides:   
 
 , 1 , , , , , , ,( ) ( )i t m i t m t i t t z i z m i m zm i zmE R E                .   (2-54) 
 
Here, ,z i , ,m i  and ,zm i  are regression coefficients of , 1i tR   on, respectively, tz , 
, 1m tR   and , 1t m tz R  . Equivalently, the SDF in (2-50) can be seen as a linear function of 
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tz , , 1m tR   and , 1t m tz R  . Hence, (2-54) can be derived applying (2-42) to (2-50) with 
the elements of tF  in (2-37) given by tz , , 1m tR   and , 1t m tz R  . Notice that, if the 
parameters of the SDF are fixed, 0ta a a   and 0tb b b  , the preceding equations 
simplify to the unconditional CAPM (CAPM), i.e. 1 , 1t m tm a bR   , and 
, 1 ,( )i t m i mE R    .  
 
2.8.5 Conditioning Variables 
A critical consideration in estimating the (C)CAPM, or any conditional asset pricing 
model, is the choice of the conditioning variable tz . The conditioning variable should 
capture the time variation in the parameters of the SDF. There are two main theoretical 
reasons why the parameters of a SDF conditionally defined over market wealth might 
change over time.  
 
One relates to non-market sources of risk and the impact of economy-wide shocks on 
the marginal utility of stock market wealth. From this perspective, we seek conditioning 
variables that proxy for the state of the economy and, in particular, for sources of 
systematic variation in non-market wealth, such as labor income shocks and real estate 
returns. These are labeled by Cochrane (2001) “distress risk” factors or recession 
variables and should capture sources of systematic risk different from the stock market. 
During a recession unemployment is high, labor income is low and more volatile and 
property prices falter. If investors’ marginal utility of stock market wealth is higher 
under these circumstances than in good times, variables that capture the state of the 
economy should show up as priced risk factors alongside the stock market factor. This 
ultimately implies that investors’ utility is not defined only over stock market wealth but 
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also over other forms of wealth. In turn, this implies that the stock market is not a good 
proxy for overall wealth. The recession state variables do not need to predict anything 
(either the stock market or the future state of the economy) but they should be highly 
correlated with the wider economy or particular (sizeable) portions of it unrelated to the 
stock market. In other words, they should represent good instruments for the state of 
portions of the economy, unrelated to the stock market but relevant in determining 
investors’ marginal utility. High correlation implies that the conditioning variable 
should be either highly pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical relative to these portions of the 
economy. If they were pro-cyclical, they would command a positive risk premium. If 
they were anti-cyclical, they would command a negative risk premium (exposure to 
them would represent an insurance against a non-stock market source of systematic 
risk). 
 
The other theoretical reason why the parameters of the SDF might change over time 
relates, in Merton (1973) ICAPM framework, to inter-temporal risk and to the impact of 
changes to the future investment opportunity set on marginal utility of wealth. Thus we 
seek conditioning variables that summarize the predictable evolution of the investment 
opportunity set and hence provide a summary measure of expected excess returns. 
These variables should, in other words, predict excess returns. In particular, in a world 
where only systematic risk matters to investors, the conditioning variable should help 
forecast market returns. The empirical literature has proposed a number of variables that 
help predict future returns. The most successful are the stochastically de-trended short 
term interest rate, employed among others by Scruggs (1998), the book to market value 
ratio, the dividend-price ratio, used by Campbell and Shiller (1988), and the observable 
proxy for the consumption-wealth ratio proposed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a). 
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Theoretical arguments that suggest that the consumption-wealth ratio and the 
dividend-price ratio should predict future returns are especially compelling.  
 
To show that the consumption–aggregate wealth ratio summarizes agents’ expectations 
of future returns, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a), using a log-linear approximation to a 
representative investor’s inter-temporal budget constraint 1 , 1( )t m t t tW R W C   , 
express the log consumption-wealth ratio in terms of future returns to the market 
portfolio and future consumption growth. Because this approximation is based on the 
agent’s inter-temporal budget constraint, it holds both ex post and ex ante. Accordingly, 
the log consumption–wealth ratio may be expressed in terms of expected returns to the 
market portfolio and expected consumption growth as: 
 
 ,
1
( )jt t t w m t j t j
j
c w E r c  

    .   (2-55) 
 
Here, lower case letters denote logarithms of (per capita) consumption and wealth and 
w  is the steady-state ratio of invested to total wealth. This essentially means that, 
given the representative investor’s wealth, the amount of consumption today depends on 
the amount he wishes to be able to afford to consume tomorrow and, therefore, on his 
expected future consumption. Under Muth (1961) rational expectations (henceforth 
RE), the above equation implies that, if consumption growth is not too volatile 
(something that appears to be true empirically), the variation in the log 
consumption-wealth ratio must be driven by variation in expected returns. It therefore 
summarizes expectations of future returns on the market portfolio. Intuitively, if the 
consumption-wealth ratio is high, then the agent must be expecting either high returns 
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on wealth in the future or low consumption growth rates (boosting in both cases current 
consumption). Since consumption growth rates are fairly stable, however, swings in the 
consumption-wealth ratio should be related to changing agents’ expectations about 
aggregate returns and therefore, under RE, they should predict aggregate returns. 
 
Of course, the log consumption-aggregate wealth ratio is not observable because human 
capital is not observable. To overcome this obstacle, Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) 
construct a proxy based on observable quantities. Denote non-human or asset wealth by 
tA  and its logarithm as ( )t ta log A . Also, assume that human capital tH  is on 
average a constant multiple of labor tY  income, i.e. t tH KY . Its logarithm then can 
be written as ttt vykh  , where k is a constant and vt is a mean zero stationary 
random variable with ( ) 0tE v  . Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) reformulate the 
bivariate cointegrating relation between tc and tw in the consumption-wealth ratio 
equation ( tc  and tw  are both integrated but their linear combination on the right hand 
side is stationary) as a trivariate co-integrating relation involving the three observable 
variables log consumption tc , log nonhuman or asset wealth ta , and log labor 
earnings ty . Since tc  and ta  are both (1)I , such a reformulation is possible, by 
Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem, under the condition that labor income 
is integrated and the rate of return to human capital is stationary. Aggregate wealth is 
ttt HAW   and log aggregate wealth may be approximated as ttt haw )1(    
where   equals the average share of nonhuman wealth in total wealth, t
t
A
W . The 
left-hand side of (2-55) may then be expressed as follows: 
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(1 )
(1 )( )
(1 ) (1 )( )
(1 ) (1 )
t t t t t
t t t
t t t t
t t t
c w c a h
c a k y v
c a y k v
cay k v
 
 
  
 
    
     
      
    
.   (2-56) 
 
Here, tttt yaccay )1(    is the difference between log consumption and a 
weighted average of log asset wealth and log labor income. Solving (2-56) for tcay  
and using (2-55), we can write:   
 
 
,
1
,
1
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
. ( ) (1 )
j
t t w m t j t j t
j
j
t w m t j t j t
j
cay k E r c v
const E r c v
  
 

 


 

      
     


.   (2-57) 
 
Because all the variables on the right-hand side of the above equation are stationary, the 
model implies that tcay  is stationary and hence that consumption, asset wealth, and 
labor income share a common stochastic trend (they are cointegrated), with   and 
1   parameters of this shared trend. If the cointegrating parameter   can be 
consistently estimated, tcay  can be treated as observable. As long as the error term tv  
on the right-hand side is not too variable, this equation also implies that tcay should be 
a good proxy for the unobservable quantities on the right hand side of (2-57) and 
therefore for variation in the log consumption–aggregate wealth ratio and expected 
returns. An important issue in using the left-hand side of this equation as a conditioning 
variable is the estimation of the parameters in tcay . Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) 
discuss how the cointegrating parameter   can be estimated consistently. As 
suggested by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) , it is the tcay  time-series constructed 
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using the estimated   parameter and the observed log consumption tc , log asset 
wealth ta  and log labor earnings ty  that can be employed as a scaling variable in a 
conditional asset pricing model. 
 
The specification of the consumption-wealth ratio equation reported above is analogous 
to the linearized formula for the log dividend–price ratio (Campbell & Shiller, 1988), 
where consumption enters in place of dividends and wealth enters in place of price: 
 
 1 ,
1
. ( )jt t t t j m t j
j
p d const E d r   

     .   (2-58) 
 
Here, td  denotes log-dividends, tr  denotes returns, and   can be seen as the steady 
state dividend yield. Because all the variables on the right-hand side of the above 
equation are stationary, the model implies that t tp d  is stationary and hence that 
prices and dividends share a common stochastic trend (they are cointegrated), with 1 
and –1 parameters of their cointegrating relation. If the dividend-price ratio is high, 
investors must be expecting either high returns on the stock market portfolio in the 
future or low dividend growth rates. Since both consumption and dividends are not very 
volatile and their growth rates are relatively unpredictable, high wealth and high stock 
market prices relative to, respectively, consumption and dividends (but also relative to 
the book value and other metrics) must predict low future returns. The key difference 
between the consumption-wealth ratio and the dividend-price ratio is what is on the 
right-hand side: in the equation for the consumption-wealth ratio it is the return to the 
entire market portfolio and consumption growth, whereas in the dividend-price ratio 
equation it is the return to the stock market component of wealth and dividend growth. 
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Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) and Guo and Savickas (2003) present evidence that tcay  
is a good predictor of excess returns on aggregate stock market indices. Evidence that 
the dividend-price ratio or the dividend yield is a good predictor of returns is given, 
among others, by Campbell and Shiller (1988), Campbell (1991), more recently, 
Cochrane (1999a, 2001); Fama and French (1996). It is worth stressing that 
predictability is a long-horizon effect. The updated predictability of 1 and 5 year returns 
using the dividend-price ratio as a forecasting regression variable is reported in Table 
2-1, reproduced from Cochrane (2011). The dividend-price ratio predicts 9 percent of 
the variation in 1 year returns and its explanatory power rises steadily as the horizon 
increases. It predicts up to 28 percent of the variation in 5 year returns. Even though the 
explanatory power, 2R , of the regression is inflated by an overlapping observations 
problem, the results at different horizons are reflections of a single underlying 
phenomenon. Even a small short run predictive power or non-zero contemporaneous 
correlation build up to yield substantial returns predictability at longer horizon if the 
forecasting variable is persistent. For example, if daily returns are very slightly 
predictable by a slow-moving (i.e., persistent) variable, that predictability adds up over 
long horizons. As argued by Cochrane (1999a) in a very illuminating way, you can 
predict that the temperature in Chicago will rise about one-third of a degree per day in 
spring. This forecast explains very little of the day to day variation in temperature but, 
because temperature changes are persistent (within each season), it tracks almost all the 
rise in temperature from January to July. Thus, the 2R  rises with horizon. Precisely, 
suppose that we forecast excess returns with a forecasting variable x: 
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 1 1
1 1
t t t
t t t
r a bx e
x c x 
 
 
  
   	 	 (2‐59)	
	
Even for small values of short-horizon b and 2R  in the first equation above, a large 
coefficient   in the second equation implies that the long-horizon regression has a 
large regression coefficient b  and a large 2R . This regression has a powerful 
implication: stocks are in many ways like bonds. Any bond investor understands that a 
string of good past returns that pushes the price up is bad news for subsequent returns. 
Many stock investors see a string of good past returns and interpret this as a sign of a 
bull market, concluding that future stock returns will be good as well. The regression 
reveals the opposite: a string of good past returns which drives up stock prices is bad 
news for subsequent stock returns, as it is for bonds. 
 
Table	2‐1	
Return	Predictability	
Horizon k b t-statistic R2 
1 year 3.8 (2.6) 0.09 
5 years 20.6 (3.4) 0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
The co-integrating relation between consumption, asset wealth, and labor income and 
between consumption and dividends imply that asset prices are set as predicted by 
rational asset pricing models, i.e. prices and wealth equal the present value of the 
rational expectation of future cash flows, either consumption (real cash flows) or 
dividends, discounted at the equilibrium expected rate of return. The valuation implied 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of excess-returns (value-weighted NYSE - Treasury bill rate) on 
value-weighted dividend/price ratio (reproduced from Cochrane (2011)): 
 
 denotes the kth year return. Standard errors use Hansen–Hodrick correction for heteroskedasticity and error 
autocorrelation.  
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by any such model is the solution to a stochastic differential equation where prices 
equal the present value of the rational expectation of next period dividend or 
consumption flows and capital gains discounted at the equilibrium expected rate of 
return. For this differential equation to have a determinate solution, a boundary 
condition that rules out bubbles must hold. Without this condition (equivalent to 
requiring that sooner or later any bubble bursts), any self-fulfilling expectation of 
capital gains would imply a different yet legitimate solution. In turn, the lack of this 
boundary condition would imply that the right hand side of (2-58) and (2-59) contains a 
non-stationary bubble component (in addition to the stationary terms in the rate of 
future returns and of consumption or dividend growth) and the left hand side would be 
non-stationary. 
 
The intimate relation between stationarity of the left-hand side of (2-58) and (2-59) and 
rational valuation has generated intense interest in tests of the co-integrating relation 
between variables such as prices and dividends or consumption, asset wealth and labor 
income. While Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) find that consumption, asset wealth and 
labor income are co-integrated and a large body of evidence suggests that the 
dividend-price ratio is stationary, see for example Cochrane (1999a, 2001), the evidence 
that prices and dividends are co-integrated is at best weaker. In particular, tests based on 
the Engle and Granger (1987) methodology find limited evidence of cointegration 
between dividend and prices, see for example Campbell and Shiller (1988), Diba and 
Grossman (1988), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), Balke and Wohar (2001). Since prices are 
much more volatile than dividends, see for example Campbell and Shiller (1988) and 
Campbell (1987), it is possible that these tests fail to detect cointegration because the 
parameters of the cointegrating relation are time varying and, in particular, they display 
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heteroskedastic variability characterized by clustering over time. Heteroskedastic 
time-variation in the parameters of the cointegrating relation in turn might help explain 
heteroskedastic excess volatility of prices over fundamentals. Harris et al. (2002) 
introduce a test for stochastic cointegration, where the parameters of the cointegrating 
relation are allowed to be time varying. This test encompasses the test for cointegration 
with fixed parameters of the cointegrating relation, defined stationary cointegration. 
Harris et al. (2002) find mixed evidence in favour of stochastic cointegration between 
stock and dividends but this evidence is stronger than the evidence in favour of 
stationary cointegration. 
 
2.8.6 The Role of Systematic Skewness 
Non-normal return distributions cannot be entirely described by first and second 
moments. Unless investors display a special type of preferences (quadratic), they care 
about higher moments. In particular, while NIARA rules out preference for negative 
portfolio skewness, decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) implies preference for 
positive skewness. As argued by Richter (1960), Levy (1969) and Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1976), an exact preference ordering for risky portfolios using the first 
three moments of the portfolio return is possible, in general, only for an investor with a 
cubic utility function of wealth. Unfortunately, as shown by Levy (1969) and Tsiang 
(1972), this third degree polynomial utility function is unsuitable to model the 
preferences of a risk adverse investor. Duly restricted third order Taylor expansions of 
admissible non-polynomial utility functions can be used instead. Under (NS, RA and) 
DARA and hence if the investor has a preference for positive portfolio skewness, he 
should be willing to accept a somewhat lower expected return to hold assets with 
positive coskewness. 
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2.8.7 The 3M-CAPM  
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) consider the optimal portfolio choice of a representative 
investor that lives in a 1-period economy. His utility is defined over end of period 
wealth W , i.e. ( )U U W , and it is not restricted to any particular functional form. The 
only requirement is that it be continuous and three times continuously differentiable 
over the range of wealth. In this very simple 1-period setting, where the investor does 
not have to solve the usual optimal consumption-investment decision problem that 
arises in multi-period (2 or more periods) models, the Euler equation for the 
maximization of his expected utility is: 
 
 , 1 , 1( ) 0t m t i tE U W r     .   (2-60) 
 
As shown in Section 8.1 Appendix A, a third order Taylor expansion of a standardized 
utility function around the point 0 ( ) 1W E W   yields: 
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               
.   
(2-61) 
 
Here, 1,
1 (1)
2t
U    and 2, 1 (1)6t U  . In the second line of (2-61), I use excess 
returns instead of returns because, in this simple 1-period setting where the distinction 
between unconditional and conditional moments is irrelevant, the risk free rate is known 
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with certainty (also conditionally) and, therefore,  , 1 , , 1 ,( ) ( )m t t m t m t t m tR E R r E r    . 
Differentiating (2-61) once with respect to wealth, marginal utility can be approximated 
as follows: 
 
 
2
, 1 1, , 1 , 2, , 1 ,( ) 1 2 ( ) 3 ( )m t t m t m t t m t m tU r r E r r E r               .   (2-62) 
 
Using (2-62) in (2-60) yields Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) 3M-CAPM. Interpreting 
marginal utility , 1( )m tU W   as a SDF, (2-60) can be seen as a version of (2-16) where 
, 1 , 1 , 1i t i t f tr R R     and, because , 1i tr   is an excess return, 0tp  . In (2-62), the SDF is 
approximated as a linear function of the market excess return and its square and thus it 
can be seen as an instance of (2-24) with )( ,1,1,1 tmtmt rErf    and 
 2,1,1,2 )( tmtmt rErf   , 1ta  , 1, 12tb  , 2, 23tb  . Applying (2-16), and dropping 
time-subscripts for notational simplicity, (2-60) and (2-62) imply:    
 
 
 [ ( | ) ( ( | ))][ ( )][ ( | ),  ]( )
[ ( | )] [ ( | )]
m m i im i
i
m m
E U r E U r r E rcov U r rE r
E U r E U r
 
 
       .  (2-63) 
 
Here, differentiating (2-62) once, 1 2( | ) 2 6m mU r r       and, differentiating it once 
more, 2( | ) 6mU r    . Finally, multiplying and dividing the first and second term on 
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the right-hand side of this equation by, respectively, 2[ ( )]m mE r E r  and 
3[ ( )]m mE r E r  and re-arranging, we can write12: 
 
 1 2( )i i iE r      .   (2-64) 
where, 
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Here, the coefficient δ1 is the beta premium and the coefficient δ2 is the gamma 
premium. The assumption of greed implies [ ( | )] 0mE U r    and, under RA, 
[ ( | )] 0mE U r   . Thus, since 0)]([ 2  mm rErE , the beta coefficient δ1 is positive for 
risk-averse, greedy investors. If the market portfolio skewness is negative (as it is often 
the case empirically) and if there is a market reward for holding assets with negative 
                                                 
 
12 I also assume that the second derivative of the utility function does not depend on the interaction between market 
and asset unexpected returns,    )()(),|( mrEmrirEirmruCov   = 0, and that the third derivative does 
not depend on the interaction between squared market unexpected returns and asset unexpected returns 
   2)()(),|( mrEmrirEirmruCov   . These are very useful and reasonable simplifications that, intuitively, 
correspond to the requirement that absolute risk aversion and preference towards skewness do not depend on the 
relation between a single asset and the market portfolio or its square (rather, they should depend only on the latter, i.e. 
the market return and its square). Essentially, only changes in overall wealth and in its volatility should determine 
moves along the utility function and, therefore, changes in the point at which its derivatives are evaluated. 
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systematic asset coskewness, the gamma coefficient δ2 is positive. This can also be seen 
by noting that, under the assumption of greed and NIARA, [ ( | )] 0mE U r    and
[ ( | )] 0mE U r    respectively. Since empirical market portfolio skewness is usually 
found to be negative, i.e. 0)]([ 3  mm rErE , then 02  . While δ1 represents 
investors’ reward for systematic variance, i.e. for holding assets that increase the 
volatility of the overall market portfolio, δ2 compensates investors for systematic 
negative skewness, i.e. for holding assets that decrease the skewness of the overall 
market portfolio (that cause the distribution of portfolio returns to be skewed to the left).  
 
2.8.8 The 3M-(C)CAPM 
While allowing utility to contain a cubic term in wealth, its parameters could be allowed 
to be time varying. For example, the elements of   in (2-60) could be specified as a 
function of conditioning information. A particularly interesting possibility is that they 
vary with the business cycle or that they are a function of conditioning variables that 
represent investors’ expectations about future returns. This would yield a conditional 
version of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) 3M-CAPM. Following a similar approach, 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) propose a conditional asset pricing equation where 
expected asset excess returns are a function of their conditional covariance and 
coskewness with the market portfolio and the prices of covariance and coskewness risk 
also vary over time: 
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where, 
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Here, the symbol 2 2, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1( ) {[ ( )],[ ( )]}t m t t m t t m t m t t m tskew r E r E r r E r        represents the 
skewness of the market portfolio in 1t  conditional on information available at time t
, while the other symbols (e.g. conditional expectation and variance operators) have the 
usual meaning. To prove this, we only assume: 
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Since,  
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then, we combine (2-71) and (2-72) by taking the terms , 1 , 1( , )t i t m tcov r r   and 
2
, 1 , 1( , )t i t m tcov r r   out, we will have the equations in (2-70), i.e. 
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The pricing equation in (2-71) can be derived from (2-25) specifying the SDF 1tm   as a 
quadratic polynomial in the market excess return , 1m tr   with parameters ta , 1,tb  and 
2,tb  that are allowed to vary over time, , 1 1f tR   , and therefore13, 1)( 1  tttt fEba . 
That is 
 
 21 1, , 1 2, , 1t t t m t t m tm a b r b r     .   (2-74) 
 
Interpreting 1tm   in (2.60) as the SDF implied by a third order Taylor expansion of the 
representative investor’s utility function, the pricing equation in (2.59) can be seen as 
the cross-sectional implication of a conditional version of the 3 moment CAPM 
(henceforth, 3M-(C)CAPM). Under this model, if investors like positive portfolio 
skewness, they should accept a negative risk premium to hold assets with positive 
coskewness because these assets contribute to increase the skewness of the overall 
market portfolio. In other words, the portfolio with positive coskewness is a ideal 
hedging instruments when the market is volatile, and the investors who hold such 
portfolio should pay extra price by bearing the lower premium. The price of coskewness 
risk 2,t , therefore, should be negative. It is worth at this point highlighting the 
difference with the 3-moment model derived by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) where, 
if market portfolio skewness is negative, positive asset coskewness implies a negative 
gamma and a positive δ2. In other words, the specification of the systematic third 
                                                 
 
13 Recall that, as shown in Section 2.2, in (2.12), and 2.3, in (2.19) and (2.22), without this approximation and the 
resulting restriction on the relation between the intercept and the mean of the factors the risk free return would show 
up in the equations for the risk prices. 
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moment premium used by Harvey and Siddique (2000) and by Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1976) are not equivalent.  
 
2.8.9 Tests of the 3M-(C)CAPM 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) test the 3M-CAPM on Centre for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP) NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock data over the period 1963-1993. 
They find that the 3M-CAPM significantly improves on a two-moment CAPM 
specification. They report that coskewness helps explain the cross-section of average 
excess-returns on 32 industry portfolios and 25 size and book-to-market value sorted 
portfolios. Moreover, they find that coskewness retains a significant explanatory power 
even after the inclusion of factors related to size and book to market value that have 
been found by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995) to empirically explain a large 
portion of the cross-sectional variation in average asset returns. In particular, they find 
that systematic skewness is important and commands on average a risk premium of 3.6 
percent per annum. 
 
Dittmar (2002) specifies a conditional model by expressing the parameters of a 
quadratic and cubic SDF as linear functions of a set of conditioning variables. The 
quadratic SDF implies the 3M-(C)CAPM whereas the cubic SDF implies a 4 moment 
CAPM where preference for co-kurtosis (the systematic fourth moment), is allowed. 
The conditioning variables include one lag of the market excess-return, of the dividend 
yield, the spread of the 3 Month T-Bill over the 1 Month T-Bill rate and the 1 Month 
T-Bill rate itself. He finds evidence of substantial non-linearity in the pricing kernel and 
that both the quadratic and cubic SDF fit well the cross-section of US industry equity 
indices average returns over the period 1963-1995. After imposing the regularity 
 68
conditions on the shape of the utility functions that correspond to standard risk 
aversion, i.e. positive marginal utility, RA and NIARA over all values of wealth, the 
estimated gamma premium remains statistically and economically significant but it 
becomes much smaller, thus considerably reducing the ability of the estimated 3 and 4 
moment conditional specifications to explain the cross-section of average returns.  
 
Post et al. (2008) criticise previous empirical tests of the 3M-CAPM, such as Harvey 
and Siddique (2000), on the grounds that they fail to check whether the decreasing 
marginal risk-aversion requirement is satisfied by the estimated pricing model. 
Consistently with Dittmar (2002), they show that the gamma (standardised asset 
co-skewness) premium turns out very small when the appropriate regularity conditions 
(risk aversion) are imposed on the shape of the investor utility function. In fact, fitting a 
cubic utility to data on the Fama and French (1995) market portfolio and on 10 
size-ranked portfolios for the period 1963-2001, their estimated expected utility 
function does not satisfy the concavity requirement over the relevant wealth interval and 
thus the market portfolio is not guaranteed to be efficient for the representative investor. 
Moreover, they find that the market portfolio is likely to minimize the sample expected 
utility, rather than maximize it as predicted by the 3M-CAPM. 
 
2.8.10 3M-CAPM vs. (C)CAPM 
Even though the (C)CAPM uses the assumption that investors have a quadratic utility 
function and its pricing kernel does not incorporate 3rd order terms, the unconditional 
implications of both the 3M-CAPM and the (C)CAPM contain a premium for a cross 
third moment of asset returns. The 3M-CAPM contains a premium for the cross third 
moment between asset return and the square of the market return, i.e. a premium for 
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2
, ,( , )i t m tcov r r . The (C)CAPM contains a cross third moment between the asset return, the 
market return and a conditioning variable that influences marginal utility of market 
wealth, i.e. a premium for , 1 ,( , )i t t m tcov r z r . Equivalently, asset coskewness can be seen 
as the covariance between the asset return and market volatility14, whereas in the 
(C)CAPM the expression , 1 ,( , )i t t m tcov r z r  can be interpreted as the covariance between 
the asset return and the sensitivity of the market return to the conditioning variable. In 
other words, in the 3M-CAPM investors are rewarded for holding assets that perform 
poorly at times of high market volatility, whereas in the (C)CAPM they are rewarded 
for holding assets that do poorly when the return on the stock market portfolio is very 
reactive to the conditioning variable, and hence when it is very reactive to either returns 
on non-market wealth or expected stock market returns. There are a number of 
circumstances under which the (C)CAPM expression , 1 ,( , )i t t m tcov r z r  could proxy for 
asset coskewness and vice versa. This would be the case if 1tz   was a good proxy for 
,m tr  and hence when the former forecasts the latter.  
 
2.8.11 Higher Moment CAPM and the Shape of the Utility Function 
Consistent with the 3M-CAPM, Dittmar (2002) finds that SDF specifications quadratic 
and cubic in the market return provide a much better fit to the observed cross-section of 
stock returns than linear models. This author also emphasises, however, that the best fit 
obtains with a U-shaped SDF, whereas the superior performance of the 3M and 
4M-CAPM is significantly reduced when the SDF is restricted to be decreasing in the 
market return. Post et al. (2008) report similar findings and reach similar conclusions. 
                                                 
 
14 More accurately, coskewness should be seen as the covariance with the realization of the market second moment.  
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This evidence implies that marginal utility of wealth increases above a threshold and 
thus that the utility function takes an “inverse S” shape. Such a shape, in turn, implies 
risk-seeking over a range of sample wealth.  
 
It is not uncommon, in the extant literature, to encounter studies that find evidence of 
risk-seeking and specifications of investors’ preferences that admit this type of 
behaviour. Psychologists, led by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), find experimental 
evidence of local risk seeking. Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) 
suggest that the willingness to purchase both insurance and lottery tickets implies that 
marginal utility is increasing over a range of investors’ wealth. Golec and Tamarkin 
(1998) and Garrett and Sobel (1999) provide evidence that risk-averse individuals take 
actuarially unfair “long shot” gambles, i.e. low-probability but high-variance bets, and 
argue that this behaviour can be rationalized by postulating skewness preference and an 
inverse-S shaped utility function. Post and Van Vliet (2006) and Post et al. (2008) 
argue, however, that non-concave utility is problematic from the viewpoint of the 
3M-CAPM. In essence, they point out that, if the representative investor’s utility 
function is not concave, the market portfolio is not guaranteed to maximize her expected 
utility function and the 3M-CAPM does not necessarily hold even if the estimated SDF 
is quadratic in the return on such portfolio. Their remark extends in a straightforward 
manner to models of the SDF cubic in market wealth, implying a similar difficulty in 
interpreting the explanatory power of such models as evidence in favour of the 
4M-CAPM. 
 
 71
2.9. Behavioural	Models	
The behavioural finance explanation of the stylized features of the distribution of asset 
returns also belongs to the new paradigm. While it does not rule out time varying risk 
and risk premia, it allows for investors’ irrationality and market inefficiency. Under this 
approach, it is admissible that asset prices and expected returns are not the solution to a 
general equilibrium model with fully rational, risk averse economic agents and 
competitive financial markets. See, for a review, Barberis and Thaler (2003)). The 
literature on limits to arbitrage clarified that, in the presence of noise trader risk, 
risk-averse market participants with short horizons (finitely lived) might not have the 
incentive to trade quickly as to exploit all available information even though financial 
markets are competitive and hence investors are price takers. This is the perspective 
advocated, among others, by De Long et al. (1990a, 1990b) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997). Noise trader risk is the risk that mispricing caused by the net demand of 
irrational (and hence uninformed) noise traders might worsen in the short run before 
trades by rational (and hence informed) traders manage to correct it. The relevant notion 
of rationality is, in this context, the definition embedded in the rational expectation 
hypothesis of Muth (1961).  
 
The behavioural perspective also allows for non-standard utility functions where 
investors either do not have unambiguously defined preferences over consumption or 
they display risk seeking over certain portions of the utility function domain. For 
example, Prospect Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory, formulated by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992), respectively, imply framing 
and S-shaped utility functions defined over gains and losses instead of over 
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consumption and wealth as in the standard Expected Utility framework. In particular, 
these utility functions display risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses 
below a threshold. Behavioural Portfolio Theory, advocated by Shefrin and Statman 
(2000), predicts instead risk aversion over losses and risk seeking over gains and thus an 
inverse S-shaped utility function. These non-standard utility functions rationalize 
evidence that investors, under certain circumstances, display risk seeking behaviour. 
Active stock traders appear to play negative-sum games and their behavior can 
sometimes be interpreted as “gambling” (Statman, 2002). In addition, psychologists led 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find experimental evidence for local risk seeking 
behavior. More specifically, Post and Levy (2005) argue that a number of celebrated 
asset pricing anomalies, such as the low average yield on stocks with large 
capitalization, growth stocks and past winners, could be explained by risk aversion over 
losses and risk seeking over gains.  
 
Numerous contributions from the literature on non-standard utility theory and 
behavioural asset pricing (see for a review Shefrin (2010)), thus, admit a non-linear 
pricing kernel that implies non concavity of the utility function over certain ranges of 
wealth, and thus an increasing SDF and a violation of RA. Friedman and Savage (1948) 
and Markowitz (1952) argue that the willingness to purchase both insurance and lottery 
tickets implies that marginal utility is increasing over a range. See Hartley and Farrell 
(2002) and Post and Levy (2005) for a recent discussion. S-shaped utility functions, 
such as the function implied by the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
do not satisfy either RA or NIARA. Inverse S-shaped utility functions, such as the 
specification implied by the behavioural portfolio theory of Shefrin and Statman (2002), 
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violate RA but satisfy NIARA at every point in the domain where the function is 
differentiable.  
 
2.10. Absolute	vs.	Relative	Pricing	
Financial theory has extensively addressed the issue of how to model the mean 
behaviour of asset returns and link it to other variables. In particular, asset pricing 
models relate mean returns to higher moments. The latter are typically cross-moments 
formed between the asset return and other variables. These variables can be either 
economic fundamentals and other non-asset variables, or returns on other assets such as 
the market portfolio. The first approach is known as absolute pricing, e.g. Lucas’ (1978) 
Consumption CAPM, whereas the second is known as relative pricing, e.g. the Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) CAPM and especially the Asset Pricing Theory (APT), 
proposed by Ross (1976). The APT requires for its derivation less restrictive 
assumptions than the CAPM, such as that investors are greedy, that markets are 
frictionless (or, at least, that diversification is not too costly) and that the returns 
variance-covariance matrix has a well defined factor structure. The latter requirement 
guarantees that diversified portfolios can be closely replicated by portfolios that mimic 
the exposure to single factors. It does not, however, require market completeness (or, 
equivalently, the representative investor assumption). It provides a no-arbitrage pricing 
relation between diversified portfolios of assets based on their sensitivity to a set of 
pervasive risk factors and on the equilibrium risk premium for the exposure to each 
factor. Chen et al. (1986) proxy for the factors using macro-economic variables deemed 
to drive the variation in stock returns. Within a multi-factor model for asset returns 
derived from the APT, Koutoulas and Kryzanowski (1996) estimated conditional 
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time-varying risk premia and conditional volatilities associated with each pervasive risk 
factor. They found that five pervasive risk factors, namely the lag of industrial 
production, the Canadian Index of 10 Leading Indicators, the US Composite Index of 12 
leading Indicators, the exchange rate and the residual market factor, have priced risk 
premia, including the residual market factor. 
 
For large and diversified portfolios, the implications of the CAPM and of the APT are 
the same when there is only one pervasive risk factor, the market portfolio. In this case, 
the expected excess return on the market portfolio would be the only risk premium 
priced in equilibrium for any diversified portfolio. Neither the CAPM nor the APT 
admit any risk premium related to idiosyncratic risk (exposure to asset-specific, 
non-pervasive risk factors), which is expected to be diversified away. It should be noted 
however that the CAPM, contrary to a popular misinterpretation, is not a special case of 
the APT. The latter imposes an assumption, namely that the idiosyncratic residuals are 
uncorrelated, that the CAPM does not require. In the CAPM, idiosyncratic residuals are 
uncorrelated only on average (with capitalization weights). This is not an assumption, 
but an implication that follows by construction from the CAPM prediction that these 
residuals are the error terms of the regression of a set of asset excess returns on their 
own capitalization-weighted average, namely the market excess returns. 
 
2.11. Transaction	Costs	
Despite the formal elegance and analytical simplicity of the C-CAPM, the empirical 
performance of the model has been, at best, mixed. Since the early studies by Hansen 
and Singleton (1982, 1983), it has been clear that observed asset returns are inconsistent 
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with the dynamics of consumption choices, at least as observed in aggregate data. This 
evidence was reinforced and confirmed in a large number of subsequent studies (see, 
Mehra and Prescott (1985)). Some studies, such as Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), 
suggested that one of the reasons for the poor empirical performance of the model was 
the low level of variability of aggregate consumption growth. More recently, there have 
been several attempts at rationalizing this discouraging evidence and several studies 
have explored the possibility that limited participation in financial markets might 
explain the disparity between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. More 
precisely, since the first-order conditions of representative-agent rational asset pricing 
models hold as equalities only for households that own diversified portfolios, the 
models should be tested for this subset of households only and not for the whole 
population. As a consequence, since in practice relatively few households hold shares 
directly and even fewer hold a fully diversified portfolio, the use of aggregate 
consumption data in evaluating asset pricing models can be misleading, This is arguably 
the case even if we abstract from standard aggregation issues arising from the 
nonlinearity of the marginal rate of substitution 
 
These points have been stressed by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Attanasio et al. (2002), 
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and Paiella (2004), among others, who propose limited 
financial market participation as a unified framework for rationalizing the empirical 
rejection of the C-CAPM. These authors show that accounting for portfolio 
heterogeneity and in particular for non-participation in financial markets helps reconcile 
the predictions of the theory with the empirical evidence. Attanasio et al. (2002), for 
instance, show that focusing on the consumption of stockholders not only yields 
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estimates of preference parameters that are in line with the theory, but also one does not 
reject the over identifying restrictions implied by the model and, relatedly, the moments 
of the marginal rate of substitution are within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds. 
However, as pointed by Attanasio and Paiella (2011), limited participation is itself a 
puzzle for the intertemporal consumption model, just like the observed substantial 
differences in portfolio composition across agents and over the life cycle. Merton (1969) 
and Samuelson (1969) have illustrated how such behaviour is inconsistent with the 
maximization of expected lifetime utility, which predicts that rational agents should 
invest an arbitrarily small amount in all assets with positive expected return, including 
risky ones, unless there are nonlinearities in the budget constraint. 
 
One possible and obvious way to reinstate consumption risk as the key determinant of 
equilibrium asset prices is by invoking other market conditions, such as trading costs, 
which may explain the tenuous link between aggregate consumption risk and asset 
volatility. This approach has been pursued by He and Modest (1995), Luttmer (1996, 
1999) and, more recently, Attanasio and Paiella (2011). Investors trading directly on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) face a bid-ask spread of at least one eighth of a 
dollar per share (one “tick”). Also, taxes can create a gap between the interest rates at 
which consumers can borrow and lend. More indirectly, about 2.5 percent of the labour 
force in the U.S. is employed in the financial sector, presumably providing some costly 
intermediating service between buyers and sellers of assets (Luttmer, 1996). Empirical 
studies of the capital asset pricing model, the arbitrage pricing theory, and of 
consumption-based asset pricing models are typically premised on the assumption that 
the empirical implications of these models are not very much affected by the presence 
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of trading frictions of commonly observed magnitudes. Using aggregate data, Luttmer 
(1999) provides a lower bound on the transaction costs that would rationalize the model 
in the face of available data. Paiella (2007), using micro data, provides evidence in 
support of the participation cost hypothesis by bounding from below the costs of 
participating in some financial markets and showing that such lower bound is realistic. 
Her bounds for the stock market participation costs are as small as $130 per year.  
 
2.12. Summary	and	Conclusions	
In this section I have summarized the important developments in asset pricing theory 
along with the transition from the old to the new paradigm of asset returns, and I have 
shown how the various asset pricing models can be seen as specializations of the 
general SDF model. I have then reviewed a number of specifications of this model. 
Whenever possible, I highlighted the connections between the implications of the 
various asset pricing models and interesting patterns in equity returns and their 
moments.  
 
The SDF representation of the asset pricing problem is surprisingly flexible, yet it 
allows explanations for the observed patterns in asset returns to be generated in a 
rigorous and testable manner. The only requirement is that the SDF be linear in the 
factors. Since this approach allows for considerable flexibility in specifying the 
functional form of the SDF, it can capture non-linearity in the behaviour of marginal 
utility and time variation in the parameters of the utility function. It therefore serves as a 
useful framework to specify alternative asset pricing models that allow for a variety of 
factors to be priced in the time series and cross section of asset returns under alternative 
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assumptions about the multivariate return distribution, investors’ preferences and 
market completeness.  
 
All the asset pricing models considered in the empirical part of the thesis, i.e. Chapter 3, 
4, 5 and 6, can be seen as specializations of the SDF model. Chapter 3 proposes a novel 
approach to testing non-linear SDF specifications that arise in rational representative 
investor models. Chapter 4 will check whether adding the sentiment factor, and thus 
allowing for a behavioural influence on asset pricing, allows to significantly improve 
the explanatory power of the (C)CAPM and 3M-CAPM. In Chapter 5, I will allow for 
market frictions, and investigate the performance of the conditional higher-moment 
CAPM under realistic transaction cost assumptions. The attribution model used in 
Chapter 6 to assess the performance of Chinese mutual fund managers is based on a 
SDF representation of a multi-factor pricing model specified under the assumption that 
the shares of the funds are held at the margin by a representative investor that faces an 
investment opportunity set made up of Chinese stocks. 
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3. The	Coskewness	Puzzle	
3.1. Introduction	
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to testing non-linear SDF specifications 
that arise in rational representative investor models. Our approach does not require 
overly-restrictive assumptions about the shape of investors’ preferences, typically 
imposed by the extant literature, and is based instead on restrictions that rule out “good 
deals”, i.e. arbitrage opportunities as well as unduly large Sharpe ratios. We apply this 
framework to test the empirical admissibility of 3 and 4-moment versions of the CAPM 
in explaining differences in average returns across a number of stock strategies and 
portfolios, including static strategies based on a fine industry-level diversification, 
momentum strategies and portfolios managed on the basis of available information. 
 
Our study aims to shed light on the puzzling conundrum arising from the problematic 
shape of the representative investor’s utility function implied by unrestricted estimates 
of the 3M and 4M-CAPM. On the one hand, the findings of Dittmar (2002) and the 
critique put forth by Post et al. (2008) suggest that omitting appropriate restrictions on 
the shape of the candidate SDF might lead to over-fitting the cross-section of the test 
asset returns and thus to spurious estimates of the parameters of the 3M and 4M-CAPM. 
On the other hand, concavity of utility is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
market portfolio to maximize expected utility. This implies that it is formally impossible 
to make any conclusive inference on the empirical validity of higher moment versions 
of the CAPM if the latter are rejected when this condition is imposed in estimation, as in 
the tests performed by Dittmar (2002) and Post et al. (2008). Such tests, in fact, while 
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suggestive, amount to tests of the joint hypothesis that the higher moment CAPM holds 
and utility is concave.  
 
To mitigate this difficulty, we pursue an alternative approach. We only assume that 
marginal utility is positive and the representative investor’s relative risk aversion (RRA) 
does not exceed an upper bound motivated by survey and experimental evidence 
(secondary data) on economic agents’ risk aversion, as well as by introspection. These 
restrictions, and especially the bound on RRA, have the effect of limiting the volatility 
of the estimated SDF and, together, they rule out both arbitrage opportunities and 
unduly high Sharpe ratios (henceforth, SR). Imposing such restrictions boils down to 
limiting the admissible curvature of the representative investor’s utility function and, 
ultimately, mitigates the danger of over-fitting the cross-section of the test asset returns. 
Because this approach does not rely on overly-restrictive assumptions about the shape 
of utility, it permits a more direct appraisal of the empirical admissibility of 
higher-moments versions of the CAPM than the approach followed by Dittmar (2002) 
and Post et al. (2008). 
 
Our empirical results paint a complex picture. On the one hand, somewhat surprisingly, 
we find that coskewness and cokurtosis risk matter only for the pricing of strategies 
characterized by relatively high SRs, such as dynamic portfolios managed on the basis 
of available conditioning information or, at least until the late 90s, payoffs spanned by a 
fine industry-level diversification, as well as momentum strategies. On the other hand, 
our results conclusively demonstrate that, as suspected by Post and Van Vliet (2006), 
the CAPM and its higher-moment versions cannot provide an exhaustive description of 
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average stock returns. This is also true of specifications, akin to those estimated by 
Dittmar (2002), consistent with 3 and 4-moment conditional versions of this model. We 
conclude that, while preferences towards higher moments are important in explaining 
average returns, especially on certain strategies, the CAPM and its higher-moment 
versions provide at best a partial account of the stock price determination mechanism. 
 
In the next Section, we discuss the problem of bounding from above SDF volatility in 
the context of the higher-moment CAPM. In Section 3.3, we outline the estimation 
methodology that underlies our tests. In Section 3.4, we describe our dataset. In Section 
3.5, we present our empirical results for the case of unconditional models. In Section 
3.6, to facilitate comparisons with the extant literature, we report estimates of the 
unconditional models obtained using different sample periods and test asset payoffs.  
In Section 3.7, we report our empirical results for the case of conditional models. In 
Section 3.8, we discuss the implications of our findings and offer our conclusions. 
 
3.2. The	Risk	Aversion	and	the	SDF	Volatility	
We specify the candidate SDF as the following third order polynomial defined over the 
market portfolio return , 1m tR  : 
 2 31 1, , 1 2, , 1 3, , 1t t t m t t m t t m tm a b R b R b R       .  	 (3‐1)	
 
The specification in (3-1) can be interpreted as a factor model with factors given by the 
first three integer powers of the return on the market portfolio of risky assets. In view of 
the covariance-pricing representation of the implications of (3-1) outlined in Appendix 
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A, 1,tb , 2,tb , and 3,tb  is related with the prices of market covariance, coskewness 
and cokurtosis risk, respectively. It is well known that the CAPM imposes a number of 
restrictions on (3-1). In this model, the market portfolio is the inter-temporal optimal 
allocation that maximizes the representative investor’s multi-period expected utility, 
subject to the economy’s inter-temporal budget constraint. Denoting by , 1( )m tU W   the 
investor’s time-separable utility function of wealth and by )( 1,  tmWU  its first 
derivative and according to the analysis in the last chapter, the first order condition 
(FOC) for the optimum is that, for every payoff 1tx  , the following equality holds: 
 , , 1 1( ) ( )m t t t m t tU W p E U W x       .  	 (3‐2)	
 
This equation also can be interpreted as 
 , 1 1 1 1
,
( )
( )
( )
m t
t t t t t t
m t
U W
p E x E m x
U W
         
.  	 (3‐3)	
 
The key prediction of the CAPM is that the market portfolio is efficient. This requires 
that the market portfolio maximizes the representative investor’s expected utility, 
subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint. That is, the market portfolio must 
represent the solution to a constrained maximization problem. The equalities in (3-2) 
represent FOCs of this problem. A necessary and sufficient condition for their solution 
to coincide with the solution to the representative investor’s problem is that the 
expectation of the utility function (the maximand) be quasi-concave in wealth. Deriving 
the implications of this condition for the parameters of (3-1) is, however, extremely 
complex. This difficulty explains why, in tests of the higher-moment CAPM, 
researchers usually impose global concavity of utility and thus require that its second 
derivative U   be negative, by either using a power specification or suitably restricting 
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the parameters of a polynomial expansion of the utility function, as in Dittmar (2002). 
This condition is relatively easy to enforce and it is sufficient to guarantee that the 
expectation of utility be quasi-concave in wealth, but it is not necessary for this to be the 
case. Therefore, if the aim is to test higher moment versions of the CAPM, such 
condition is too restrictive.  
 
We do not wish to impose the overly restrictive assumption that utility is concave, nor 
we are able to directly impose the requirement that its expectation be quasi-concave. We 
do wish, however, to restrict the curvature of the utility function in a meaningful 
fashion. To achieve this aim, we exploit the link between the curvature and volatility of 
the representative investor’s IMRS. Referring to Appendix A, we have: 
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 
  
   

.  	 (3‐4)	
 
As a first step, we obtain an expression for the variance of the IMRS by applying the 
conditional variance operator to both sides of (3-4). In doing so, we neglect all terms in 
the Taylor expansion of the IMRS that contain second and higher order powers of the 
market return. This yields the following locally valid approximation of the IMRS 
conditional variance: 
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 ,2 2 2 2 21 , , 1 , , 1
,
( )
( ) ( )
( )
m t
t t t m t m t t m t m t
m t
U W
m W r RRA r
U W
      
     
.  	 (3‐5)	
The above result illustrates the relation between RRA and the volatility of the IMRS in 
a neighbourhood of an initial wealth value Wm,t. Under an upper bound on the (absolute 
value of) RRA, i.e. letting Vtm RRARRA , , we have the following inequality: 
 2 2 2 2, , 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( )t m t t V V tm t m t m tRRA r RRA r RRA r      .  	 (3‐6)	
Using (3-6) to bound from above the right-hand side of (3-5), and recalling that the 
coefficient γ which is often called the subjective inter-temporal rate of substitution 
should satisfies 10   , we obtain the following upper bound to the volatility of the 
IMRS: 
 2 2 2 2 2 21 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( )t t V t V tm t m tm RRA r RRA r       .  	 (3‐7)	
Since 2 2 21 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1( ) (1 ) ( )t m t t m t t m tr r R          , (3-7) could be re-written as, 
 2 2 2 2 2 21 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( )t t V t V tm t m tm RRA R RRA R       .  	 (3‐8)	
This inequality, ultimately a restriction on the curvature of utility, implies that the 
volatility of the IMRS is bounded from above by a quantity that depends on market 
volatility and a bound on the admissible values of RRA. It should be noted that, while 
(3-5) only holds in a neighbourhood of the initial wealth value Wm,t, the upper bound in 
(3-7) and (3-8) holds in the neighbourhood of every value of wealth as long as RRA, 
itself a function of wealth, evaluates to a quantity that is within the RRA bound. This 
makes the bound relevant for restricting the volatility of the IMRS of investors who 
exhibit non constant RRA and thus care about moments of third and higher orders. 
Therefore, (3-7) and (3-8) can be seen as a generalization to a possibly non 
mean-variance world of a result already formulated by Ross (2005) under the 
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assumption of either log-normally distributed returns or exponential utility. Importantly, 
Ross (2005) also demonstrates15 that the volatility of the representative investor’s 
IMRS provides a “no good deal” upper bound to the economy maximal SR or, 
equivalently, to the volatility of the minimum-variance SDF * 1tm   that prices all assets 
traded in the economy, i.e. 2 * 21 1( ) ( )t t t tm m   . Thus, using (3-8), we obtain the 
following bound on the variance of * 1tm  : 
 2 * 2 2 21 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t V t m tm m RRA R      .  	 (3‐9)	
Taking unconditional expectations of both sides of (3-9) gives the following upper 
bound on the unconditional variance of the candidate SDF: 
 2 * 2 21 , 1( ) ( )t V m tm RRA R   .  	 (3‐10)	
To give empirical content to this inequality, one needs to identify a suitable value for 
the RRA bound. To this end, we follow the advice of Ross (2005) and seek guidance 
from survey and experimental evidence on investors’ RRA provided by the extant 
literature. Ross (2005) suggests imposing an upper bound of 5 on the RRA of the 
marginal investor, i.e. 5VRRA . Among the motivations advanced by Ross (2005) to 
do so, the one that most easily applies to a world with possibly non-normally distributed 
returns and non quadratic utility is the simple observation that RRA higher than 5 would 
imply that the investor is willing to pay more than 10 percent per annum to avoid a 20 
percent volatility of his wealth (i.e., about the unconditional volatility of the S&P in the 
last 75 years), which seems a rather large amount. Similar indications can be drawn 
from the analysis offered by Meyer and Meyer (2005), who provide a comprehensive 
                                                 
 
15 See Proposition 1 in Ross (2005). 
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re-evaluation of the hitherto scattered empirical evidence on economic agents’ risk 
aversion. They show that RRA estimates reported by the extant literature are less 
heterogeneous and extreme if one takes into account measurement issues and the 
outcome variable with respect to which each study defines risk aversion. Using returns 
on stock investments as the outcome variable, calculations by Meyer and Meyer (2005) 
show that the RRA coefficient in the classical Friend and Blume (1975) study of 
household asset allocation choices ranges between 6.4 and 2.0, and decreases in 
investors’ wealth. Using returns on the investors’ overall wealth, including real estate 
and a measure of human capital, the RRA estimate ranges between 3.0 and 2.4. The 
same calculations show16 that the RRA implied by the findings of Barsky et al. (1997) 
ranges between 0.8 and 1.6.  
 
These considerations allow us to identify a plausible upper bound on RRA. To be able 
to compute the SDF volatility upper bound in (3-10), all that remains to be done is to 
obtain an estimate of the market portfolio volatility, or at least an upper bound on such a 
quantity. To this end, we note that, even though the market portfolio of risky assets 
includes both a traded and a non traded portion, the former is likely the most volatile. 
Thus, we use the S&P500 index to proxy for the traded portion and neglect the 
non-traded one, which is hard to measure. The sample estimate of the S&P500 index 
volatility over the period 1965-2005 is about 15.5 percent per annum. Therefore, using 
(3-10), the SDF volatility bound for this period is about 78 percent per annum if, as 
                                                 
 
16 Meyer and Meyer (2005) calculate somewhat higher values based on estimates provided by studies of the equity 
premium puzzle. Since these estimates are backed out parametrically from estimates of a particular asset pricing 
model, often based on a narrow definition of the market portfolio, they are of no interest for the purpose of computing 
the SDF volatility bound. Moreover, their use would imply a circular argument. 
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suggested by Ross (2005), the RRA upper bound is set to RRAV = 5.0 and about 99 
percent per annum if the RRA upper bound is set to match the RRA of the most risk 
averse households’ cohort in Friend and Blume (1975) study, i.e. RRAV = 6.4. 
 
3.3. Factor	Model	Estimation	under	SDF	Sign	and	Volatility	Restrictions	
Given a set of n basis test asset payoffs 1tx  , a NA restriction and an upper bound on 
the volatility of the candidate SDF 1tm  , the latter can be estimated by solving the 
following problem: 
 { }
2
1 1
       min  
. .   0,   ( )
t n n tm
t t t t
g W g
s t m m A

 

 
.  	 (3‐11)	
with 
 1 1 1( ) ( )t t t t t tg E m x p x    .  	 (3‐12)	
The elements of the vector tg  correspond to the moment conditions implied by the 
restriction in (3-3) and can be interpreted as pricing errors, while W  is a suitable 
n n  weighting matrix. The efficient choice for the latter is Hansen (1982) optimal 
weighting matrix but in this study, following Dittmar (2002), we mainly use Hansen and 
Jagannathan (1997) second moment matrix because it does not reward spurious 
variability of the candidate SDF. When using this weighting matrix, the minimized 
pricing error metric in (12) becomes T times the square of Hansen and Jagannathan 
(1997) distance, where T denotes the length of the sample period. To make inferences 
about the empirical admissibility of the candidate SDF, we use the asymptotic 
distribution of this statistic, under the null of zero pricing errors, provided by 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996). To identify the mean of the SDF, as done by Dittmar 
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(2002) and recommended by Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999) and Farnsworth et al. 
(2002a), we include the risk-free asset amongst the basis test asset payoffs 1tx . In 
estimation, under the usual ergodicity assumptions, we use sample averages ()TE  
instead of unconditional means and we expand the set of orthogonality conditions by 
imposing the pricing errors to be unpredictable using information carried by a vector of 
instruments tz : 
 { }
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
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.  	 (3‐13)	
with 
  1 1( )T T t t t tg E m x p z    .  	 (3‐14)	
Here, tz  is a vector of k  conditioning variables. This yields a total of  N n k   
orthogonality conditions for the pricing of as many test assets with payoffs represented 
by the cross-products tt zx 1 . The latter can be seen as payoffs of dynamic portfolios 
made up of basis assets having payoffs 1tx  and managed using information carried by 
the conditioning variables tz . The candidate SDF 1tm   is the polynomial described by 
(3-1). We call the unrestricted version of the latter the (conditional) cubic market factor 
model, and denote it by the shorthand notation CMFM. Letting tb ,2  equal zero yields a 
quadratic market factor model (QMFM). Setting both tb ,2  and tb ,3  equal to zero 
yields a linear market factor model (LMFM). Given the seminal role played by the 
study of Dittmar (2002) in the literature on tests of the higher moment-CAPM under 
preference restrictions, we adopt an empirical specification of the candidate SDF that is 
as close as possible to the one used by this author. We thus model the market portfolio 
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as a linear combination of a value-weighted portfolio of traded assets, with rate of return 
denoted by , 1vw tR  , and human capital, with rate of return , 1l tR  . That is, we let:  
 , 1 , 1 , 1(1 )m t t vw t t l tR R R      .  	 (3‐15)	
Here, 0 1t   represents the fraction of market wealth allocated to traded financial 
assets. Thus, using (3-15) in (3-1), we have the following empirical specification of the 
candidate SDF: 
 
2 3
1 0, ,1, , 1 ,2, , 1 ,3, , 1
2 3
,1, , 1 ,2, , 1 ,3, , 1
t t vw t vw t vw t vw t vw t vw t
l t l t l t l t l t l t
m a b R b R b R
b R b R b R
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  
    
  

.  	 (3‐16)	
Here, the cross product between , 1
i
vw tR   and , 1
i
l tR   is ignored. This specification is the 
same as the one used by Dittmar (2002). We note, however, that the weights t
 
and 
1 t  are time-varying. For this reason, imposing that the candidate SDF in (3-16) be 
decreasing in , 1vw tR   and , 1l tR  , as done by Dittmar (2002), is not the same as 
imposing it to be decreasing in , 1m tR  . In fact, the former requirement is much more 
restrictive than the latter and it is overly restrictive if the aim is to impose concavity of 
the utility function, which only requires that the candidate SDF be decreasing in the 
overall market portfolio wealth rather than in each one of its components17. These 
considerations provide further motivation for imposing positivity and volatility 
restrictions on the estimated SDF in place of global concavity in tests of the higher 
moment CAPM. Finally, following again Dittmar (2002), we model conditional 
time-variation in the shape of the utility function by specifying the parameters of the 
                                                 
 
17 Admittedly, imposing that the estimated SDF be decreasing in Rm,t+1, rather than in Rvw,t+1 and Rl,t+1 separately, can 
be quite challenging because of obvious programming difficulties and econometric software limitations as well as 
because the weights with which traded and non traded wealth enter the market portfolio are difficult to observe and 
measured with error. 
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candidate SDF as linear functions of the set of conditioning information variables tz , 
i.e. we let, 
 , , , , , ,'               '               't t vw j t vw j t l j t l j ta z b z b z     .  	 (3‐17)	
Here, recalling that tz  is a vector of k
 
conditioning variables, ,vw j  and ,l j , with 
[1,  2,  3]j  , are conformable coefficients vectors.  
 
3.4. Empirical	Specification	Details	and	Data	
We use monthly data, from 1963 to 2005, on the rate of returns on an overall 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks included in the Centre for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP) database and on portfolios of such stocks sorted into 17 and 30 industries 
as well as 10 momentum deciles 18 . As customary, the value-weighted portfolio 
represents the proxy for the return , 1vw tR 
 
on the traded portion of the market portfolio 
of risky assets. The returns on the 17 and 30 industry-sorted stock portfolios represent 
payoff spaces similar to those spanned by the returns on the 20 and 27 industry-sorted 
portfolios used by Dittmar (2002) and Harvey and Siddique (2000), respectively. The 
10 momentum portfolios are also similar to those used by the latter authors. We use 
NIPA data to construct, as in Dittmar (2002), a proxy for the return on human capital 
, 1l tR 
 
and we employ the yield of the 1-month US Government Treasury Bill as a proxy 
for the risk-free rate. We use the rates of return on the test asset payoffs to compute 
gross returns (i.e., one plus the rate of return or the yield). The conditioning information 
variables tz  are the unit series and variables drawn from a set that includes the 
                                                 
 
18 We thank K. French for making this data publicly available for download. 
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excess-return on the market portfolio proxy ,m tr , its dividend-yield tdy , the yield spread 
tys  of the 3-month T-Bill in excess of the 1-month T-Bill, the return ttb  on the T-Bill 
closest to one-month maturity, i.e, ,[ ,  ,  ,  ]t m t t t tz r dy ys tb  . These variables are known 
to predict market-wide returns, as noted by Dittmar (2002) and references therein. 
 
Figure 3-1 plots the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) mean-variance frontier of the SDFs 
that price by construction the payoff space for the case when the payoffs 1tx   are the 
gross returns either on one of the two sets of industry portfolios or on the 10 momentum 
portfolios, augmented by the gross return on the risk-free asset proxy. The figure also 
plots the SDF mean-variance frontier for the case when the payoffs are the 
cross-products 1t tx z   between the gross returns on the 17 industry-sorted portfolios, 
augmented by the gross return on the risk-free asset proxy, and the conditioning 
variables tz , represented by the unit series, ,m tr , tdy , tys  and ttb . Panel A of the 
Figure 3-1 plots the frontiers for the sub-sample period 1965-1993, which ends at the 
same time as the sample period considered by Harvey and Siddique (2000), while Panel 
B plots the frontiers for our benchmark sample period 1965-2005. By construction, the 
30 industry-sorted portfolios span all strategies spanned by the 17 industry-sorted ones, 
but not the other way round. As a result, the frontier for the former set of portfolios lies 
above the frontier for the latter. Similarly, the managed portfolios span all strategies 
spanned by the static portfolios, but not the other way round, which is reflected in a 
tighter Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bound for the former and thus in a higher 
frontier. One interesting feature of all these frontiers is that they are noticeably lower in 
the longer sample period. 
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3.5. Unconditional	Estimates	
We first estimated unconditional versions of (3-16), setting tz  equal to the unit series 
and using gross returns as test asset payoffs. The price of these payoffs, by construction, 
equals one. In (3-14), we therefore set 1tp  . In Panel A of Table 3-1, we summarize 
the unconstrained estimates of the LMFM, QMFM and CMFM. The panel reports the 
point estimates of the coefficients of the candidate SDFs, along with the p-values of the 
corresponding t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
adjusted (HAC) Newey and West (1987) standard errors, the Hansen and Richard (1987) 
distance and the associated p-value, based on the asymptotic distribution under the null 
of zero pricing errors provided by Jagannathan and Wang (1996), as well as the 
annualized volatility of the estimated SDF and the implied RRA bound. The sample 
period is 1965-2005.  
 
The estimated 2b  coefficients are statistically insignificant for all models. While the 
non-linear models are not rejected, neither are the linear ones. As shown in Panel B of 
the Table 3-1, imposing the positivity constraint on the estimated SDF does not 
significantly diminish the explanatory power of the models under consideration and the 
restriction is in many cases not binding. In Table 3-2, we report estimates of the 
candidate SDFs obtained under additional restrictions. To enforce RA and NIARA in 
estimation, we imposed 0)1( ,,  tjij b , with [ ,  ]i vw l  and [1,  2,  3]j  . We also 
restricted the estimated SDF to satisfy a strict positivity constraint and imposed an 
upper bound on its volatility, as specified by (3-13). The volatility bound was set to 78 
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percent per annum, corresponding to a RRA upper bound of 5. Again, the Hansen and 
Jagannathan (1997) test fails to reject any of the models under consideration. Overall, 
these results suggest that third and fourth systematic moments play at most a limited 
role in the pricing of the test asset payoffs used in estimation, i.e. the gross returns on 
the 17 industry-sorted portfolios and the risk-free asset. 
 
3.6. The	Role	of	Coskewness	Risk	over	Time	and	Strategies	
On balance, our findings thus far suggest that the price of coskewness (and cokurtosis) 
risk does not greatly matter in the pricing of unconditional (i.e., static) portfolios of 
stocks. This is consistent with the results reported by Friend and Westerfield (1980) and 
Fang and Lai (1997) but is in sharp contrast with the findings of other authors, most 
notably Harvey and Siddique (2000). To double-check on these seemingly conflicting 
results, we estimate the QMFM under alternative choices for the weighting matrix of 
the moment conditions, including the identity matrix and the optimal weighting matrix, 
and using alternative sets of test asset payoffs and sample periods.  
 
To save space, we report in Table 3-3 only the estimation results obtained using a 
sample counterpart of Hansen (1982) optimal weighting matrix, based on a 
continuously updating (CUE) estimate of the spectral density matrix, and a set of test 
asset payoffs represented by excess-returns (in place of gross returns) on the 17 and 30 
industry-sorted portfolios over the sample period 1963-2005 and portions thereof. For 
comparison, we also report estimates obtained using excess-returns on the 10 
momentum portfolios as the test asset payoffs. The weighting matrix choice yields 
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CUE-GMM, which has nice statistical properties that allow for more efficient estimates. 
The use of excess-returns as test asset payoffs implies exact pricing of the risk free asset. 
By construction, excess-returns have a zero price. Therefore, in (3-14), we set 0tp  . 
 
Table 3-3 reports two sets of results. The first comprises point estimates of the 1b  and 
2b  parameters of the QMFM and the p-values of the corresponding t-statistics 
constructed using standard errors based on our estimate of the spectral density matrix. 
The second set of results include the stock market covariance and coskewness 
annualized risk-premia ,1vw  and ,2vw , respectively, implied by the estimated ,1vwb  
and ,2vwb  according to the beta-pricing representation, described by (A-3), (A-4) and 
(A-5) in section 8.1 Appendix A, of the QMFM. The Table also reports p-values of the 
bootstrapped risk-premia distribution. The latter is generated using the so called 
“estimation-based” bootstrap introduced by Freedman and Peters (1984) and Peters and 
Freedman (1984)19. A comparison of Panel A and B of Table 3-3 shows that the role of 
coskewness risk in explaining pricing phenomena is emphasized when the 30 
industry-sorted portfolios are used in place of the 17 industry-sorted ones. As shown by 
Figure 1, the frontier for the 30 industry-sorted portfolios lays noticeably above the 
frontier for the 17-industry sorted portfolios. This suggests that a positive price of 
                                                 
 
19 We first estimated time-series regressions of the test assets excess-returns on the factors (the stock market return 
proxy Rvw,t+1 and its square) and stored the residuals. We then re-sampled 5,000 times, with replacement, blocks of 5 
consecutive realizations from the stored residuals time-series, i.e. we employed ‘block re-sampling’ to capture any 
residual serial correlation not explained by the estimated time-series regression. Using the time-series of the 
re-sampled residuals and the point estimates of the time-series regression parameters, we generated 5,000 separate 
bootstrapped return series for each test asset, for which we then re-estimated the QMFM model and recorded the λvw,1 
and λvw,2 coefficients, calculated using (A5). This generates a bootstrapped distribution of the λvw,1 and λvw,2 
coefficients. 
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coskewness risk helps generate the additional SR attainable by a finer industry-level 
diversification. 
 
As shown in Panel C of Table 3-3, the quadratic term coefficient is also highly 
significant when the momentum portfolios are used as the test asset payoffs. This is 
consistent with the findings of Harvey and Siddique (2000) and also in agreement with 
the conclusions reached by Rachev et al. (2007), who argue that momentum strategies 
entail considerable tail risk. The coskewness risk premium, however, is not statistically 
significant. In the terminology used by Cochrane (2001), this implies that the quadratic 
factor helps “price” the momentum portfolios but it is not “priced” in their 
cross-section. Interestingly, this suggests that a non-zero price of coskewness risk might 
help explain the momentum effect uncovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) rather 
than the other way round. Noticeably, however, in spite of the extremely large amount 
of volatility of the estimated SDF, the quadratic model is rejected in all sample periods 
at the 5 percent level and at the 10 percent level in the period 1963-1993. In 
un-tabulated results, we find a similarly disappointing empirical performance for 
4-moment versions of the model and for specifications that include human capital.  
 
Another, and perhaps most noteworthy, fact highlighted by Table 3-3 is that the pricing 
ability of coskewness risk has diminished in recent times, as implied by the 
considerably reduced significance of both the price of coskewness risk and the 
coskewness risk premium in the 1963-2005 sample period relatively to the benchmark 
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sample period used in Harvey and Siddique (2000) study, i.e. 1963-199320. The less 
important role played by coskewness risk after the early 90s, while somewhat puzzling, 
might be explained by a number of circumstances. For example, the discovery by 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) of the strength of the coskewness ‘effect’ might have led 
investors to engage in strategies designed to exploit it. The rise of hedge funds springs 
to mind as a possible key ingredient for such development. The analysis conducted by 
Zakamouline and Koekebakker (2009) suggests that hedge funds managers pursue 
strategies that exhibit negative skewness (and excess-kurtosis), for example by shorting 
options or engaging in dynamic portfolio insurance, in a quest for higher Sharpe Ratios. 
This behaviour can, in principle, drive down both the price of coskewness risk and the 
maximal SR attainable from the investment opportunity set, producing the drop in the 
SDF frontier that we observe in Figure 3-1.  
 
On balance, these results clarify that our earlier findings (those reported in Table 3-1 
and Table 3-2) do not contradict those of the extant literature but rather all such findings 
are sample-specific, in the sense that the estimated price of coskewness risk and the 
associated risk premium depend on the test asset payoffs used in estimation as well as 
on the sample period. Overall, coskewness appears to play a more important role in the 
pricing of strategies with relatively high SRs, such as those spanned by the finer 
industry level diversification allowed by the 30 industry portfolios, and in explaining 
                                                 
 
20 Our estimated market coskewness risk premium for this period, when using the 30 industry-sorted portfolios as 
test assets, is –2.90 per cent per annum. It is thus very close to the –3.60 per cent per annum estimated by Harvey and 
Siddique (2000) and it is larger, in absolute value, than the market covariance risk-premium, which is just 2.70 per 
cent per annum. By contrast, in the extended sample period 1993-2005, the coskewness premium is –0.48 per cent 
per annum, and thus the coskewness discount is a mere 0.48 percent, whereas the covariance premium is a much 
larger 6.68 per cent per annum.  
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returns on hard-to-price strategies, such as those spanned by the 10 momentum 
portfolios. The investigation of the determinants of the changing role of coskewness in 
asset pricing, as well as the difficult task of exploring the relations between momentum 
and coskewness, are outside the scope of this chapter. In order to focus on the main task 
at hand, i.e. the testing of the CAPM and its higher moment versions, we leave these 
intriguing tasks to future research. 
 
3.7. Conditional	Estimates	
Next, we turn to conditional versions of (3-16). Initially, in (3-14) and (3-17), we use 
the full set of conditioning variables. In Table 3-4, we report the unconstrained 
estimation results, obtained using gross returns on the 17 industry portfolios and the 
risk-free asset as the basis test asset payoffs. The reported SDF coefficients are the 
values of ta , tjvwb ,,  and tjlb ,, , with [1,  2,  3]j  , evaluated at the sample average 
values of the conditioning variables tz . The associated p-values are significance levels 
of Wald tests of the restriction that the coefficient under consideration is zero. 
Consistently with Dittmar (2002) findings, the non-linear SDF specifications achieve 
considerable empirical success. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 3-2, the 
estimated CMFM expected returns line up reasonably closely with sample average 
returns. Both the QMFM and the CMFM, but not the LMFM, pass the Hansen and 
Jagannathan (1997) distance test when the market portfolio proxy includes human 
capital. The results imply that coskewness and cokurtosis risk are significantly priced in 
the cross-section of stock portfolios managed on the basis of available information. This 
contrasts with the insignificance of the coskewness and cokurtosis risk coefficients in 
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unconditional estimates, suggesting that the quadratic and cubic terms generate the 
additional SDF volatility that, as shown in Figure 3-1, is required to price the managed 
portfolios used in conditional estimates. 
 
The unrestricted estimates do not satisfy, however, a number of requirements of 
Kimball (1993) standard risk aversion. For example, as shown in the top panel of Figure 
3-2, the estimated SDF is not always positive and, as shown in the lower right-hand 
corner of the same figure, it is not decreasing in the return on the stock market proxy. It 
may be argued that the estimated SDF takes negative values only very seldom, 
essentially only around times of exceptional market turmoil, namely the bear market 
that followed the 1974 oil shock, the 1987 stock market crash, the so-called 1997 Asian 
crisis and the crisis that followed the default of the Russian Federation on its domestic 
debt in 1998, as well as the bust of the “dot com” bubble in March 2000. Admittedly, 
these may be viewed as exceptional one-off circumstances, akin to outliers. The 
estimated SDF, however, is also very volatile, especially in the case of non-linear 
models. For example, the annualized volatility of the estimated SDF is 273 percent for 
the QMFM and 299 percent for the CMFM. Given a 15.5 percent annualized volatility 
of the stock market portfolio, this would imply that RRA takes values as large as 17.56 
and 19.23, respectively. These values are puzzling when compared with the upper 
bound on RRA suggested by Ross (2005), i.e. RRAV = 5, and survey evidence, as 
summarized by Meyer and Meyer (2005), which shows that, even for the most 
risk-averse households cohorts, RRA does not exceed 6.4 when the wealth portfolio 
includes only financial assets and 3.0 when it includes also non-financial assets.  
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To disentangle the pricing implications of violations of the NA positivity requirement 
from those of excessive SDF volatility, we estimate the candidate SDFs imposing each 
one of the two restrictions in turn. In  
 
Table 3-5, we report estimates obtained under a positivity restriction on the SDF. All 
candidate SDFs fail the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance test when estimated 
under this restriction. This is also the case of non-linear specifications with human 
capital included in the market portfolio. Next, we estimate the candidate SDFs without 
the positivity restriction but under various upper bounds on their volatility. In Figure 
3-3, we summarize the results of this exercise for the CMFM with human capital. In the 
Figure, we plot the model Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance against the 
annualized volatility upper bound used in estimation and the corresponding RRA upper 
bound. All models estimated under a volatility upper bound set to less than 188 percent 
per annum are rejected at the 5 percent level. That is, it takes a RRA upper bound as 
loose as about 12.04 for the 4M-CAPM with human capital to be empirically 
admissible. These results are consistent with those reported by Dittmar (2002), who also 
reject the 4M-CAPM as well as more restricted versions of this model. Our findings, 
however, clarify that the model is rejected not because of attempts to enforce overly 
restrictive requirements on the shape of the estimated utility function but rather, and 
more conclusively, because of the binding implications of sensible ‘no good-deal’ 
restrictions. In unreported estimates, we find this to be the case also in the earlier 
sample period used by Dittmar (2002), i.e. in the period 1963-1997.  
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These results imply that, while the prices of coskewness and cokurtosis risk are 
statistically significant, 3 and 4-moment versions of the CAPM provide an inadequate 
account of asset pricing patterns. In interpreting these findings, however, a caveat is in 
order. The test asset payoffs second moment matrix used to compute the weighting 
matrix of the moment conditions is close to singular. This implies that the pricing error 
metric being minimized in estimation is the pricing error of a portfolio that contains 
extreme long and short positions21. This is a widespread problem in empirical asset 
pricing and occurs also with the second moment matrix estimated using data for the 
period 1963-1997, i.e. the sample period used by Dittmar (2002). To mitigate this 
problem, we re-estimate using one conditioning variable at a time, i.e. including in tz  
only one of the conditioning variables ,m tr , tdy , tys , and ttb , as well as the unit-series. 
This way, only 36 test asset payoffs at a time are used in estimation22. As shown in 
Table 3-6, the empirical performance of the CMFM with human capital improves 
somewhat and it passes the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance test at the five 
percent significant level when the conditioning information variables set includes the 
lag of either the dividend yield, a term spread variable or the 3-month T-Bill return. The 
model, however, fails the test at the 10 percent in all cases except when the conditioning 
variables are the unit series and the lagged term spread and no restriction is placed on 
SDF volatility. When the conditioning variable is represented by the unit series and the 
lagged market excess return, the CMFM is rejected at the 0.1 percent level. These 
findings are important in that they confirm that our rejection of the 4M-CAPM is not a 
                                                 
 
21 We verified this by computing the weights assigned by this matrix to the asset payoffs in the definition of the 
pricing error metric. These weights can be calculated by taking the sum by column of the elements of the upper 
triangular matrix obtained from a Cholesky decomposition of the weighting matrix, i.e. of the inverse of the second 
moment matrix. 
22 Reassuringly, the resulting second moment matrix is much less close to singular.  
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spurious by-product of a near-singular inverse weighting matrix. Interestingly, the fact 
that the model fares worst when the conditioning variable is represented by the lagged 
market excess return might be related to the well-known difficulty, also noted earlier, of 
explaining abnormal returns of momentum strategies.  
 
3.8. Final	Remarks	and	Conclusions	
In this chapter, we acknowledge the importance of Dittmar (2002) findings and of the 
critique put forth by Post et al. (2008), in that they highlight the danger of spurious 
estimates of higher-moment versions of the CAPM. We emphasize, however, that a 
decreasing SDF, albeit sufficient, is not a necessary condition for the CAPM. Moreover, 
even if one is willing to restrict focus on the joint hypothesis of the higher moment 
CAPM and concave utility, the specification of the market portfolio proxy may 
seriously affect inferences on the empirical admissibility of such hypothesis, much in 
the same way in which, as pointed out by Roll (1977), the circumstance that the market 
portfolio is de facto un-observable affects all tests of the CAPM. Recognising this 
difficulty amounts to acknowledging the ramifications of Roll (1977) critique for tests 
of non-linear versions of the CAPM. In estimating the model, we thus impose 
alternative restrictions on the shape of the candidate SDF, namely a positivity 
requirement and a volatility upper bound. These restrictions boil down to ruling out 
arbitrage opportunities and SRs that, at least to the marginal investor, would resemble 
obvious near arbitrage opportunities23. This way, we limit the danger of over-fitting the 
                                                 
 
23 Beside, since coskewness is an asset characteristic that explains a considerable portion of the cross-section of asset 
returns, such an approach is also consistent with a multi-factor, no-arbitrage perspective, along the lines of Ross’ 
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cross-section of asset returns without the need to resort to the overly-restrictive 
assumption of concave utility.  
 
Our findings confirm that the quadratic and cubic market factors help explain observed 
stock returns. They play an important role in the pricing of certain payoffs, including 
strategies characterized by relatively high SRs, such as those spanned by a fine 
industry-level diversification, most notably until the late 90s, or by dynamic portfolios 
managed on the basis of available conditioning information, as well as momentum 
portfolios. They do so, however, by generating high levels of SDF volatility. To 
rationalize this evidence within a higher moment CAPM framework, we would need to 
postulate implausibly high levels of investors’ risk aversion. We conclude, therefore, 
that the 3M and 4M-CAPM provide at best a partial explanation of the differences in 
average returns on stocks and stock strategies. This gives rise to a coskewness (and 
cokurtosis) puzzle. The solution of the latter requires an explanation, different from the 
3M and 4M-CAPM, for why the quadratic and cubic market factors are priced in the 
cross-section of stock returns.  
 
One obvious possibility is that these factors proxy for other priced but omitted factors. 
Vanden (2006) suggests that powers of the market returns proxy for omitted 
option-related factors. This possibility, while intriguing, requires further scrutiny 
because Vanden (2006) sample period is relatively short and, more importantly, it 
                                                                                                                                               
 
(1976) APT. From this perspective, it is similar to the approach followed by Cochrane and Saà-Requejo (2000) and 
Cochrane (2005) to extend, in incomplete markets, the pricing implications of the factor prices and of (1) to a 
non-redundant security. 
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remains to be established whether the SDF estimated by this author satisfies a sensible 
volatility upper bound. Another fruitful extension of our study would be a check of 
whether the more flexible specification used by Smith (2007) 24  is empirically 
admissible under appropriate positivity and volatility restrictions on the estimated SDF. 
An alternative approach would be to allow for a wedge between volatility of the 
candidate SDF and IMRS volatility by letting sentiment and variables related to 
investors’ errors generate, as suggested by Shefrin (2010), the extra SDF volatility 
required to price stocks. There is also the possibility that some of the managed 
portfolios used in Dittmar (2002) study and in ours correspond to unfeasible strategies, 
i.e. strategies with unfeasibly high SRs. Luttmer (1996), for example, shows how even 
modest proportional transaction costs, short sales restrictions and margin requirements 
considerably lower the mean-variance SDF frontier.25 We leave the investigation of 
these possible explanations of the coskewness puzzle for the remaining parts of the 
thesis. 
  
                                                 
 
24 As shown by Smith (2007), his specification nests Dittmar’s (2002) specification and hence the specification used 
in this paper. 
25 While we took this problem partially into account by re-estimating using one conditioning variable at a time, we 
feel that additional and more direct checks on the implications of transaction costs and market microstructure 
frictions might be worthwhile. 
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Figure	3‐1	
SDF	Mean‐Variance	frontier	
Panel	A	
Sample	period:	1965‐1993	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel	B	
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Sample	period:	1965‐2005	
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Notes. This Figure plots the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) SDF mean-variance frontiers for sets of 
portfolios of basis assets managed using information conveyed by a set of conditioning variables. The 
basis assets are either industry-sorted (17 or 30 industries) or momentum portfolios augmented by the 
risk-free asset proxy. The data is monthly, but results are converted to an annual basis, for the 
indicated sample periods. The symbol U (C) in the legend means that the set of conditioning variables 
used in forming the managed portfolios includes only the unit series (the full set of conditioning 
variables). 
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Notes. This Table reports unrestricted GMM estimates of the unconditional LMFM, QMFM and CMFM, obtained using 
Hansen and Jagannathan’s (1997) second moment weighting matrix. Panel A reports the unconstrained estimates of SDF, 
while Panel B reports the estimates under no-arbitrage condition. For each included factor, we report the corresponding 
SDF coefficient point estimate and its p-value in brackets. We also report the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance and 
its p-value in brackets. The second last column reports the annualized volatility of the stochastic discount factor in 
percentage. All the variables are defined as in the text. The test asset payoffs are gross returns on the 17 industry-sorted 
portfolios augmented by the gross return on the risk-free asset. The sample period is 1965-2005.  
 
Table	3‐1	
GMM	estimates	of	unconditional	models	
(1965‐2005)	
Model a bvw,1 bvw,2 bvw,3 bl,1 bl,2 bl,3 HJT 
(p.-value) 
σ(m) RRAv 
Panel A 
(Unconstrained estimates) 
Market portfolio without human capital 
LMFM 1.02  -2.55       0.18  0.40  2.55 
 (0.000)  (0.006)       (0.522)    
QMFM 0.99  -2.57  1.25      0.17  0.40  2.57 
 (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.978)      (0.511)    
CMFM 1.04  4.48  -34.48  -743.79    0.16  1.28  8.29 
 (0.000)  (0.138)  (0.241)  (0.039)    (0.677)   
Market portfolio with human capital 
LMFM 0.985  -2.32    47.82   0.17  0.76  4.86 
 (0.000)  (0.040)    (0.321)   (0.567)    
QMFM 1.01 -2.22 22.66  -3536.1 1783.12  0.17  0.88  5.67 
 (0.000)  (0.096)  (0.687)   (0.736) (0.732)  (0.525)    
CMFM 0.87  2.36  -14.60  -486.23 32.16 360.07 -516,15* 0.12  1.86  11.99 
 (0.001)  (0.303)  (0.395)  (0.154) (0.262) (0.373) (0.033) (0.798)    
Panel B 
(Estimates under NA) 
Market portfolio without human capital 
LMFM 1.02  -2.55       0.18  0.40  2.55 
 (0.000)  (0.006)       (0.522)    
QMFM 0.99  -2.57  1.25      0.17  0.40  2.57 
 (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.978)      (0.511)    
CMFM 1.03  3.68  -34.48  -743.80    0.17  1.12  7.22 
 (0.000)  (0.186)  (0.241)  (0.039)    (0.454)   
Market portfolio with human capital 
LMFM 0.99  -3.21    -53.53   0.19  0.86  5.53 
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.292)    
QMFM 1.26  -2.23  3.64   -46.32 -334.81  0.17  1.18  7.62 
 (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.470)   (0.110) (0.361)  (0.420)   
CMFM 0.86  1.77  -14.59  -486.23 32.17 360.07 -516,15* 0.15  1.15  7.43 
 (0.001)  (0.349)  (0.395)  (0.154) (0.262) (0.373) (0.033) (0.428)    
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Table	3‐2	
GMM	estimates	of	unconditional	models	under	NA,	Local	RA,	NIARA	and	
SDF	volatility	restrictions	
(1965‐2005)	
Model a bvw,1 bvw,2 bvw,3 bl,1 bl,2 bl,3 HJT 
(p.-value) 
σ(m) RRAv 
σ(m) ≤ 0.78 
Market portfolio without human capital 
LMFM 1.02  -2.55       0.18  0.40  2.55 
 (0.000)  (0.006)       (0.519)    
QMFM 0.99  -2.57  1.25      0.17  0.40  2.57 
 (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.978)      (0.511)    
CMFM 0.93 -2.61 45.64 -0.08    018 0.78 5.00 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.087) (0.974)    (0.376)   
 
Market portfolio with human capital 
LMFM 1.01 -2.44   -0.01   0.17 0.37 2.39 
 (0.000) (0.010)   (0.975)   (0.432)   
QMFM 1.07 -0.71 1.39  -53.75 4795.55  0.18 0.78 5.00 
 (0.000) (0.093) (0.925)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.160)   
CMFM 0.91 -0.37 1.91 -0.01 -20.47 4739.12 -73215.94 0.18 0.78 5.00 
 (0.000) (0.218) (0.878) (0.925) (0.007) (0.000) (0.893) (0.140)   
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports GMM estimates of the unconditional LMFM, QMFM and CMFM for the period 1965-2005, 
obtained using Hansens and Jagannathan’s (1997) second moment weighting matrix, under positivity and volatility 
restrictions on the estimated SDF. For each included factor, we report the corresponding SDF coefficient point estimate 
and its p-value in brackets. We also report the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance and its p-value in brackets. The 
second last column reports the annualized volatility of the stochastic discount factor in percentage. All the variables are 
defined as in the text. 
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Table	3‐3	
QMFM	without	human	capital	CUE‐GMM	estimates	
Sample Period m > 0 
(yes/no) 
R2 bvw,1 
(p.-value) 
λvw,1 
(p.-value) 
bvw,2 
(p.-value) 
λvw,2 
(p.-value) 
TJT 
(p.-value) 
σ(m) RRAv 
Panel A 
(17 industry portfolios) 
1963-2005 yes 0.01 -2.63 -8.28 0.18 0.43 2.77 
   (0.010) (0.840) (0.710)   
   6.40 0.20    
   (0.000) (0.500)    
1963-1993 yes 0.17 -2.59 87.48 0.14 1.35 8.85 
   (0.258) (0.083) (0.934)   
   4.32 -1.96    
   (0.000) (0.150)    
 
Panel B 
(30 industry portfolios) 
1963-2005 yes 0.05 -2.82 22.42 0.21 0.54 3.50 
   (0.027) (0.572) (0.761)   
   6.68 -0.48    
   (0.000) (0.270)    
1963-2000 yes 1.08 -3.94 78.49 0.22 1.26 8.29 
   (0.038) (0.092) (0.922)   
   8.26 1.61    
   (0.000) (0.250)    
1963-1997 yes 0.15 -4.18 116.95 0.21 1.73 11.68 
   (0.060) (0.010) (0.981)   
   6.95 -2.33    
   (0.000) (0.070)    
1963-1993 no 0.15 -2.25 127.96 0.21 1.94 12.70 
   (0.336) (0.004) (0.956)   
   2.71 -2.90    
   (0.000) (0.090)    
1963-1993 yes 0.12 -2.34 105.24 0.22 1.61 10.51 
   (0.278) (0.000) (0.930)   
   3.39 -2.37    
   (0.000) (0.050)    
 
Panel C 
(10 momentum portfolios) 
1963-2005 no 21.52 -2.67 -69.95 0.32 1.10 7.23 
   (0.006) (0.145) (0.000)   
   6.66 1.48    
   (0.000) (0.210)    
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1963-2005 yes 0.03 -6.79 106.10 0.27 1.82 11.98 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)   
   15.14 -2.17    
   (0.000) (0.150)    
1963-1993 no 0.22 -17.99 383.30 0.20 6.21 40.66 
   (0.003) (0.004) (0.057)   
   34.45 -8.47    
   (0.050) (0.300)    
1963-1993 yes 0.10 -8.02 108.55 0.35 1.96 12.87 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
   16.60 -2.34    
   (0.050) (0.220)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports CUE-GMM estimates of the unconditional QMFM for various sample periods, 
specified in the first column. The second column indicates whether the estimated SDF satisfies the positivity 
requirement. The third column reports the coefficient of determination R2, i.e. the squared correlation 
coefficient between sample average excess returns and their model estimate. Next, we report the SDF 
coefficient point estimates with, in brackets, the p-values of their t-statistics computed using HAC standard 
errors. We also report the corresponding implied annualized percentage risk-premia and, in brackets, the 
p-values of their bootstrapped distribution. In the last 3 columns, we report Hansen’s (1982) TJT statistic (and 
the corresponding p-value, in brackets), the estimated SDF volatility and the associated RRA bound. The test 
asset payoffs are monthly excess returns on the 17 and 30 industry-sorted and momentum portfolios. 
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Table	3‐4	
Unconstrained	GMM	estimates	of	conditional	models	
(1965‐2005)	
Model a bvw,1 bvw,2 bvw,3 bl,1 bl,2 bl,3 HJT 
(p.-value) 
σ(m) RRAv 
Market portfolio without human capital 
LMFM 1.05 -3.67      0.53  0.73 4.69 
 (0.000) (0.001)      (0.000)    
QMFM 1.06 -5.80 24.25     0.50  1.24 7.96 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)     (0.011)    
CMFM 1.07 -2.03 5.73 -613.23    0.49  1.39 8.94 
 (0.000) (0.024) (0.128) (0.605)    (0.012)    
 
Market portfolio with human capital 
LMFM 1.04 -3.09   -1.96   0.50  1.60 10.27 
 (0.000) (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.012)    
QMFM 1.01 -4.14 38.46  -20.70 1,098.81  0.44  2.73 17.56 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.039) (0.041)  (0.228)    
CMFM 0.96 -0.24 13.78 -548.68 -12.62 2,157.97 -75,667.48 0.42  2.99 19.23 
 (0.000) (0.030) (0.544) (0.335) (0.106) (0.249) (0.483) (0.170)    
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports unrestricted GMM estimates of the LMFM, QMFM and CMFM with conditioning variables 
for the period 1965-2005, obtained using Hansen and Jagannathan’s (1997) second moment weighting matrix. For 
each included factor, we report the corresponding SDF coefficient point estimate and its p-value in brackets. We also 
report the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance and its p-value in brackets. The second last column reports the 
annualized volatility of the stochastic discount factor in percentage. All the variables are defined as in the text. 
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Table	3‐5	
GMM	estimates	of	conditional	models	under	NA	
(1965‐2005)	
Model a bvw,1 bvw,2 bvw,3 bl,1 bl,2 bl,3 HJT 
(p.-value) 
σ(m) RRAv 
 
Market portfolio without human capital 
LMFM 1.05 -3.67      0.53  0.72 4.66 
 (0.000) (0.001)      (0.000)    
QMFM 1.06 -5.78 24.25     0.50  1.15 7.40 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005)     (0.007)    
CMFM 1.06 -2.05 5.63 -613.24    0.50  1.21 7.81 
 (0.000) (0.064) (0.178) (0.773)    (0.006)    
 
Market portfolio with human capital 
LMFM 1.03 -3.26   0.65   0.52  1.17 7.54 
 (0.000) (0.001)   (0.100)   (0.002)    
QMFM 1.00 -4.86 38.00  -18.32 1,098.82  0.47  1.87 12.03 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.199) (0.521)  (0.024)    
CMFM 0.92 -0.25 13.78 -548.68 -12.62 2,157.97 -75,667.48 0.46  2.30 14.81 
 (0.000) (0.049) (0.804) (0.781) (0.873) (0.596) (0.999) (0.015)    
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports GMM estimates of the LMFM, QMFM and CMFM for the period 1965-2005, obtained 
using Hansens and Jagannathan’s (1997) second moment weighting matrix under a positivity restriction on the 
estimated SDF. For each included factor, we report the corresponding SDF coefficient point estimate and its 
p-value in brackets. We also report the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance and its p-value in brackets. The 
second last column reports the annualized volatility of the stochastic discount factor in percentage. All the 
variables are defined as in the text. The conditioning variables are rm,t, dyt, yst,  tbt. 
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Figure	3‐3	
Pricing	errors	vs.	SDF	volatility/RRA	bound	
Conditional	CMFM	with	human	capital	
(1965‐2005)	
  
0.450
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0.530
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0.610
      1.00    
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      1.09    
7.00
      1.33    
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      1.62    
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      1.64    
10.51
      1.73    
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      1.80    
11.53
      1.88    
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      2.04    
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      2.12    
13.54
      2.30    
14.68
Notes. This figure plots the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance of GMM estimates of the conditional 
CMFM with human capital under a varying volatility upper bound on the estimated SDF. The annualized 
volatility of the estimated SDFs and the corresponding RRA upper bound are reported on the horizontal axis. 
The sample period is 1965-2005. Values of the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance that plot above the 
dotted line are significant at the 5 percent level.  The conditioning variables are rm,t, dyt, yst,  tbt. All 
variables are defined as in the text. 
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Table	3‐6	
GMM	estimates	of	conditional	CMFM	under	NA	
(1965‐2005)	
zt a bvw,1 bvw,2 bvw,3 bl,1 bl,2 bl,3 HJT 
(p.-value) 
σ(m) RRAv 
           
rm,t 1.00 -2.67 0.00 -5.10 -5.58 1458.78 -45873.47 0.34 0.46 2.97 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.955) (0.759) (0.882) (0.504) (0.842) (0.001)   
 
dyt 1.21 -2.62 6.32 -25.35 -39.24 1313.89 -73356.49 0.29 0.74 4.77 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.758) (0.772) (0.040) (0.050) (0.094) (0.061)   
 
yst 0.84 -2.23 0.13 -2.00 -10.43 4550.70 -5.09 0.27 0.94 6.07 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.954) (0.907) (0.751) (0.011) (0.995) (0.192)   
 
yst 0.91 -0.58 39.34 -40.75 -1.85 1006.42 -77507.20 0.32 0.78 5.00 
 (0.000) (0.178) (0.114) (0.228) (0.495) (0.049) (0.045) (0.005)   
 
tbt 0.86 -2.19 33.82 -2.88 -8.38 2739.05 -10212.62 0.30 0.78 5.00 
 (0.000) (0.032) (0.283) (0.854) (0.686) (0.091) (0.759) (0.069)   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports GMM estimates of the CMFM for the period 1965-2005, obtained using Hansens 
and Jagannathan’s (1997) second moment weighting matrix under a positivity restriction on the estimated 
SDF. The first column reports the conditioning variable used in estimation. For each included factor, we 
report the corresponding SDF coefficient point estimate and its p-value in brackets. We also report the 
Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance and its p-value in brackets. The second last column reports the 
annualized volatility of the stochastic discount factor in percentage. All the variables are defined as in the 
text. Since the RRAV implied by yst is over 5, then we also report the SDF estimates under the restricted 
condition .  
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4. The	Sentiment	in	SDF:	Behaviour	Approach	
4.1. Introduction	
Habit persistence, as in the model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and recursive 
non-(time) separable preferences, as those employed by Epstein and Zin (1989), go 
some way towards explaining the equity premium puzzle. These models represent at 
least partially successful attempts to overcome some of the empirical shortcomings of 
the consumption-based CAPM without abandoning the tenets of rational asset pricing 
theory and thus, essentially, the view that asset prices are set by an expected utility 
optimizing representative investor endowed with rational expectations. Rational asset 
pricing theory, however, has not yet succeeded in the task of explaining the 
cross-section of stock returns. For example, it is difficult to reproduce the explanatory 
power of a number of stock characteristics26  using empirical specifications of 
available rational asset pricing models, most notably the CAPM. Well known 
examples of such characteristics are firms’ size and their book-to-market ratio, as in 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) studies, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum and, 
more recently, idiosyncratic volatility, as in Ang et al. (2006); Ang et al. (2009), 
(Peterson & Smedema, 2011), and (Fousseni, 2011).  
 
Conditional specifications, that allow for time-variation in the parameters of the 
representative investors IMRS, and 3 and 4-moment versions, are amongst the most 
empirically successful extensions of the CAPM. For example, Lettau and Ludvigson 
(2001b) demonstrate that a multifactor model inspired by the (C)CAPM performs 
                                                 
 
26 Other examples of relatively successful characteristics are the momentum effect documented by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the liquidity effect documented by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
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much better than the unconditional CAPM and almost as well as the Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 1995) 3-factor model, while Harvey and Siddique (2000) argue that a 
conditional version of the 3M-CAPM captures a large portion of the cross-sectional 
variation in average stock returns27.  
 
Lewellen and Nagel (2006); Lewellen et al. (2010) however, warn that the sign of the 
risk premia estimated by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) is problematic from the 
perspective of the conditional consumption CAPM. More specifically, the risk premia 
point estimates reported by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) imply that (conditional) 
relative risk-aversion takes negative values for certain sample realizations of the 
conditioning variable. Moreover, these estimates imply a SDF, or pricing kernel, that 
might take negative values. This implies the existence of arbitrage opportunities, i.e. 
non-negative payoffs with a negative price. It is also inconsistent with the assumption 
that the representative investor’s preferences display non-satiation, as in the 
(C)CAPM the SDF and the representative investor’s IMRS coincide. There is 
therefore a puzzling contrast, in the specification of the (C)CAPM estimated by Lettau 
and Ludvigson (2001b), between the high cross-sectional explanatory power of the 
factors implied by the model and the inconsistence between the parameter estimates 
and fundamental assumptions underlying the model itself. We might label this 
problem as the “(C)CAPM puzzle”.  
 
On a related note, Dittmar (2002) and Post et al. (2008) point out that covariance and 
coskewness risk prices estimated in empirical tests of the 3 and 4 moment CAPM 
                                                 
 
27 Adesi, Gagliardini and Urga (2004) and Potì (2005), using a quadratic market model consistent with 
the 3M-CAPM, add to the evidence that models that allow for both covariance and coskewness 
premium fit the cross-section of stock returns well. 
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imply a non-concave utility function, to an extent that might be inconsistent with the 
models being tested. More worryingly, these authors show that the empirical fit of 
these models is greatly reduced when the shape of the representative investor’s utility 
function is restricted to display non satiation, risk aversion and non increasing 
absolute risk aversion (henceforth, NS, RA and NIARA, respectively). Yet, the 
evidence on the cross-sectional explanatory power of coskewness is compelling. This 
evidence, coupled with the critique put forth by Post et al. (2008) and Potì and Wang 
(2010), gives rise to a “coskewness puzzle” in the complete market-representative 
investor setting of the 3M-CAPM. 
 
There is the concrete possibility that an omitted factor problem might be behind both 
puzzles. In this case, OLS estimates of the model parameters, i.e. factor risk premia 
and risk prices, would be inconsistent. In this chapter, we explicitly explore this 
possibility and, in particular, we investigate whether the omitted factors are related to 
systematic investor error. We thus propose a multi-factor specification that augments 
2 and 3 moment versions of the (C)CAPM with a sentiment factor. This specification 
is based on the central result of Shefrin (2010), namely that the pricing kernel can be 
decomposed into two terms, one being sentiment and the other being an expression 
that depends only on economic fundamentals. The former term can be seen as the 
behavioural component of the kernel, while the second can be seen as its rational 
component. We check whether adding the sentiment factor, and thus allowing for a 
behavioural influence on asset pricing, allows to retain or improve the explanatory 
power of the (C)CAPM and 3M-CAPM while admitting risk price point estimates 
consistent with investors risk aversion (RA) and non increasing absolute risk aversion 
(NIARA), and thus with the underlying economic theory. Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
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carefully constructed a proxy for investors’ sentiment and demonstrated that exposure 
to this variable can explain a significant portion of the cross-section of stock returns. 
We thus employ this variable to proxy for sentiment in our specification. These 
authors, however, did not specify the representative investor’s problem and her role in 
setting prices and therefore their results, while suggestive, cannot be directly used to 
characterize the relative importance of the rational and behavioural component of 
asset prices. On the contrary, Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Abel (2002) did model the 
impact of sentiment in a representative investor setting, but their empirical focus was 
on the equity premium rather then on cross-sectional differences in stocks average 
returns. 
 
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section, we 
introduce Shefrin (2010) SDF decomposition into a rational and sentiment related 
component and we map this decomposition into a linear factor model. In Section 4.3, 
we outline our estimation strategy. In Section 4.4, we present our dataset. In Section 
4.5, we report our empirical results. Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Sentiment	and	the	Pricing	Kernel	
As in Shefrin (2010), we may model the stochastic process for the pricing kernel as 
follows: 
 
0
'( ( ))( ) ( )
'( )
i
i R i
U C xm x x
U C
  .  	 (4‐1)	 	
Here, R  is the representative investor’s subjective rate of time preference, 
)(
)()(
i
iR
i x
xPx   is the ratio of the probability weight )( iR xP  assigned to state ix  by 
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the representative trader and the objective probability ( )ix  of occurrence of state 
ix , 0C  represents current aggregate consumption and ( )iC x  represents aggregate 
consumption in state ix . The quantity )( ix  can be interpreted as sentiment and it 
plays a role similar to investors’ pessimism and optimism in the models of the equity 
premium developed by Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Abel (2002). Letting for simplicity 
1R  and exploiting the fact28 that ),(ln1)( ii xx  the kernel process can be 
approximated as follows: 
 
0 0
'( ( )) '( ( ))( ) ln ( )
'( ) '( )
i i
i i c s
U C x U C xm x x m m
U C U C
     .  	 (4‐2)	 	
In (4-2), 
)('
))(('
0CU
xCUm ic   is aggregate marginal utility growth, while  
)(ln
)('
))(('
0
i
i
s xCU
xCU
m   is the product of marginal utility growth and the log of the 
ratio between the representative investor’s probabilities and the correct probabilities. 
The above equation thus states that the pricing kernel is the sum of two distinct 
processes, one based on the kernel of a rational expected utility optimizing 
representative investor and the other based on sentiment. The sentiment component is 
zero only when the likelihood ratio )( ix  equals one and thus only when prices are 
set in such a way that the representative investor holds objectively correct belief.  
 
Recalling from the last chapter, Arrow (1971) argued that investors’ utility functions 
should display non satiation (NS), risk aversion (RA) and non-increasing absolute risk 
aversion (NIARA). The latter is related to the notion of prudence, see Kimball (1990, 
                                                 
 
28 This approximation implicitly assumes that Λ(xi) is never much different from one.    
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1993). With utility functions ( )U W  defined over wealth, NS implies positive 
marginal utility of wealth, i.e. 0)(  WU , RA implies decreasing marginal utility, 
i.e. 0)(  WU , whereas NIARA, i.e. 0)/( 
dC
UUd , implies that the rate of 
decrease of marginal utility does not increase in wealth. A necessary condition for 
NIARA, as shown in Arditti (1967), is 0U . Hence NIARA implies 0U  and 
aversion to negative skewness. We may approximate the marginal utility growth of 
the representative investor with preferences defined over aggregate consumption 
using a Taylor's expansion, 
 2 20 00 0
0 0 0
'( ( )) ( ) ( )1 11 ( ) ( )
'( ) 2 ( ) 6 ( )
i
c i c i
U C x U C U CC r x C r x
U C U C U C
       .  	 (4‐3)	 	
Here, 
0
( )( ) ic i
C xr x
C
  is aggregate consumption growth. Differentiating (4-3) twice 
with respect to wealth, it becomes clear that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
0U  is 02 b  and thus this is also a necessary condition for NIARA. When this 
condition holds, a necessary condition for RA is 0,1 tb . Following Dittmar (2002), 
we might allow for a multi-period setting with predictability due to a possibly 
time-varying investment opportunity set, and we might thus generalize (4-3) as 
follows:  
 2 3, 1 1, , 1 2, , 1 3, , 1
( ) ( ) ( )1
( ) ( ) ( )
t t t
c t t c t t c t t c t
t t t
U C U C U Cm h r h r h r
U C U C U C   
          .  	 (4‐4)	 	
Here, the ih  terms, i = 1, 2 3…, are non-negative expansion parameters. Dropping 
terms of order higher than the second, we might rewrite 1, tcm  more compactly as 
follows:  
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 2, 1 1, , 1 2, , 11 ...c t t c t t c tm b r b r     .  	 (4‐5)	 	
Since 1, 1,
( )
( )
t
t t
t
U Cb h
U C
   and 2, 2,
( )
( )
t
t t
t
U Cb h
U C
  , RA and NIARA imply 1, 0tb   and 
2, 0tb  . With power utility with risk aversion parameter  , we have that 1,tb    
while the coefficients of the higher order terms are zero. This is the constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA) case considered by Shefrin (2010). The component sm  of the 
kernel in (4-2) is the cross-product of cm  and the log-likelihood ratio )(ln ix . 
Letting, for notational simplicity, )()(ln ii xsx  , using (4-2) and (4-5), and 
dropping terms of third and higher orders, we can thus rewrite the kernel as follows: 
 21 1, , 1 2, , 1 3, 1 , 11t t c t t c t t t c tm b r b r b s r        .  	 (4‐6)	 	
 
4.3. Estimation	Strategy	 	
Consider the general conditional factor model, where the SDF is a (conditionally) 
linear function of a set of factors 1tf ,  
 1 1t t t tm a b f   .  	 (4‐7)	 	
The model in (4-6) is a specification of the general conditional factor model in (4-7), 
with 1ta  and factors 1tf  given by a constant, the growth rate of aggregate 
consumption, , 1c tr  , the square of the latter, 
2
, 1c tr   , and the cross-product between the 
sentiment proxy, 1ts , and the consumption growth rate, 1 , 1t c ts r  . Since the price of 
excess returns , 1i tr   is by definition zero, the prcing of , 1i tr   can be rewritten as 
 1,10  titt rmE . The unconditional implications of the latter are 
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 1 , 1( ) 0t i tE m r   .  	 (4‐8)	 	
As in Dittmar (2002), we model variation in tb  as a linear function of the first lag of 
a vector of conditioning variables tz  (which typically include a constant), i.e.  
          1, ,t i tb b z i k   .  	 (4‐9)	 	
The unconditional factor model implied by (4-7), (4-8) and (4-9) can then be written 
as follows, 
 1 1t tm a b F   .  	 (4‐10)	 	
Here, 1a   and b  is a vector that stacks all the ib  vectors in a column. The 
specification in (11) is an unconditional model, i.e. a model with time-invariant 
parameters, in the new set of (unconditionally) de-meaned factors
)()( 111 ttttt zfEzfF   . When pricing excess returns, the means of excess 
returns do not identify the mean of the risk free rate29, see for example Cochrane 
(2001). Thus, for simplicity, we will set the mean of the kernel in (4-10) equal to one,  
    1 1 1t tE m a b E F    .  	 (4‐11)	 	
Based on (4-10) and (4-11), we can rewrite the restrictions that (4-8) impose on the 
cross-section of expected returns as follows: 
 , 1( )i t iE r    .  	 (4‐12)	 	
Here,    11 1 , 1,i t t i tvar F cov F r     is a vector of factor loadings of the regression 
of asset i  on the factors. The elements of   are factor risk-premia (of the 
unconditional model). Following a widely used terminology, we will refer to (4-12) as 
the beta-pricing representation of the restrictions that (4-8) and (4-10) impose on the 
                                                 
 
29 This, however, is strictly true only as long as the risk free rate is not unrealistically high. 
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cross-section of expected returns. The risk-premia and the parameters of the 
unconditional SDF model are linked as follows: 
 1( )tvar F b   .  	 (4‐13)	 	
We estimate (4-12) using a robust 2-pass regression without intercept in the second 
pass. In the first pass of this procedure, we regress the test asset payoff excess returns 
on the factors of the unconditional model and in the second pass we regress average 
excess returns on the factor loadings estimated in the first pass. This yields factor risk 
premia   estimates and we then retrieve the parameters of the SDF (of the 
unconditional model) using (4-13). It can be shown that this approach is equivalent to 
first-stage GMM. In a GMM setting, in fact, the parameters of the kernel that prices a 
vector of n  test asset payoff 1tx   can be estimated by solving the following 
problem: 
 (1 ) (1 ){ }
min   T n k n k Tm g W g   .  	 (4‐14)	 	
  1 1( )         ( )T T t t t t t tg E g g m b x p z     .  	 (4‐15)	 	
Here, ( )TE    denotes a sample average, i.e. an arithmetic average over a sample of T  
observations, and tz  is a vector of k  instruments that coincide with the 
conditioning variables in (4-9). Based on (4-8), the elements of the 1n  vector tg  
can be interpreted as pricing errors and the moment conditions Tg  as pricing errors 
sample averages. Under the usual ergodicity assumption, the latter are consistent 
estimates of the unconditional expectations of (4-8). The nn  matrix W  is a 
weighting matrix for the moment conditions. The 2-pass OLS regression amounts to 
minimizing (4-14) using the identity matrix to weight the moment conditions, i.e. 
setting W I . Efficient second-stage and iterated GMM estimates are obtained 
instead by setting W  equal to the optimal weighting matrix of Hansen (1982). We 
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also experiment with the latter approach but we do not report the results as these are 
qualitatively the same as those obtained using the 2-pass regression. Finally, with the 
parameters of the unconditional model in hand, we back out the parameters of the 
conditional model using (4-9). 
 
4.4. Data	
The sample period starts in the first quarter of 1966 (to avoid the impact of dividend 
taxation reform in the early part of the previous decade) and ends in the last quarter of 
2005. The test asset payoffs are 25 size and book-to market sorted portfolio and 30 
value-weighted sorted portfolios of the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks30. We 
use returns on the three-month Treasury Bill as the risk-free rate and aggregate 
consumption expenditure data constructed as in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b)31. We 
set the elements of ts  equal to the first difference of a proxy for investors’ sentiment 
constructed as described by Baker and Wurgler (2006)32, namely the updated version 
of their SENT   variable. More specifically, the latter is the first difference of a 
sentiment index33  based on the first principal component of six (standardized) 
sentiment proxies over the period 1966-2005, where each of the proxies has first been 
orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions. Finally, we use the 
consumption-wealth ratio estimates tcay  supplied by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001a) 
as the conditioning variable that drives, in (4-9), the variation of the parameters of the 
representative investor’s IMRS. Notice that the much debated “look-ahead” bias of 
                                                 
 
30 Data on this portfolios was downloaded from Kenneth French website. 
31 We thank Martine Lettau and Sidney Ludvigson for making this data available on their web-sites.  
32 We thank these authors for making this data available for download from the AFA-Journal of Finance web-site. 
33 This index is given by Equation (3) in their paper.   
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this variable, if present, is actually a desirable feature in our context. This is because 
rational expectations themselves should indeed display look ahead bias, as rational 
investors know the return data generating process, see Muth (1961) for a seminal 
reference and, more recently, Sargent (1996).  
 
4.5. Empirical	Results	
Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 report estimates of an empirical specification of the 
(C)CAPM and 3M(C)CAPM, with an without sentiment. In particular, Table 4-1 
reports risk premia estimates and associated t-statistics. We construct t-statistics using 
standard errors adjusted, based on Shanken (1992) correction, for sampling error that 
arises because the regressors t  are estimated in a first-stage time-series regression. 
Following Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b), we also construct conventional OLS 
t-statistics. This is motivated by the argument put forth by Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996), who show that OLS standard errors from a 2-pass procedure do not 
necessarily overstate the precision of the standard errors, even if conditional 
heteroskedasticity is present. Table 4-2 reports the estimates of the SDF parameters 
(of the unconditional model), their t-statistics, without and with Shanken’s (1992) 
correction, and a first-stage GMM JT  test statistic of the null that the pricing errors 
are jointly zero. This statistic is constructed as a quadratic form of the pricing errors 
TTWgg , weighted by the first-stage GMM weighting matrix, 1))ˆ((  bgCovW T . The 
latter is defined as follows 
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 1 1ˆ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )T n T t nTcov g b I d d d d cov g I d d d d
                (4-16)  
Here, nI  is the nn  identity matrix, ( )Tcov    denotes the sample 
variance-covariance matrix and 1 1
( ) ( )T T t t
g bd E F r
b  
    is the vector of the first 
derivatives of the moment conditions in (4-15) with respect to the model parameters. 
 
Concerning the (C)CAPM estimates, all the factor risk premia are statistically 
significant when t-statistics are computed using OLS standard errors. With Shanken’s 
(1992) standard error adjustment, however, only the risk premium of , 1t c tcay r   is 
statistically significant. This should not surprise as it simply means that there is 
considerable sampling error in the estimation of the factor loadings t . The 
coefficient of determination is, however, not very high. In particular, it is much lower 
than the coefficient of determination reported by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b). This 
is due to the fact that they include an intercept in the second pass regression, thus 
reducing pricing errors. More importantly, the estimates of b  imply that both the 
SDF and 1,tb  display the wrong sign for prolonged portions of the sample period. As 
shown in Panel A of Figure 4-1, the estimated SDF often takes negative values, thus 
assigning negative prices to non-negative payoffs almost surely. This implies the 
existence of arbitrage opportunities and violation of the assumption that investors 
preferences display non-satiation. Moreover, as shown in Panel B, the estimated 1,tb  
does not always take a negative value, thus implying a violation of the assumption 
that investors are risk averse. Interestingly, 1,tb  becomes positive roughly when 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the market assessment of perspective earnings 
growth might have been affected by over-optimism, i.e. in the second part of the 
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1990s, end it peaks on June 2000, roughly at the beginning of the stock market 
correction. The estimates of the 3M(C)CAPM suffer from the same problems, i.e. the 
SDF is not always positive and b1t is not always negative (neither however plotted to 
save space), alongside a non-positive point estimate of 2b , in contrast with the 
assumption of non-increasing absolute risk aversion and thus with standard risk 
aversion.     
 
The Sentiment-(C)CAPM and Sentiment-3M(C)CAPM are empirically more 
successful, and most of the increase in the explanatory power is due to the inclusion 
of sentiment. As shown in Table 4-1, the 2R  of Sentiment-(C)CAPM jumps to 58.9 
(50.7 adjusted). This value is comparable to the coefficient of determination obtained 
by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) allowing for an intercept in the second pass 
regression. The 2R  of the 3-moment (C)CAPM with sentiment is not much larger (it 
is actually lower, when adjusted for degrees of freedom) than the 2R  of its 
2-moment version but it is much larger than the 3-moment specification without 
sentiment.  
 
The JT  test statistic reported in Table 4-2 is never statically significant, thus 
implying that pricing errors are jointly insignificant. Moreover, while not all risk 
premia are statistically significant at conventional levels (merely implying that the 
price of the factors themselves might be close to zero), both aggregate consumption 
and sentiment are priced in the cross-section of average returns, as demonstrated by 
the significance of the corresponding elements of the b  vector reported in Table 4-2. 
More importantly, the point estimates of the elements of b  imply a much better 
behaved behaviour of the rational component of the SDF compared to the 
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specifications without sentiment. As shown in Panel A of Figure 4-2, while the SDF 
still often takes negative values, its rational component (the ticker line) is rarely 
negative. Perhaps more remarkably, 1,tb  is now always negative, both in the case of 
the 2-moment model, as shown in Panel B of Figure 4-2, and in the case of the 
3-moment model (not reported to save space). This is important as it implies that, 
including sentiment as a factor, the sign of the price of systematic conditional 
covariance is consistent with the risk-aversion assumption for any realization of the 
conditioning variable. In Figure 4-3, we report the sentiment component of the SDF. 
This is the component that helps the SDF fit the cross-section of average excess 
returns while allowing for a representative investor’s IMRS much more consistent 
with the tenets of rational optimizing behaviour. As it is evident from the Figure, this 
component of the SDF peaks at times of high market valuations, such as the so called 
‘dot-com’ boom of the late 1990s, and its troughs coincide with the bottom of market 
corrections, when investors’ judgment might have been clouded by pessimism, as in 
the aftermath of the Latin American debt crisis in 1982. At these times, it is necessary 
to allow for a substantial amount of systematic investors’ information processing 
error, to be able to justify stock valuations and still retain the assumption that, by and 
large, investors are greedy, risk averse, expected utility maximizing individuals.  
 
We also report estimates that add an extra sentiment factor, namely ts  alongside 
1t ts cay  , and, to facilitate comparison of our estimates with those reported by Lettau 
and Ludvigson (2001b), we include 1tcay   among the factors. The estimates of these 
augmented specifications are reported in Table 4-3 and Table 4-4. The only 
qualitatively important difference is that now the point estimate of the b2 parameter of 
the 3M-(C)CAPM is positive, in accordance with NIARA. This suggests that there 
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might be additional factors with which both 1tcay   and the square of the 
consumption growth rate are correlated. We leave for future research the 
identification of the extra factor (factors) and, more importantly, of whether it is 
should enter the rational or the sentiment-related component of the SDF.  
 
4.6. Conclusions	
This chapter shows that augmenting the (C)CAPM with sentiment, and thus allowing 
for systematic investor error in forming beliefs about the distribution of returns, 
permits to largely reconcile investors’ optimizing behaviour with the cross-section of 
average returns. This implies that investors must either commit systematic errors in 
assessing the joint distribution of stock returns and aggregate consumption or behave 
in a way that, at the aggregate level, is inconsistent with expected utility maximization 
and with standard risk aversion assumptions, as formulated for example by Kimball 
(1993). We leave for future research to ascertain whether these systematic (ex-post) 
errors might have been avoided making full use of available information, thus 
implying a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, as formulated by Fama (1970, 
1976). 
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Table	4‐1	
Second	Pass	Regressions	(1966‐2005)	Estimates	
25	Size	and	Book‐to‐Market	Portfolios	
Beta‐Pricing	Representation	
	
Model 
, 1c tR   , 1t c tcay R   1 , 1t c ts R   2, 1c tR   
2R  
(Adj. 2R ) 
      
(C)CAPM 0.48 0.02   26.1 
 (3.21) (5.97)   (22.8) 
 (0.99) (1.83)    
      
3M(C)CAPM 0.21 0.01  0.01 33.7 
 (1.36) (4.71)  (4.63) (27.6) 
 (0.45) (1.53)  (1.57)  
      
Sentiment-(C)CAPM 0.84 0.01 -1.35  56.5 
 (5.59) (3.70) (-6.22)  (52.6) 
 (1.76) (1.21) (-1.96)   
      
Sentiment-3M(C)CAPM 0.67 0.01 -1.22 0.01 56.5 
 (4.61) (3.25) (-5.74) (5.00) (50.3) 
 (1.59) (1.16) (-1.99) (1.78)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports 2-step regression estimates of the beta-pricing representation of various 
factor models for the period 1966-2005. The second pass regressions are estimated without an 
intercept term. The top row indicates the factors included in each model. For each included 
factor, we report the risk premia point estimates in percentage and two sets of t-statistics in 
brackets. These statistics are computed using OLS standard errors that account for correlated 
errors across test portfolios while the second set of t-statistics also uses Shanken’ (1992) 
correction for the fact that the beta coefficients are estimated. The third and second last columns 
report the percent coefficient of determination R2, both unadjusted and adjusted for the degrees of 
freedom. All the variables are defined as in the text. The data frequency is quarterly.  
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Table	4‐2	
Second	Pass	Regressions	(1966‐2005)	Estimates	
25	Size	and	Book‐to‐Market	Portfolios	
Implied	SDF	Parameters	
 
Model 
, 1c tR   , 1t c tcay R   1 , 1t c ts R   2, 1c tR   TJShanken m  mc
ms  
        
(C)CAPM -418.00 -37,904.00   17.00 629.8 629.8 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.763)   629.8 
        
3M(C)CAPM 284.00 -30,117.00  -70,956.00 24.28 632.2 632.2 
 (0.399) (0.003)  (0.038) (0.230)  632.2 
        
Sentiment-(C)CAPM -526.00 -13,219.00 305.00  15.08 617.5 446.8 
 (0.000) (0.309) (0.007)  (0.772)   383.5 
        
Sentiment-3M(C)CAPM -209.00 -14,153.00 252.00 -30,205.00 24.25 433.84 239.25 
 (0.987) (0.319) (0.056) (0.450) (0.232)   316.76 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports the elements of the b vector, the negative of the risk prices, implied by 2-pass 
regression estimates (without intercept in the second pass regression) and, in brackets, associated p-values. These 
are computed using standard errors based on a weighting matrix equal to the inverse of the sample (first stage) 
estimate of the pricing errors variance-covariance matrix. The same weighting matrix is used in the computation 
of the average pricing errors TJ reported in the third last column. The last two columns report the annualized 
volatility of the estimated stochastic discount factor (in percentage) and its decomposition in a rational and 
sentiment-related component. The market Sharpe ratio is about 40 percent. All the variables are defined as in the 
text. The data frequency is quarterly.  
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Table	4‐3	
Augmentation	by	cayt	and	st	
Beta‐Pricing	Representation	
	
Model tcay  , 1c tR   , 1t c tcay R   1ts   1 , 1t c ts R   
2
, 1c tR   
2R  
2( . )Adj R  
        
1 2.34 0.41 0.02 22.8 
(4.86) (2.6) (6.41) (15.8) 
(1.49) (0.79) (1.93) 
2 0.86 0.64 0.01 0.003 34.3 
(2.23) (3.87) (4.22) (2.13) (24.9) 
(0.74) (1.27) (1.39) (0.71) 
3 1.16 0.71 0.01 -1.46 54.7 
(3.18) (4.54) (4.2) (-6.43) (48.2) 
(1.34) (1.71) (1.52) (-3.10)  
4 1.09 0.65 0.01 -1.39 0.01 55.16 
(3.32) (4.44) (3.59) (-7.91) (4.2) (46.2) 
(1.02) (1.47) (1.44) (-2.11) (1.43) 
5 0.84 0.6 0.01 -80.61 -1.12 58.9 
(2.59) (3.93) (4.36) (-3.36) (-6.45) (50.7) 
(0.97) (1.43) (1.62) (-1.25) (-2.38) 
6 0.86 0.64 0.01 -74.86 -1.13 0.003 59.2 
(2.61) (4.33) (4.41) (-3.19) (-6.42) (2.13) (48.5) 
(0.92) (1.49) (1.52) (-1.12) (-2.24) (0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports 2-step regression estimates of the beta-pricing representation of various 
factor models for the period 1966-2005. The second pass regressions are estimated without an 
intercept term. The top row indicates the factors included in each model. For each included factor, 
we report the risk premia point estimates in percentage and two sets of t-statistics in brackets. These 
statistics are computed using OLS standard errors that account for correlated errors across test 
portfolios while the second set of t-statistics also uses Shanken’ (1992) correction for the fact that 
the beta coefficients are estimated. The third and second last columns report the percent coefficient 
of determination R2, both unadjusted and adjusted for the degrees of freedom. All the variables are 
defined as in the text. The data frequency is quarterly.  
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Table	4‐4	
Augmentation	by	cayt	and	st	
Implied	SDF	Parameters	
 
Model 
tcay  , 1c tR   , 1t c tcay R   1ts   1 , 1t c ts R   2, 1c tR   TJShanken ( )m  mc  
ms
          
1 -21.67 -391.61 -36,754.60    24.14 636.6 636.6 
 (0.655) (0.000) (0.000)     (0.340)   636.6 
          
2 -31.00 -510.00 -10,945.00   14,812.00 25.34 364.2 364.2 
 (0.536) (0.132) (0.284)   (0.672) (0.189)   364.2 
          
3 -55.40 -468.80 -7,893.20  334.00  16.24 616.8 409.2 
 (0.270) (0.000) (0.568)  (0.004)  (0.756)  419.9 
          
4 -48.00 -342.00 -8,977.00  308.00 -12,772.00 16.23 544.2 332.4 
 (0.393) (0.448) (0.531)  (0.037) (0.775) (0.702)  387.2 
          
5 -27.96 -381.17 -11,457.46 -1.22 387.55  20.46 524.9 350.3 
 (0.633) (0.002) (0.426) (0.368) (0.003)   (0.429)   340.3 
          
6 -31.00 -510.00 -10,945.00 -1.00 429.00 14,812.00 12.56 556.6 298.91 
 (0.600) (0.297) (0.451) (0.618) (0.033) (0.785) (0.895)  410.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This Table reports the elements of the b vector, the negative of the risk prices, implied by 2-pass regression 
estimates (without intercept in the second pass regression) and, in brackets, associated p-values. These are 
computed using standard errors based on a weighting matrix equal to the inverse of the sample (first stage) estimate 
of the pricing errors variance-covariance matrix. The same weighting matrix is used in the computation of the 
average pricing errors TJ reported in the third last column. The last two columns report the annualized volatility of 
the estimated stochastic discount factor (in percentage) and its decomposition in a rational and sentiment-related 
component. The market Sharpe ratio is about 40 percent. All the variables are defined as in the text. The data 
frequency is quarterly.  
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Figure	4‐1	 	 	
(C)CAPM	
Panel	A	
(Estimated	SDF)	
 
	
Panel	B	
(Estimated	b1,t)	
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Notes. Panel A of this figure reports the SDF implied by the 2-step regression estimates of the 
(C)CAPM. Panel B reports the estimate of the conditional b1t parameter for the same model and 
its linear interpolation (denoted as “linear”). The sample period is 1966-2005.  
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Figure	4‐2	
Sentiment‐(C)CAPM	
	
Panel	A	
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Notes. Panel A of this figure reports the SDF implied by the 2-step regression estimates of the 
Sentiment-(C)CAPM, and its rational component. Panel B reports the estimate of the conditional b1t 
parameter for the same model and its linear interpolation (denoted as “linear”). The sample period is 
1966-2005. 
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Figure	4‐3	
The	Sentiment	Adjustment	
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Notes. This figure reports the sentiment component of the SDF implied by the 2-step regression 
estimates of the Sentiment-(C)CAPM. The sample period is 1966-2005.  
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5. SDF	and	Transaction	Costs	
5.1. Introduction	
In this chapter, we compare several competing pricing kernels using a modified 
version of Hansen-Jagannathan distance (Hansen & Jagannathan, 1997), which not 
only accounts for conditional information but also allows for transaction costs. The 
competing pricing kernels we consider here include linear and quadratic models, 
together with the relevant conditional version. The assessment of candidate pricing 
kernels in this chapter is preceded by the discussion of extensions of the 
Hansen-Jagannathan (henceforth HJ) bound and distance measure allowing for both 
conditional information and transactions costs. On the one hand, it is shown how the 
payoff space is extended, by including scaled asset returns, when the investment 
opportunity set considered in deriving the bound includes dynamic investment 
strategies that exploit conditioning information. This modification leads to a sharper 
bound. On the other hand, we discuss the implications for the bound of allowing for 
the presence of transaction costs, which are assumed to be absent by a large part of the 
earlier literature. This modification leads to a loosening of the bound. Although 
former literature has already delt with these two issues separately (see Gallant et al. 
(1990), Bekaert and Liu (2004), and He and Modest (1995)), no study, to our 
knowledge, addresses both. . 
 
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the 
tradidtional Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds as well as the version that allows 
for transaction costs. Section 5.3 discusses the HJ Distance and the testing procedure 
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followed in this chapter. Section 5.4 presents the dataset and the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2. Volatility	Bounds	and	Transaction	Costs	
He and Modest (1995) generalized the equilibrium condition for the optimal 
intertemporal consumption-investment problem by allowing for transaction costs, 
which include both bid-ask spreads and commissions. Over a one period horizon, each 
unit investment leads to the end of period return , 1(1 ) (1 )
i i t
i
R


 . Here i  
denotes the rate of transaction costs in the price of asset i. Similarly, a one unit 
borrowing generates the end of period payment , 1(1 ) (1 )
i i t
i
R


 . For a portfolio, 
long and short positions must therefore satisfy the following pricing condition,  
 1 , 1
1 ( ) 1[ ]
1 ( ) 1
i t i
t i t
i t i
U CE R
U C
  


    .  	 (5‐1)	 	
Assuming transaction costs are the same across all assets and equal to  , Equation 
(4-2) becomes 
 1 , 1[ ]
L U
i t t i t iE m R    .  	 (5‐2)	 	
where (1 ) 1
L
i
     and (1 ) 1Ui      represent the lower and upper 
bounds, respectively, on the initial outlay for future payoffs, 1tR  . And   is a  
vector of 1N   ones. 
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Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) suggested a non-parametric technique to find the 
projection of the admissible pricing kernels on the payoff space, based on the fact that 
 11 1 1 1 1 1( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( )]t t t t t t t t t tm E m E m E R R E R            .  	 (5‐3)	 	
where 1 1( ,  )t t tcov R R    represents the covariance matrix of asset returns. This 
results derives directly from the Law of One Price. By a well known property of even 
powers, 2 ( )t   is non-negative and therefore 
 2 11 1 1 1 1( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]t t t t t t t t t tm E m E R E m E R          .  	 (5‐4)	 	
This inequality has been used as one of the most popular diagnostic tools for 
inspecting unconditional pricing models. As a relatively week selection requirement, 
however, it fails to capture the implications of conditional information, and it does not 
take into account market frictions such as transaction costs, including bid-ask spreads, 
commission fees, taxation and so on. Many authors have examined the implications 
for the admissibility of candidate pricing models of either the use of conditioning 
information in dynamic investment strategies (Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b), Bekaert 
and Liu (2004), Ferson and Siegel (2003), and Dittmar (2002)) or of frictions such as 
the transaction costs (He & Modest, 1995). To our knowledge, however, no empirical 
study has considered the two issues at the same time.  
 
We consider a payoff space augmented by the inclusion of dynamic strategies based 
on conditioning information. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b) pointed out that the 
consumption-wealth ratio summarizes the return expectations of the representative 
agent and, as a result, it must be strongly linked to the expected stock market return, 
i.e.  
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1
i
t t w m t i
i
cay E r 

  ,  	 (5‐5)	 	
where tcay  denotes deviations from the long run value of the consumption-wealth 
ratio. We therefore consider conditioning information summarized by this variable 
and an augmented payoff space given by , 1 , 1( ,  )i t t i tR cay R    . If we set 1newtR   equals 
, 1 , 1( ,  )i t t i tR cay R    , and the price vector new  equals ( ,  )tcay    , (5-2) then can be 
rewritten as follows, 
 
1 , 1
1 , 1
[ ]
[ ( )]
L U
i t t i t i
L U
t i t t t i t t i
E m R
cay E m cay R cay
 
 
 
 
 
  .  	 (5‐6)	 	
The conditional expectation can be dropped, since the extended payoff space includes 
the dynamic strategies in the basis of the conditional expectations. The corresponding 
pricing kernel volatility bound, accounting for transaction costs and conditional 
information, is as follows, 
 
2 1
1 1 1 1 1( ) inf[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
1 1. .           
1 1
new new new new
t t t new t t
new new new
m E m E R E m E R
s t
  
    

       
   
.  	 (5‐7)	 	
where 1 1( ,  )new newnew t tcov R R    . 
 
5.3. Estimation	and	Diagnostic	Tests	
Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) proposed the so-called Hansen–Jagannathan (HJ) 
distance to measure the pricing error for any particular candidate pricing model. 
Setting families of pricing kernels that price assets correctly as the benchmark, the HJ 
distance shows the maximum pricing error per unit norm on a set of portfolio with n 
risky assets and takes the form 
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 1( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]T T THJ E g G E g   ,  	 (5‐8)	 	
where the weighting matrix 1 1( )
new new
t tG E R R    is assumed to be nonsingular and 
 1 1
1
( ) [( ( ) ) ]
. .     ( )
new new
T t t t
t
g E m R I
s t m f
  
 
 

  
 , 	 (5‐9)	 	
here tI  stands for the conditioning variables tcay  and tz  in this chapter. This 
distance measure is equivalent to p , where p  is the correction to the proxy 
stochastic discount factor necessary to make it consistent with the data. As such, the 
HJ-distance is typically interpreted as the least-square distance between the given 
candidate pricing kernel and the true pricing kernel. The first order condition for its 
minimization criteria is 
 1 ( ) 0T T TD G g   ,  	 (5‐10)	 	
which gives, 
 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) newT T T T T TD G D D G      ,  	 (5‐11)	 	
where 1( )T tD E R f  . The asymptotic distribution of HJ Distance, as shown by  
Jagannathan & Wang (1996) differs from the 2  distribution of the pricing errors 
under the optimal weighting matrix Hansen (1982). It follows a combination of 2  
distributions weighted by the nonzero eigenvalues of a particular matrix. 
Mathematically, 
 2
1
[ ( )]
N K
d
T j j
j
T HJ v 

 ,  	 (5‐12)	 	
where jv  is random variable drawn from a 2 (1)  distribution, and j  are the 
nonzero eigenvalues of the following matrix: 
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1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 21 1[ ( ) ( ) ]( ) ( )S G I G D D G D D G G S           ,  	 (5‐13)	 	
where S  is the variance matrix of pricing errors, with sample counterpart 
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )]T T TTS g g   . 12S  and 12G  are the upper-triangle matrices obtained from a 
cholesky decomposition of matrices S  and G , respectively. The testing procedure 
involves the simulation on M  sets of N K  random 2 (1)  variables. Then the 
p-value is 
 2
1 1
{ [ ( )] }
M N K
j ij T
i j
p I v T HJ M 

 
   ,  	 (5‐14)	 	
where ( )I    is the discrete choice function, which is equal to one when the underlying 
condition holds, and zero otherwise. This provides a diagnostic test based on the 
HJ-distance, which should be not statistically significant for the null that the model is 
correctly specified not to be rejected. This approach differs from the conventional 
two-stage GMM estimation by Hansen (1982). The HJ distance, as a measure of the 
departure between the candidate pricing kernels and the set of true pricing kernels, has 
a more intuitive interpretation than the spefification error statistic based on the GMM 
estimator that uses the optimal weighting matrix or it two-stage 
approximation..Perhaps more importantly, since the distance measure is formed on a 
weighting matrix that is invariant across all models tested, it can be used to directly 
compare the performance not only of nested models, but nonnested models as well. 
 
Another advantage of the Hansen-Jagannathan approach is that it largely avoids the 
pitfall of favoring pricing models that produce volatile pricing errors. The 
Hansen-Jagannathan criterion is a function of the inverse of the second moment 
matrix of returns rather than the inverse of the second moment matrix of pricing errors. 
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Consequently, the HJ distance will fall only if the least-square distance to an 
admissible pricing kernel is reduced, and not if the proxy pricing kernel generates 
volatile pricing errors. Thus, the distance rewards models exclusively for improving 
pricing and not for adding noise.  
 
One caveat is in order. The distribution of the Hansen-Jagannathan test statistic is a 
function of the optimal GMM weighting matrix. Consequently, when testing the 
significance of the Hansen-Jagannathan distance, one may find a high p-value because 
the parameters imply a “small” optimal GMM weighting matrix; that is, a weighting 
matrix characterized by highly volatile pricing errors. One potential safeguard against 
failing to reject a model due simply to noise in the pricing kernel is to analyze the 
significance of the parameter estimates. Whereas the distribution of the distance 
measure is rewarded for a small GMM weighting matrix, the distribution of the 
parameter estimates is penalized by a small GMM weighting matrix. That is, although 
a model may be accepted due to volatile pricing errors, the volatility will tend to 
reduce the significance of the parameter estimates. Consequently, we perform Wald 
tests to assess the significance of adding each marginal term in the pricing kernel. 
These tests provide some surety not only that a pricing kernel is not rewarded simply 
for being noisy, but also provides evidence as to the importance of adding polynomial 
terms, potentially alleviating concerns about overfitting.  
 
A final advantage to the Hansen-Jagannathan distance measure is that the results may 
be more robust than in standard GMM estimates (Cochrane, 2001). Since the 
weighting matrix is not a function of the parameters, the results should be more stable. 
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Despite this advantage, Ahn and Gadarowski (2004) suggest that the size of the test 
statistic is poor in finite samples; the distance measure rejects correctly specified 
models too often. These results suggest the possibility that using the HJ GMM 
estimator rather than the optimal or two-stage GMM estimators may trade size for 
power. To gauge the possible impact of this trade-off, we also estimate the models 
using two-stage GMM. 
 
5.4. Data	and	Empirical	Results	
5.4.1 Data 
The data used in this chapter includes the logarithmic quarterly returns of 30 
value-weighted industry-sorted portfolios of the stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ for the period from the first quarter of 1954 to the third quarter of 2002, 
the quarterly return on the three-month Treasury Bill to proxy for the risk-free rate, 
the individual quarterly non-durable and services consumption expenditure from 
DataStream to proxy for the representative agent’s intertemporal consumption stream. 
Finally, we use the consumption-wealth ratio series, tcay  as the proxy of conditional 
information to scale the factors. Empirically, the choice of conditioning variables has 
been discussed in many studies. The variables should reflect investors’ expectations 
about future market conditions and predict asset returns. To check the robustness of 
our results, we also replicate the work of Dittmar (2002), i.e. we include the set of 
instruments ,{1,  ,  ,  ,  }t m t t t tz r dy ys dp  as another information set differing from 
tcay . In detail, the ,m tr  represents the market excess return, tdy  is the aggregate 
dividend yield, tys  measures the yield term spread between three-month treasury bill 
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return and one-month treasury bill return, and tdp  captures the industrial production 
growth. Table 5-1 is the statistic summary of conditioning factors. 
 
To test the predictive ability of tz , we project all returns 1tR   on the conditioning 
variable set tz  through the following regression, 
 , 1 1i t t tR b z e   ,  	 (5‐15)	 	
Table 5-2 provides Wald statistics, computed using the Newey and West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, and the 
corresponding p-values. The null hypothesis for the test is that the lagged conditioning 
variables set has no predictive power for asset returns. Statistically, the coefficients b  
of the predictive regressions are jointly zero. The null is rejected at 1 percent critical 
level for all 30 industry portfolios. 
 
5.4.2 Empirical Results 
5.4.2.1 Estimation of pricing kernels 
A traditional GMM procedure is employed to estimate the coefficients of the 
candidate pricing kernels, which include the linear, quadratic and cubic specifications 
with time-varying coefficients, with and without human capital , 1c tr   as a component 
of the return on aggregate wealth. Moreover, two alternative sets of conditioning 
variables, i.e. { }tcay  and tz , are employed in estimation. 
 
Table 5-3 presents results of specification tests when the measure of aggregate wealth 
does not include human capital , 1c tr  . The table presents average values of the 
 145
coefficients ta  and ,i tb , 1,  2,  3i   corresponding to the thi  order term of the 
return on the market portfolio polynomial. The table also presents the TTJ  measure, 
i.e. T times the weighted average pricing error with the weighting given by the inverse 
of the error variance-covariance matrix ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )]S E u u  , and associated p-values 
under the null that the candidate model is correctly specified. Panel A reports the 
coefficients of the linear conditional pricing models, with SDF 1 1, , 1t t t m tm a b r   , 
where the , 1m tr   stands for the market return proxy, i.e. the market index return, and 
ta  and ,i tb  are time-varing as linear functions of the conditioning variable tcay , as 
defined in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b). Both these two coefficients are statistically 
significant, and the coefficient of maket return is negative, in accordance with the 
CAPM. The mispecification test statistic is not significant at conventional levels. As 
shown in Panel B, the linear market return term is significant in the quadratic model 
too and dominates the quadratic term. The p-values of the TTJ  statistic and of the 
individual coefficients suggest marginal improvement in the model fit in moving from 
a linear specification to a nonlinear one. The quadratic pricing kernel reduces the TTJ  
measure from 75.25 to 74.99, and furthermore, the additional cubic term reduces TTJ  
by another 0.65 drop. However, the addition of either the quadratic or cubic term does 
not materially improve the performance of the conditional pricing kernel. If we 
choose 10 percent as the critical p-value, none of the above models can generate the 
admissible pricing kernel which prices the cross section of returns on the 30 
value-weighted industry-sorted portfolios. 
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We next analyse the impact of incorporating a measure of human capital in the return 
on aggregate wealth. These results are displayed in Table 5-4. The outcomes of the 
specification tests are markedly different from those in Table 5-3. The fit of all three 
pricing kernels improves relative to the case in which human capital is not included in 
the measure of aggregate wealth. The TTJ  measure implied by the linear pricing 
kernel falls to 74.81. This result is consistent with the findings of Jagannathan and 
Wang (1996), who find that incorporating human capital improves the performance of 
the conditional CAPM. However, the linear pricing kernel and the quadratic pricing 
kernel are rejected at the 10 percent significance level.  
 
We subsequently re-estimated by mimimizing the HJ-distance and using the set of 
information variables zt . Estimation results are qualitatively unchanged. Consistent 
with the two-stage GMM estimation, the distance measures and p-values for the tests 
of significance of the coefficients suggest marginal improvement in moving from a 
linear specification to a nonlinear specification. As shown in Panel B of Table 5-5, a 
cubic specification of the pricing kernel with human capital results in a decrease in the 
distance measure of 4.27 percent relative to the linear kernel without human capital. 
The same measure in Table 5-6 improves by 16.35 percent, which is in line with the 
improvement of 12.50 percent reported by Dittmar (2002). In either case, the cubic 
pricing kernel cannot be rejected at the 10 level. These results suggest that the 
performance of a pricing kernel grounded in preference theory, i.e. estimated 
imposing preference restrictions implied by decreasing absolute risk aversion and 
decreasing absolute prudence, can capture cross-sectional variation in returns. The 
results of Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 suggest that incorporating only nonlinear functions 
of the return on the value-weighted index or a linear function of the return on labour is 
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insufficient to generate an admissible pricing kernel. However, consistently with 
Dittmar (2002), by utilizing both the return on labour and the nonlinearities implied 
by the series expansion, we are able to generate an admissible pricing kernel. 
 
5.4.2.2 Volatility of pricing kernels and the HJ Bounds with Transaction Costs 
Dittmar (2002) examines the relation of the estimated pricing kernels to the volatility 
bounds of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), and shows that the cubic pricing kernel 
with human capital is able to generate sufficient volatility that meets the 
Hansen-Jagannathan bound for a certain range of values of the mean, but the 
estimated value of the latter is slightly too high for the pricing kernel to actually lie 
within the bound. This finding essentially implies that the cubic pricing kernel, even 
with human capital, is not volatile enough to be admissible though it is very close. 
 
In order to cope with this problem, and gather some insight into the role of market 
frictions in asset pricing, we compare the estimated pricing kernels with the HJ 
bounds in the presence of transaction costs. As indicated in Section 5.2, the bounds 
represent the minimum volatility that a pricing kernel must exhibit, given its mean, to 
be admissible. In this respect, the bounds depict the set of admissible pricing kernels 
in mean-standard deviation space. Since the pricing kernel approach relates the first 
moment of returns to the second moment of the discount factor, this provides further 
insight into the specification of the model. The analysis differs from the specification 
test of the Hansen-Jagannathan distance measure, which asks whether there is some 
specific admissible pricing kernel that is statistically indistinguishable from that of the 
model. 
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The Hansen-Jagannathan bounds for the 30 value-weighted industry-sorted portfolios 
augmented by the three-month T-bill return are presented in Figure	5‐1 panel A and 
panel B. The assumption of 0.80 percent transaction costs per quarter is similar to the 
one made by He and Modest (1995), which is reasonable given the existence of stamp 
duty, brokage commissions (or the bid-ask spread) and slippage costs. As suggested 
by Table 5-5 and Table 5-6, the conditional cubic pricing kernels with human capital 
dominate the others in terms of mean-volatility pairs, although neither of them reaches 
the HJ bounds in the absence of transaction costs. In contrast, the conditional cubic 
and quadratic pricing kernels lie insider the HJ bounds when transaction costs are 
taken into account. In detail, Panel A of Figure	5‐1 shows that the conditional cubic 
pricing kernel with human capital is admissible when the conditioning information set 
is tcay  and transaction costs are 0.8 percent, and Panel B shows that the conditional 
cubic and quadratic pricing kernels either with or without human capital are all 
admissible when the conditioning information set is tz  and transaction costs are 0.8 
percent. These findings are novel relative to those reported by Dittmar (2002). 
 
The Hansen-Jagannathan bounds plot, together with the decomposition of the distance 
measure, indicate that incorporating human capital and transaction costs substantially 
improves the nonlinear pricing kernels’ ability to match the volatility of the set of 
pricing kernels that are admissible for the industry portfolios. That is, it substantially 
lowers the standard deviation of the adjustment necessary to make the nonlinear 
pricing kernels admissible. 
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5.5. Conclusion	
In this chapter, we follow the approach of He and Modest (1995) and Luttmer (1996), 
who showed how to adapt the the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds to economies 
with the kinked budget constraints that arise in the presence of proportional 
transaction costs, to assess whether allowing for transaction costs can help solve the 
coskewness puzzle. Since these bounds do not depend on a particular model for the 
stochastic discount factor, but only on the form of the budget constraint, this provides 
a robust way to quantify the extent to which market frictions affect inferences about 
important features of asset pricing models.  
 
Like in the study of Dittmar (2002), we consider nonlinear pricing kernels that can be 
seen as providing a link between nonparametric and parametric approaches to 
describing cross sectional variation in equity returns. The common element in these 
pricing kernels and those of nonparametric models is nonlinearity in priced risk 
factors. In contrast to these nonparametric approaches, and in common with 
parametric approaches, the pricing kernels are defined over an endogenous risk factor, 
and preference restrictions govern the sign of the relationship between returns and the 
terms in the pricing kernel. The risk factor is the return on aggregate wealth, and the 
nonlinearity arises from an expansion of a representative investor’s Euler equations 
for portfolio and consumption choice. Adding the additional assumption that the 
agent’s preferences exhibit decreasing absolute prudence allows us to restrict the sign 
of the first three terms of this expansion. We show that this framework is consistent 
with a setting in which agents are averse to kurtosis, and consequently asset returns 
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are affected by covariance, coskewness, and cokurtosis with the return on aggregate 
wealth. 
 
Tests of the model show that incorporating nonlinearity substantially improves upon 
the pricing kernel’s ability to describe the cross section of returns. In particular, when 
human capital is incorporated into the measure of aggregate wealth, a cubic pricing 
kernel is able to fit the cross section of industry-sorted portfolio returns. Moreover, 
the conditioning information set is the crucial factor to the effect of determining the 
volatility of pricing kernel. Although the information set tcay   and the information 
set tz  generate similar admissible cubic pricing kernels, they perform differently 
under the HJ bounds framework. The success of former depends on the inclusion of 
human capital, while for the later it does not. 
 
The main finding is that the conditional quadratic pricing kernel, given by the 
quadratic polynomial approximation of the representative investor’s IMRS that arises 
in the 3M-CAPM, dominates the competing kernels under both the sharpened HJ 
bound and the sharpened HJ distance and it is admissible under relatively high, 
though not unrealistically so, proportional transaction costs. The pricing errors, as 
summarized by the HJ distance, are not significant for the conditional quadratic 
pricing model for a quarterly transaction cost rate as low as 2 percent when the risk 
factor is the return on the stock market portfolio. This break-even rate increases to 3 
percent per quarter when the risk factor is the growth rate of aggregate consumption 
In contrast, if the market is assumed frictionless (i.e., under the no transaction cost 
assumption), the volatility of the admissible nonparametric pricing kernels is so high 
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that cannot be matched even by any of the models we consider. This suggests that 
market friction consisting of proportional transaction costs can explain, at least in part, 
the coskewness puzzle. . 
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6. Fund	Evaluation	
6.1. Introduction	
The evaluation of fund performance has attracted lots of attention from both 
practitioners and scholars. The essential concern of this part of the thesis, as in Ahn 
and Shivdasani (1999), is to provide an empirical assessment of fund performance in 
the Chinese market. Although research on fund performance evaluation has seen 
countless contributions over the years, applications are somewhat limited 
geographically (Leite & Cortez, 2009). This is especially the case of Chinese funds. 
The reason may be traced to the lesser development of the Chinese security exchange 
market34. The lack of an efficient regulatory framework during the early stage after 
the birth of the Chinese stock exchange inevitably discouraged the emerging of 
open-end funds during 1990s. But since 2000, the open-end mutual fund industry has 
become one of the fastest growing segments of the financial sector in China. The first 
fund, called Hua’an Innovation, was introduced with the assistance of J.P. Morgan in 
September, 2001. According to the WIND financial Database35, the biggest financial 
data service provider in China, by the end of 2011, the number of listed open-end 
funds had risen to 992, and more than 400 mutual funds are heavily invested in 
equities. 
 
                                                 
 
34 The Shanghai stock exchange rebegan to operate on December 19th, 1990, after the founding of the People's 
Republic of China. And the Shenzhen stock exchange is founded on December 1st, 1990. 
35 Please check http://www.wind.com.cn/En/Default.aspx for more details. 
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In analysis of the trading practices in China, Kang et al. (2002) pointed out that the 
trading decisions of most individual investors in the Chinese market are mainly driven 
by sentiment and market rumours. Then the question is whether fund managers in the 
Chinese market construct their portfolio more efficiently than the ordinary individual 
investors. Most studies of mutual funds rely on Jensen’s alpha as a measures of risk 
adjusted performance. As noted by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), however, Jensen’s 
alpha may assigns erroneously negative performance to a market timer. The reason is, 
as shwon by Grant (1977), that the estimate of the CAPM beta coefficient is biased 
upwards, and therefore the estimation of performance is downward-biased. In order to 
cope with this weakness, recent studies of mutual fund returns have moved beyond 
performance measures based on Jensen’s alpha derived from the ordinary CAPM. As 
emphasized by Lee and Rahman (1990), the basis for a mutual fund manager to 
generate superior performance consists of two components: microforecasting (security 
analysis ability) and macroforecasting (market timing ability). In their paper, the 
authors allow for the risk coefficient to be time-varying in order to reflect 
market-timing ability. In this chapter, we apply the approach of Chen and Knez (1996) 
to analyse the open-end fund performance in the Chinese market. Following Dahlquist 
and Söderlind (1999), we examine the hypothesis that the open-end fund managers in 
Chinese market process information more professionally than individual investors to 
generate significant superior returns and also try to establish whether their 
performance could be replicated by employing some simple strategies that make use 
of public information. This analysis makes several contributions to the fund 
performance literature. Firstly, we extend our understanding of the trade-off between 
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risk and return to the Chinese open-end fund industry. Instead of using, as in many 
studies, the the Sharpe ratio36, our approach echoes the newly emerging literature (see 
Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999), Ahn et al. (2003) and Ferson et al. (2006)) and 
defines performance relative to a pre-specified SDF. As discussed by Dahlquist and 
Söderlind (1999), given an pre-derived SDF, a measure of abnormal return (SDF 
alpha) is easily obtained. Secondly, by adding conditioning information, we test the 
fund performance conditional on ex-ante economic states (Ferson et al., 2006). In fact, 
due to the short history of the open-end fund in Chinese market, the conditional 
performance of this industry is still largely unexplored. A few studies challenge the 
pertinence of the use of conditioning information in fund performance evaluation 
outside the US market (see, Bauer et al. (2006), Blake et al. (2002), Otten and Bams 
(2002), and Sawicki and Ong (2000)), then the question is whether this argument 
applies to the Chinese market as well.  
 
6.2. Theoretical	Framework	
For the identification of superior return, Chen and Knez (1996) require two conditions: 
a) the existence of a reference portfolio set ox , which is available to both fund 
managers and retail investors, b) the existence of an admissible pricing kernel m  
which assigns an identical performance measure for portfolios constructed through 
simple replication strategies from the reference portfolio set by using public 
                                                 
 
36 Chen and Knez (1996) proposed four basic conditions for the legitimacy of evaluation measure. In fact, the 
Sharpe measure, and the RAROC (risk adjusted rate of return) index violate at least one of these conditions. For 
instance, the RAROC does not satisfy the condition II in Chen and Knez (1996): the measure function   must be 
linear. 
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information. If the law of one price (LOP) holds, the price for a portfolio equals the 
value-weighted price of each individual stock. Mathematically, 
 
1 1
( ) ( )
N N
i i i i
i i
p x p x 
 
  .  	 (6‐1)	
where ( )p    denotes the linear pricing function which is a projection from payoff 
space to price space :  op x  , i  represents the investment weight of each 
individual stock, and ix  is the payoff of each individual stock, i.e., i ox x . If we 
define the future return on the asset with payoff ix  as ( )i i iR x p x , where iR  
forms the return space oR , then for any two iR  and jR , we have, 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] 0
( ) ( )
ji
i j
i j
xxp R p R p p
p x p x
    .  	 (6‐2)	
For a fund manager, whose performance *R  lies inside the reference return space 
oR , the assessment of superior investment ability is zero, i.e. 
*( ) 0op R R  . If the 
generated performance *R  lies inside the managed superior return space sR , which 
indicates the existence of * 0( ) ( ) 0R R    for at least one state of the world  , 
then under the assumption of NA, *( ) 0op R R  . In fact, Chen and Knez (1996) 
point out that the only way for fund managers to achieve superior performance is to 
exploit superior information. Chen and Knez (1996) define the superior return affine 
hull as 
 { | ( )   and  ( ) 1}
( )
s
s s s i i i
i N i Ns
xR R x w s x w s
p x  
     .  	 (6‐3)	
Here, the fund manager can generate dynamic trading strategies ( )w s  by using the 
superior information set s . By contrast, the reference return affine hull is 
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 { | ( )   and  ( ) 1}
( )
o
o o o i i i
i N i No
xR R x w o x w o
p x  
     ,  	 (6‐4)	
where the information set o  is publicly available to the retail investors. Inevitably, 
some fund managers may only follow a passive constant strategy or the dynamic 
trading strategies on the basis of public information. In this case, the superior return 
space sR  should contain the reference return affine hull oR  and the passive return 
affine hull cR . More precisely, c o sR R R   where cR  is the constant 
composition return by a passive strategy. Chen and Knez (1996) propose a 
generalized performance measure m   which satisfies 
 ( ) 1       0oE m R m
   ,  	 (6‐5)	
According to (6-5), we have: 
 0
0
[ ( )] 0       if ( ) 0
and  [ ( )] 0       if ( ) 0
s o s
s o s
E m R R R R
E m R R R R


   
    . 	 (6‐6)	
 
6.3. Conditional	Performance	Evaluation	
Traditional or unconditional alphas compare returns and risks measured as averages 
over an evaluation period, and these averages are taken “unconditionally” or without 
regard to variations in the state of financial markets or the broader economy. In the 
conditional performance evaluation approach, the state of the economy is measured 
using predetermined, public information variables. This takes the view that a managed 
portfolio strategy that can be replicated using readily available public information 
should not be judged as having superior performance.  
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Similarly, when the fund manager predicts the price movement, ideally he will adjust 
his portfolio in an attempt to fully explore beneficial opportunities. Literally, if the 
market has a high probability to generate positive (negative) return over the next 
investment period, the manager will reconstruct his portfolio by including more (less) 
high-risk stocks and less (more) low-risk stocks. The analysis of mean-variance 
efficient sets with respect to conditioning information is developed by Hansen and 
Richard (1987). In their paper, they state that unconditional efficiency can be treated 
as a special case of conditionally efficiency, but not the converse. In fact, a number of 
papers have since extended Jensen’s (1968) work by including conditioning 
information to evaluate the timing ability. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) suggest that 
the excess return of the manager’s portfolio should be expressed as 
 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1p t t p t m t p tr J r        , 	 (6‐7)	
where J  denotes the Jansen’s alpha. Ferson and Harvey (1999) provide an 
empirical study on the ability of the Fama-French model to capture common dynamic 
patterns in returns by using a set of lagged, economy-wide predictor variables. The 
betas in the asset pricing model are allowed to be time-varying and depend linearly on 
the predetermined instruments, 
 
, 1 , , 1 1 , 1
, 0, 1, 1 , 1( )
p t p t p t t p t
p t p p t t p t
r J b f
J b b z f
 
 
   
 
  
    , 	 (6‐8)	
Here, 1tf   is a vector of excess returns on the risk factor-mimicking portfolios over 
the risk-free rate ,f tR , and 1 ,t f t of R R   . Assume , 1 , , 1p t f t p tR R r    is in the 
affine hull oR , then ,p tJ  is statistically insignificant. Otherwise, , 1p tR   
outperforms the basis assets oR  and lies inside the superior return affine hull sR , if 
,p tJ  is significant positive in measure. According to Ferson and Siegel (2009), both 
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of the above cases (6-7) and (6-8) can be represented conditionally, in a similar way 
as in (6-6), In fact, 
 
1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
, 1
, , 1 1 , 1 , 1
( ) ( ) [ ( )]
1 [ ( )]
[ ( )]
t t p t t t p t t t p t p t p t
p t t t p t o t
f t
p t f t t t p t o t
E m r E m J E m f
J E m R R
R
J R E m R R
  


  
      

  


   
  
 
 
, 	 (6‐9)	
or equivalently, we could write (6-9) as, 
 , , 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1( )          p t f t t t p t f t p t sJ R E m R R R R         , 	 (6‐10)	
Therefore, a natural hypothesis to test is whether ,p tJ  is equal to zero. 
 
Through equation (6-3), we know that an investment manager forms a portfolio of the 
primitive assets with gross return , 1 , 1( )p t i i t
i N
R w s R 

  , here, ( ) 1i
i N
w s

  and 
, 1i t oR R  . To see how a manager with superior information can generate alpha, 
substitute portfolio , 1p tR   into (6-10) and use the definition of covariance and 
equation (6-5) to obtain 
 
, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 1 , 1
( ) [ ( )] [ , ( )]
[ , ( )]
t f t t t i t t i f t t t i t i f t
f t t t i t i
J R E m R E w s R cov m R w s R
R cov m R w s
        

  
  
 . 	 (6‐11)	
If the trading strategy ( )iw s  is based on the public information set o , the trading 
strategy is predetermined at time t  and tJ  is zero. Otherwise, if the fund manager 
has the access to the superior information set s , then an abnormal return can be 
generated.  
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6.4. Estimation	of	Alpha	
Similarly to Ahn et al. (2003), the method that we employ follows Chen and Knez 
(1996) in that, to measure risk-adjusted performance, we use a stochastic discount 
factor retrieved from a set of basis assets. It is important to note the differences 
between this method and other parametric approaches in assessing the abnormal 
performance of superior strategies employed by fund managers. Nonparametric 
performance measures attempt to recover a set of admissible stochastic discount 
factors based on minimal conditions such as the law of one price or no arbitrage 
conditions. Parametric approaches put forth instead a particular parametric pricing 
model, which is assumed to price all basis assets, and then test whether the strategy of 
interest outperforms the efficient portfolio relative to this model. 
 
As discussed by Ahn et al. (2003), the nonparametric approach has several advantages. 
First, as mentioned above, estimating a stochastic discount factor from a set of basis 
assets imposes equilibrium pricing conditions without the need to specify a parametric 
benchmark. This can help avoid the problem that the success of superior performance 
might be only conditional on a particular parametric pricing model assumed to be true. 
Second, the estimation of a discount factor leads to natural measures of risk-adjusted 
abnormal performance. If the funds considered outperform when measured in this 
manner, then it is more likely that their performance is due to investor irrationality. 
However, if these funds cannot outperform the benchmark, their success may be 
consistent with rational asset pricing. Third, the nonparametric measures I use can be 
easily extended to conditional measures which incorporate the possibility that risk 
premiums are time varying.  
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Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) investigate how to retrieve the stochastic discount 
factors 1tm   from a given set of tradable, or basis, assets. The key underlying 
assumption therein is that there is no pricing inconsistency among the basis assets: 
that is, the SDFs are admissible. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) suggest two 
particular solutions for 1tm   which are the minimum-norm discount factors defined 
in different metrics. The first is defined as the 1tm   that is in the space oR . That is, 
 1 , 1 , 1    
T
t i t i t om R R R     . 	 (6‐12)	
Here , 1i tR   is the basis assets in oR , and   usually equals 11 1( )t t tE R R    . We 
follow Chen and Knez (1996) and term this solution for the SDF the law of one price 
(LOP) discount factor, since its existence necessitates only that the law of one price 
holds. The second SDF satisfies equation (6-5), and the further requirement that 1tm   
is strictly positive, 
 1 , 1 , 1max[ , 0]    
T
t i t i t om R R R     . 	 (6‐13)	
This SDF satisfies the stronger condition of no arbitrage, thereby ruling out 
investment opportunities with positive payoffs and non-positive prices. We refer to 
this discount factor as the no-arbitrage SDF.  
 
The method for estimating tJ  in a GMM setting is taken directly from Farnsworth 
et al. (2002a), and it is based on the system of moment conditions listed below,  
 
, 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
( ) [ ( ) ]
( ) [ ( ) ]
o o t t
s t f t s t f t
g E m R z
g J R E m R R
  
  



  
  
   . 	 (6‐14)	
The parameters can be estimated by minimizing the criterion function ( )G  ,  
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
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. 	 (6‐15)	
where the weighting matrix W  is,  
 1
( )
{ [ ( ), ( )]}
( )
o
o s
s
g
W E g g
g
  
     
. 	 (6‐16)	
As shown by Hansen (1982), under the null of no model mispecification 
2( ) ~ n kTG    , where T  is the number of the observation in the sample period, n  is 
the number of moment conditions and k  is the number of parameters. Each of the n  
assets is associated with one moment condition. We incorporate the return on a 
risk-free asset among the test asset payoffs, since Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999) 
emphasize the importance of doing this in order to fix the mean of the stochastic 
discount factor at a reasonable level. The fund performance return adds an additional 
moment condition so that 21( ) ~TG   . 
 
6.5. Data	
All the data we use here are provided by WIND37, which is the most famous and 
reliable financial data provider in the Chinese market. Due to the short period during 
which the open-end fund industry in China has been in existence, we only focus on 
the relatively high weekly frequency in order to have a sufficiency large number of 
observations in our sample period. The latter runs from January 1, 2006 to December 
                                                 
 
37 The official website of WIND is: http://www.wind.com.cn/En/Default.aspx 
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31, 2011, for a total of 306 observations. We choose the fund performances and the 
basis portfolios as follows. 
 
6.5.1 The Fund Performance 
We only focus on the funds whose main investment holdings are stocks, and 
meanwhile we exclude the funds with passive trading strategies, such as the ETFs, 
and index-tracking funds. In fact, the trading purpose of the ETFs or the 
index-tracking funds is to replicate the targeted index. The fund managers follow a 
predetermined passive strategy, and rebalance the investment portfolio according to 
the change in the index components. It seems relatively pointless to include such 
funds in an assessment of investment ability of active fund managers. After these 
filters are applied, we are left with only 12 open-end funds. Summay statistics on 
these funds are given in Table 6-1. 
 
6.5.2 The Basis Portfolios 
The choice of the basis portfolios effectively determines the measure of abnormal 
performance. In complete markets, the SDF is unique. However, when markets are 
incomplete, there exists a multiplicity of SDFs that correctly price the assets in the 
economy (Harrison & Kreps, 1979). If the reference set from which the SDF is 
formed spans the payoff opportunity set which is available to investors, then 
measuring abnormal performance relative to this reference set will provide a correct 
(and unique) inference. However, if the reference set does not span the payoffs, it is 
possible to incorrectly reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance (Ahn 
& Shivdasani, 1999). 
 
171 
 
 
Ideally, to prevent an incorrect rejection of the null, the reference assets should mimic 
the entire opportunity set from which the trading strategies are chosen. However, this 
approach is not implementable in practice. Therefore we must choose a more 
parsimonious set of reference assets that capture as much of the investment 
opportunity set as possible; that is, we wish to group securities in a manner that 
maximizes intragroup correlation and minimizes intergroup correlation. King (1966) 
demonstrates that industry groupings do precisely what we need. In an exhaustive 
analysis of factors important in the determination of stock returns, he concludes that 
market and industry factors capture most, if not all, of the common variation in stock 
returns. For example, he demonstrates that “large” positive covariance in returns 
cluster strongly within industry groupings, and negative covariances are observed 
exclusively across industry groupings. Therefore we form the reference set by 
forming portfolios on the basis of industry. In this part, we choose Shen & Wan 23 
Industry portfolio groups, which are published everyday and treated as the standard 
industry portfolios in Chinese market.  
 
6.6. Empirical	Findings	
6.6.1 Unconditional Performance Measures 
We examine unconditional performance based on no-arbitrage first. The purpose of 
the unconditional estimation is to investigate whether the fund manager is able to 
achieve superior performance compared with the passive strategy. In this case, we are 
testing the fund performance , 1i t cR R  . As discussed previously, the basis assets 
used for the tests consist of the 23 industry-sorted portfolios plus the return on the 
riskless asset. Results of this test are shown in Table 4-1. 
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The results in Table 6-1 suggest that the abnormal performances of all the listed funds 
are trivial when the unconditional performance measure is used, as none of the tJ  
is significant at any conventional level. These results suggest that the fund managers 
of the selected funds add no superior performance to their managed investment. 
 
6.6.2 Conditional Performance Measures 
In order to further assess performance, we now apply the conditional measure used by 
Ahn et al. (2003) and check whether our results are affected if we allow investors’ 
expectations to vary conditional on three publicly known information variables: the 
one-week lag market excess return over risk-free rate, the return on the Treasury bill 
with maturity closest to one month, and the term spread, measured as the difference in 
yields on three-year maturity Treasury bonds over one-year maturity Treasury bills, 
i.e., { ,  ,  }t t t tZ rm tb ys . These results are presented in Table 6-3. All the funds 
appear to display significant negative performances. These results, combined with 
those in Table 6-1, show that the fund performances , 1i tR   only belong to cR , but 
are outside oR  and even sR . These results suggest that the open-end fund purchaser 
in Chinese market is largely wasting money by buying these funds, since their 
performance can be simply replicated by the individual investor through passive 
strategies.  
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6.7. Conclusion	
In this part, we followed the approach of Chen and Knez (1996), and in a similar spirit 
to Dahlquist and Söderlind (1999), to analyse the open-end fund performance in the 
Chinese market. The results of our analysis show that the fund managers of active  
open-ended funds in fact add no superior performance to the managed portfolios. 
Even the naive buy-and-hold trading strategy is able to replicate their performance 
easily. Then the question is why we assist to the phenomenon of the rapid expansion 
of the open-fund industry in spite of the poor fund performance. Tight restrictions on 
admissible investment policies apply to all fund managers in China. Frequent 
rebalancing, short selling and leverage trading are banned by the CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission) for the open-end funds. These restrictiction might 
help explain the poor performce of the mutual fund industry. Other possible 
explanations include high transaction costs, and in this respect a comparison with non 
active mutual funds would be useful, and investors inexperience and limited 
monitoring ability. We leave the investigation of these possibilities for future 
research. 
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Table	6‐1	
Statistical	Summary	of	the	Fund	Performances	
Quotation 
Codes 
Mean Stdev 
Quotation 
Codes 
Mean Stdev 
160106.OF 0.456 4.570 percent 161706.OF 0.495 4.220 percent 
160211.OF 0.604 3.892 percent 161810.OF 0.440 3.988 percent 
160314.OF 0.542 3.435 percent 161903.OF 0.181 5.008 percent 
160505.OF 0.517 3.757 percent 162006.OF 0.496 3.825 percent 
161607.OF 0.364 4.466 percent 162605.OF 0.445 4.581 percent 
161610.OF 0.430 4.044 percent 162703.OF 0.502 4.496 percent 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table presents weekly means and standard deviation of the returns to the 12 target funds. In 
fact, only the funds whose main investment holdings are stocks are included, and meanwhile the funds 
with passive trading strategies, such as the ETFs, and index-tracing funds are excluded. The sample 
period is from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2011. The “.OF” in quotation codes stands for 
“open-end fund”. 
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Table	6‐2	
NA‐based	Performance	Measures	(Unconditional)	
Quotation 
Codes 
tJ  p-value 
Quotation 
Codes 
tJ  p-value 
160106.OF 0.0011 0.9009 161706.OF 0.0017 0.8231 
160211.OF 0.0032 0.6359 161810.OF 0.0016 0.8127 
160314.OF 0.0037 0.5496 161903.OF 0.0001 0.9906 
160505.OF 0.0033 0.6160 162006.OF 0.0034 0.6140 
161607.OF 0.0012 0.8806 162605.OF 0.0009 0.9141 
161610.OF 0.0024 0.7434 162703.OF 0.0022 0.7762 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table presents results from the unconditional no arbitrage estimation of performance 
measures.  represents average weekly excess performance over the portfolio of basis assets for 
the passive strategy. The p-value represent a chi-squared test of the hypothesis . The 
basis assets in this sample consist of 23 industry sorted portfolios plus the risk-free rate. 
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Table	6‐3	
NA‐based	Performance	Measures	(Conditional)	
Quotation 
Codes 
tJ  p-value 
Quotation 
Codes 
tJ  p-value 
160106.OF -0.0336 0.0077 161706.OF -0.0322 0.0086 
160211.OF -0.0309 0.0076 161810.OF -0.0322 0.0087 
160314.OF -0.0305 0.0051 161903.OF -0.0336 0.0077 
160505.OF -0.0319 0.0087 162006.OF -0.0301 0.0051 
161607.OF -0.0338 0.0072 162605.OF -0.0337 0.0076 
161610.OF -0.0308 0.0060 162703.OF -0.0329 0.0084 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes. This table presents results from the conditional no arbitrage estimation of performance 
measures.  represents average weekly excess performance over the portfolio of basis assets for 
the active strategies. The p-value represent a chi-squared test of the hypothesis . The 
basis assets in this sample consist of 23 industry sorted portfolios plus the risk-free rate, augmented by 
managed portfolios based on the instrumental variables .  
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7. Implication,	Limitations	and	Future	Work	
7.1. Introduction	
In this Chapter I summarize my main findings and discuss their implications for asset 
pricing. I start, in the next Section, by reviewing the main findings and the important 
analytical results. Section 7.3 discusses their implications. In Section 7.4, I then 
outline the main limitation of this study, I suggest possible extensions and I highlight 
opportunities for future research. The final Section presents some final remarks and 
draws together the main conclusions. 
 
7.2. The	Main	Findings	Restated	
My thesis contributes to depict a representation of the multivariate distribution of 
stock returns where the relations between moments and their dynamics are important 
in explaining their cross-sectional differences. More innovatively, we explore whether 
the SDF implied by the 3 and 4-moment CAPM is plausible under restrictions that are 
weaker than those considered by Dittmar (2002) yet sufficient to rule out implausible 
curvature of the representative investor’s utility functions. We find that, even under 
these weaker restrictions, the 3 and 4-moment CAPM cannot solve well known 
puzzles which plague the empirical performance of extant rational asset pricing 
models, even though the higher order terms do generate considerable additional 
explanatory power. In chapter 3, our findings confirm that the quadratic and cubic 
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market factors help explain observed stock returns. They play an important role in the 
pricing of certain payoffs, including strategies characterized by relatively high SRs, 
such as those spanned by a fine industry-level diversification, most notably until the 
late 90s, or by dynamic portfolios managed on the basis of available conditioning 
information, as well as momentum portfolios. They do so, however, by generating 
high levels of SDF volatility. To rationalize this evidence within a higher moment 
CAPM framework, we would need to postulate implausibly high levels of investors’ 
risk aversion. We conclude, therefore, that the 3M and 4M-CAPM provide at best a 
partial explanation of the differences in average returns on stocks and stock strategies. 
This gives rise to a coskewness (and cokurtosis) puzzle. The solution of the latter 
requires an explanation, different from the 3M and 4M-CAPM, for why the quadratic 
and cubic market factors are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. 
 
Faced with this difficulty, we then explore whether the failure to fully account for 
cross-sectional differences in average returns can be explained by the presence of 
either transaction costs or a behavioural component of the SDF, reflecting investors’ 
systematic mistakes in processing information. In chapter 4, we show that augmenting 
the (C)CAPM with sentiment, and thus allowing for systematic investor error in 
forming beliefs about the distribution of returns, permits to largely reconcile investors’ 
optimizing behaviour with the cross-section of average returns. In fact, The 
Sentiment-(C)CAPM and Sentiment-3M(C)CAPM are empirically more successful, 
and most of the increase in the explanatory power is due to the inclusion of sentiment. 
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This implies that investors must either commit systematic errors, at least ex-post, in 
assessing the joint distribution of stock returns and aggregate consumption or they 
must behave in a way that, at the aggregate level, is inconsistent with expected utility 
maximization and with standard risk aversion assumptions. 
 
In chapter 5, we compare several competing pricing kernels using a modified version 
of Hansen-Jagannathan distance (Hansen & Jagannathan, 1997), which not only 
accounts for the conditional information but also recognizes the existence of 
transaction costs. We follow the approach of He and Modest (1995) and Luttmer 
(1996), who show how the Hansen-Jagannathan volatility bounds can be derived for 
economies with the kinked budget constraints that arise from proportional transaction 
costs. Since these bounds do not depend on a particular model for the stochastic 
discount factor, but only on the form of the budget constraint, this provides a robust 
way to quantify the extent to which market frictions affect inferences about important 
features of asset pricing models. In fact, if the market is frictionless (i.e., there are no 
transaction costs), the volatility of the admissible nonparametric pricing kernels is so 
high that even the candidate kernels with nonlinear terms cannot match it, however, a 
number of the estimated pricing kernels reach the minimum volatility requirement 
when transaction costs are assumed to be 0.8 percent per quarter. 
 
In chapter 6, we follow the approach of Chen and Knez (1996) to analyse the 
open-ended fund performance in the Chinese market. In a similar spirit to Dahlquist 
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and Söderlind (1999), we examine the validity of the hypothesis that the open-ended 
fund managers in the Chinese market process information more efficiently than 
individual investors do, so as to generate significantly superior returns, and also try to 
observe whether their performance can be replicated by employing some simple 
strategies that make use of publicly available information. Our results show that the 
fund managers’ performance is significantly negative and is outperformed even by a 
naive buy-and-hold trading strategy. While these findings supports the view that the 
stock market is efficient, they beg the question why there has been such a rapid 
expansion of the open-fund industry in spite of such a poor performance of the mutual 
funds.  
 
7.3. Implications	
The main implications of our results are in the field of asset pricing. The candidate 
pricing kernel specification in (3.1), estimated using the 30 Fama and French US 
Industry portfolios and the CRSP index as a proxy for the market portfolio, implies a 
‘coskewness puzzle’. The puzzle arises because, while the ,i tb  parameter estimates 
fit the cross section of industry returns relatively well, they imply risk seeking over 
gains and thus a non-concave utility function. Given the shape of the utility function 
implied by these estimates, the market portfolio is not necessarily efficient for the 
representative investor. In turn, if the market portfolio is inefficient, the 3M-CAPM 
and 4M-CAPM do not hold. 
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Pending the investigation into the theoretical explanation of these findings, the 
interesting question is then whether we should price assets based on expected returns 
that reflect a coskewness premium and, in particular, the large coskewness premium 
implied by the unrestricted quadratic SDF specification. It is clear that, as long as we 
do not have an equilibrium asset pricing model that can account for this large 
coskewness premium, we cannot strictly consider coskewness a risk measure. 
However, since 2,tb  and 3,tb  are the factor loadings of a multifactor model that 
explains the cross-section of industry returns relatively well, we might draw pricing 
implications for other assets based on no-arbitrage arguments.  
 
Alternatively, in performance attribution, we may follow the approach of Chen and 
Knez (1996) adopted in Chapter 6, based on constructing a non parametric kernel 
from a set of traded asset payoffs.  
 
7.4. Limitations	of	the	Analysis	and	Future	Work	 	
 
Predictability and time varying risk premia likely reflects a premium for holding 
macroeconomic risk associated with the business cycle, for holding assets that do 
poorly in times of high volatility and financial distress and for holding assets that do 
poorly when the market portfolio is negatively skewed. Therefore, they seem to be 
closely related to the issue of asymmetry and thick tails in the multivariate return 
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distribution and hence to asset coskewness. The exploration of the link between 
aggregate idiosyncratic risk, higher moments and asymmetries of the multivariate 
distribution of asset returns opens fascinating yet challenging possibilities for future 
research. For example, further research might suitably expand the set of conditioning 
variables to better model variation in the utility function parameters and might use a 
more meaningful proxy for the market portfolio of all risky assets. This, beside 
improving the fit of the model, might lead to a 3M-(C)CAPM specification with 
parameter estimates that do not violate RA and NIARA. I leave these developments, 
however, for future research.  
 
Turning to the ‘coskewness puzzle’, its solution requires a theory that predicts a 
stochastic discount factor quadratic in the market return without implying that the 
market portfolio is efficient. We might appeal to Harrison and Krepp’s (1979) 
theorem to motivate the stochastic discount factor representation of the asset pricing 
problem without requiring that the market portfolio maximizes investors’ expected 
utility. Recall that this theorem states that, given free portfolio formation and under 
the law of one price, there exists an 1tm   such that, for every payoff 1tx  , 
1 1( )t t t tp E m x  . This approach, however, rises the problem of motivating why (2.74) 
specifies 1tm   as a function of the market excess return and its square. Alternatively, 
we might specify individual utility functions that exhibit DIARA and then determine 
equilibrium prices without imposing restrictive assumptions such as investors’ 
homogeneity and market completeness or the equivalent representative investor 
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assumption. The interesting question then becomes why the market return and its 
square should be good proxies for aggregate marginal utility growth even though the 
market portfolio is not necessarily efficient for the representative investor. I leave the 
investigation of these issues for further research. 
 
7.5. Final	Comments	and	Conclusion	
 
This Chapter reviewed and summarized the main findings reported by this thesis and 
their implications for theoretical asset pricing. The unifying theme of this thesis is 
about asset pricing from a cross-sectional perspective. In the cross-section of average 
returns, assets with negative coskewness, and therefore with exposure to volatility risk, 
command a risk premium on top of the reward for market risk. This relation, as shown 
in Chapter 3, is empirically strong and bears puzzling implications for the shape of the 
stochastic discount factor, and thus for the possibility that prices are set by a 
representative investor. A deeper understanding of the relation between ‘good deal’ 
opportunities and the volatility of the SDFs contributes to the formulation of a richer 
investment advice and more meaningful fund evaluation system. From this 
perspective, Chapter 4 and 5 have explored whether the failure to fully account for 
cross-sectional differences in average returns can be explained by the presence of 
either transaction costs or a behavioural component of the SDF, reflecting investors’ 
systematic mistakes in processing information. We find evidence of both problems, 
though our analysis is not conclusive in this respect. Finally, in a more applied 
exercise, we employ the SDF-framework to test whether Chinese fund managers 
generate superior investment performance, and find that Chinese fund managers 
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generate significantly negative performance under both the unconditional and the 
conditional measure.  
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8. Appendix	
8.1. Appendix	A：Higher	Co‐moments	in	IMRS	
Consider the local variation in a marginal utility function defined over wealth tW , 
( )tU U W  , given by a third order Taylor’s expansion: 
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It is easy to have the following restrictions on the parameters of the candidate SDF by 
identification of (A-3): 
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Then the admissible SDF should be rewritten as  
186 
 
 
 
4
1 , , 1
1
( ) ( )it t t i t t m t
i
E m a b E r 

  .  	 (A‐5)	
In (A-4), )(iU  denotes the i-th derivative of the utility function )( ,tmWU . Arrow 
(1971) argues that desirable properties of this function are non satiation (NS), risk 
aversion (RA) and non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA). NS implies 
0U , RA implies decreasing MU, i.e. 0U , whereas NIARA implies that the 
rate of decrease of MU does not increase in wealth and thus 0U . Hence, NIARA 
implies aversion to negative skewness of the distribution of the return on wealth. 
Kimball (1993) adds non-increasing absolute prudence (NIAP) to the set of desirable 
properties of a ‘well behaved’ utility function. Under NIARA, NIAP implies '''' 0U   
and thus aversion to kurtosis. Together, NS, RA, NIARA and NIAP yield standard 
risk aversion, as defined by Kimball (1993). Preferences of rational expected utility 
maximizers will necessarily display the first of these properties, namely NS. This 
implies a no-arbitrage (NA) positivity restriction on the sign of the admissible SDFs, 
and hence 1 0tm   , to avoid assigning a zero or negative price to strictly positive 
payoffs and thus to rule out unexploited arbitrage opportunities. NIAP, NIARA and 
RA rule out counter-intuitive behaviour and can be used to further restrict 1tm  , but 
they are not necessary conditions for the CAPM. When 0U , and thus under NS, 
NIAP implies 03 b . Under NS, a necessary condition for 0U , and thus for 
NIARA, is b2 ≥ 0. Finally, a necessary condition for 0U , and thus for RA, is 
1 0b  . The latter condition guarantees local risk aversion, a milder requirement than 
concave utility (i.e., global risk aversion).  
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Since utility functions are equivalent up to a linear transformation, we might let 
( ) 0tU W   and ( ) 1tU W  . This standardization is often very useful when working 
with utility functions in that it simplifies their manipulation. From (A-2), the third 
order Taylor expansion of this standardized marginal utility function around an initial 
level of wealth 1tW  is therefore: 
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According to the above discussion, we can easily find 1 0  , 2 0  , and 3 0  . 
 
8.2. Appendix	B:	The	Pratt‐Arrow	Risk	Premium	
In this Appendix, I provide a derivation of the equilibrium relation between expected 
variance and expected return. Define the simple gamble (an actuarially neutral 
gamble) as follows: 
 2~ (0, )zZ  .  	 (B‐1)	
with: 
 
2 2
:   the random variable
(0, ) :  a probability distribution with zero mean and  variance.z z
Z
  .  	 	
I then assume that investors’ utility is a function of wealth W  only: 
 ( )U U W .  	 (B‐2)	
Now we can define the condition for the investor to accept the gamble according to 
the following equation: 
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[ ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
[ ( )]
E U W Z U W E Z Z
U W Z


   
  .  	 (B‐3)	
In equation (B-3) the expression ( )Z  represents the risk premium that makes the 
investor indifferent between accepting the actuarially neutral gamble Z  and not 
accepting. It is assumed to be a function solely of wealth and of the gamble itself. 
Now, writing out the Taylor expansion of the left-hand side and right-hand side of 
equation (B-3): 
 
21
2
21
2
[ ( )] [ ( ) ]
[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )
W W
W W
E U W Z E U W U Z U Z
U W Z U W U Z U Z  
     
     


.  	 (B‐4)	
Here, the terms WU   and WU   are the first and second total derivatives of the utility 
function. Now, since [ ( )] ( )E U W U W  and [ ] 0E Z  , equating and simplifying 
(B-4) we get: 
 2 21 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2W W W
U E Z U Z U Z      .  	 (B‐5)	
If we further assume the term 
2 ( )
2
WU Z  to be negligible, we can solve for  , 
the risk premium: 
 2 2
1( ) ( )
2 2
W W
Z
W W
U UZ E Z
U U
       .  	 (B‐12)	
The above expression W
W
U
U
   is analogous to the Pratt-Arrow absolute 
risk-aversion (ARA) coefficient. Therefore, using equation (B-12) we can write: 
 21
2 Z
ARA  .  	 (B‐7)	
Denoting by Zr W  the return on the gamble given the risk premium, we can 
write: 
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 2 2 2 2 2( ) { [ ( )] } ( )Z E Z E W r E r W var r     .  	 (B‐8)	
Therefore, using (B-8) in (B-7) we can write: 
 21 ( )
2
W var r ARA  .  	 (B‐9)	
Then, 
 1 1( )( * ) ( )
2 2
r var r W ARA var r RRA
W
    , 	 (B‐16)	
where: 
 * W
W
URRA ARA W W
U
    . 	 (B‐11)	
Here, the quantity 
W
  denotes negative expected return that the investor is willing to 
accept to remove the risk of an otherwise actuarially neutral gamble. The coefficient 
RRA in equation (B-11) denotes relative risk aversion. As long as the ‘local shape’ of 
the utility function does not change, it should be constant against changes in wealth. 
Equation (B-11) displays a linear relation between risk and expected excess-return 
that is valid only locally since the relation has been derived on the basis of a second 
order Taylor expansion of a potentially non-linear equation.  
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